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Plant Figurations: A Vital Study in Rhetorical Address 
following Theodor W. Adorno 
Theodore Neal Albiniak, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
Supervisor:  Joshua Gunn 
In this dissertation, I ask the question: how is (and is not) the plant both subject 
and object of human rhetoric? In taking up the question, I explore an array of texts, 
artifacts, and encounters revealing “the plant” addressed as a vital object of subjective 
experience and as a subject of objective reflection. Following what Diane Davis and 
Michelle Ballif call “extrahuman rhetorical relations,” I demonstrate an orientation of 
struggle that holds the question open at its limit, by approaching iterations of “the plant” 
caught in motion. I apply a method drawn from Frankfurt School scholar Theodor W. 
Adorno’s invitation to apply negative dialectics—or immanent criticism—to everyday 
sites of personal encounter and interdisciplinary texts. I understand the dialectic features 
of human-plant relations in three chapters or figures studies. First, I examine the concept 
of “natural history” revealed in a site-specific experience at Red Rock State Park in 
California. Second, I look at the historic and contemporary texts that name a parasitic 
liana known as the Sipo-Matador. Third, I hear the sounding of European trees emanating 
through a vinyl copy of the 2012 art-album Years by Bartholomäus Traubeck. 
Approaching these figures in affirmative and negative modes, I argue that keeping the 
dialectic in motion instantiates a critical process—a reflection on reflective capacity—
across multiple renderings of representation and structure. Writing and reading is an 
 viii 
essential part of this process. In understanding thinking as a movement of mediation—a 
dramatic journey joining the dialectic across theoretical abstraction and lived reality—I 
reveal a multidimensional orientation to rhetorical criticism suited to hear the plant, 
addressed. My approach, I argue, keeps Adorno and the plant—both subjects and objects 
of this dissertation—close enough to touch while at bay enough to remain mysterious. I 
trace a malignant structure surrounding my encounter between the human and the plant—
the Enlightenment in its dominating iterations—in relief as much as I hope to leave open 
creative reflection and vital critique. 
 ix 
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE ........1	
I. Introduction and Definitions .................................................................................7	
Bundling the Approach: Defining Rhetoric as Orientation ............................7	
Defining the Need: Enlightenment Orientation and Domination .................10	
II. Literature Review ..............................................................................................21	
Turning Toward Subject ...............................................................................23	
Turning Toward the Object ...........................................................................36	
Turning Toward a Center: New Materialism ................................................47	
Preview of Figure Studies (Chapters) ...........................................................54	
CHAPTER TWO: METHOD .............................................................................58	
I. A Contemporary Story of Rhetoric ....................................................................61	
Brief History of Rhetorical Method ..............................................................61	
Ideological Criticism .....................................................................................64	
II. The Persistence of the Dialectic ........................................................................68	
Applied dialectics ..........................................................................................69	
Ancient Origins .............................................................................................74	
Kant’s Critique ..............................................................................................76	
Hegel’s Influence ..........................................................................................77	
Marx’s Revision ............................................................................................81	
Adorno on the Dialectic ................................................................................85	
III. Immanent Criticism: Steps in Constellations in Orientation ...........................93	
Techniques ....................................................................................................97	
(A) Pairing of contradicting terms .......................................................97	
(B) Dialectic examination in an object or artifact ................................99	
(C) Primacy of Object ........................................................................102	
 x 
 
IV. Figural Plants: An Immanent Critique ...........................................................106	
CHAPTER THREE: FIGURING NATURAL HISTORY .............................111	
I. Natural History, Introducing an Idea ................................................................113	
II. Red Rock Canyon State Park ..........................................................................119	
III. Natural History, A Dialectic ..........................................................................132	
Nature grasped as historical ........................................................................133	
History grasped as natural ...........................................................................136	
IV. Natural History, A Constellation ...................................................................141	
V. Happy Trails ....................................................................................................150	
CHAPTER FOUR: FIGURING THE SIPO-MATADOR ..............................151	
I. Strangler Fig .....................................................................................................151	
II. Introduction .....................................................................................................151	
III. The Sipo Matador, by any other name ...........................................................155	
IV. Colonial Figurations ......................................................................................160	
V. Figuring Nietzsche ..........................................................................................172	
VI. Conclusion .....................................................................................................187	
CHAPTER FIVE: FIGURING YEARS, A VINYL ALBUM REVIEW ........191	
I. The Tree’s Song ................................................................................................191	
II. Introduction .....................................................................................................191	
III. Sound Studies.................................................................................................195	
IV. Adorno and Sound .........................................................................................207	
V. Years, Up Close ..............................................................................................213	
The Return of Trees: Or the Persistence of Natural History .......................215	
Eternal Return of the Object .......................................................................222	
 xi 
VI. Grammar ........................................................................................................226	
VII. Structure .......................................................................................................231	
The Pains of Digital Hearths .......................................................................236	
VIII. Floating .......................................................................................................240	
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION .....................................................................244	
I. Plant Communication Models ..........................................................................246	
II. Reconsidering Grossberg ................................................................................254	
1. Dialectic Motion .....................................................................................269	
2. Language as Mechanism .........................................................................269	
3. Rhetoric as Address ................................................................................270	
4. Rhetorical Criticism as Orientation ........................................................270	
5. An Ethics of Living and Dying ...............................................................271	
6. Multidimensional Weathering ................................................................271	
III. Journey through the Secret Life of Plants, an Album Review ......................271	
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................279	
  
 1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF 
LITERATURE 
 
 
During the summer of 2014, Peter Coffin, a New York City based installation 
artist, designed a series of exhibits intending to reveal a deeply complex relationship 
between human and botanical worlds. Coffin’s aesthetic experience, which he simply 
titled, Living, played with various media and scale to bring examples of human culture 
into contact with nature.  Built in the rooms of New York City’s Red Bull Studios, an 
exhibition, lecture, recording and performance space in Chelsea, Coffin’s project keenly 
featured audience interaction and interpretation.1  In one exhibit, Coffin invited viewers 
to meditate on exotic anachronism by placing a bumper-sticker clad automobile, similar 
to the DeLorean DMC-12 from the popular time-traveling film series Back to the Future, 
next to a common houseplant. By drawing attention to collisions between the mechanical 
and the natural, Coffin initiated a provocative set of questions: What makes the markings 
on the surface of a leaf different from the bumper stickers on the exterior of a vehicle 
nostalgic in its futurity? How does a sense of time vary based on whether one considers 
the standpoint of an automobile or a fern? If there is a line to be drawn between culture 
and nature, how might it be described? In subtly posing these unanswerable questions, 
                                                
1 Mary Margaret Rinebold, “The Life of the Object and the Approach of the Viewer with Peter 
 2 
Coffin exposed an intimate and textured relationship between a viewing audience and 
various objects of life.2   
In another exhibit in Living, Coffin constructed a small greenhouse that also 
doubled as a recording studio in the gallery’s basement. In this exhibit, Coffin composed 
music for an inconspicuous group of audience members: the plants for whom the 
basement-greenhouse was home. While the ears of human gallery-goers could certainly 
appreciate the sounds, the artists’ collection of tracks was not designed exclusively for 
human consumption.3 As part of a decade long endeavor, Coffin (and other musicians 
including Yoko Ono, Animal Collective, Ariel Pink, and Sonic Youth) assumed plants as 
their primary audience of address. While implicit, Coffin asks human-audience members 
to approach Music for Plants not from a sense of personal enjoyment but rather in an 
imaginative mode of curiosity, hopefully leading to appreciating sounds that might 
motivate vegetal pleasure.  Subtly, Coffin challenges us to navigate the difference 
between a traditional assumption of plants as static objects and an emergent 
understanding of plants as fellow audience members of art.4    
As Coffin’s large scale 2014 exhibit suggests, much remains to be explored with 
the provocative suggestions about the constitution of vegetal life and its relationship to 
                                                
2 Rinebold, “The Life of the Object,” http://www.redbullstudios.com/newyork/articles/the-life-
of-the-object-and-the-approach-of-the-viewer-with-peter-coffin-2.  
3 Jeremy Gordon, “Sonic Youth, Ariel Pink, Animal Collective Members, Jim O’Rourke, Yoko 
Ono, More Make Music for Plants,” Pitchfork (blog), August 22, 2014, 
http://pitchfork.com/news/56429-sonic-youth-ariel-pink-animal-collective-members-jim-orourke-
yoko-ono-more-make-music-for-plants/.  
4 Claire Healy, “The Secret History of Music for Plants” Dazed Digital (blog), August 16, 2014, 
http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/21280/1/the-secret-history-of-music-for-
plants.  
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human experience of art and everyday life. For me, Living offers a sensorial invitation to 
open a curious investigative journey that asks after the ways the plant is both similar and 
different from the human. In asking the large question—what is the relationship between 
the human and the plant?—other questions also emerge. If such a relationship exists, how 
can it be understood? Does such a relationship have a history? Are some means more or 
less appropriate in ascertaining this connection? What constraints or limitations exist in 
seeking to place this relationship in relief?  What implications present themselves in the 
answers, especially for the field of rhetoric, which I argue is well suited to explore some 
of the possibilities that present themselves in the question’s address?  
In asking these questions and taking seriously the challenge to answer them, I 
argue, that we must begin to understand the plant as a vital object of subjective 
experience and as a subject of objective reflection. In situating the relationship between 
humans and plants as a struggle between what counts as subject and object of rhetorical 
inquiry, I explore what Diane Davis and Michelle Ballif call “extrahuman rhetorical 
relations.”5 Defined simply, extrahuman rhetorical relations refers to a study of “the 
scene of responsive engagement with or among nonhuman others.”6 While the remaining 
pages will be devoted to explicating the exciting opportunities and challenges of the 
“extrahuman turn,” I argue in favor of considering an inquiry into the sites and situations 
in which human-plant relations are constituted and revealed as a unique contribution to a 
growing interest in the relationship between the theoretical humanities and the natural 
                                                
5 Diane Davis and Michelle Ballif, ”Introduction: Pushing the Limits of the Anthropos,” in 
Philosophy & Rhetoric 47, no. 4 (2014): 346-353. 
6 Davis and Ballif, “Pushing the Limits,” 348. 
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(especially vegetal) worlds. I also hope to consider an unanswerable, but nevertheless 
vital, question about the proper rhetorical and ethical response to categories of otherness 
and difference with the example of the plant.  
I look at a broad set of artifacts that reveal the extrahuman relationship between 
humans and plants: state parks, nineteenth century travel logs, texts in Western 
philosophy, contemporary understandings of plant life drawn from biology, and various 
pieces of art (including poetry, sound, and science fiction). To this end I am interested in 
how they present a unique figuration of the plant. I mean figure here in multiple ways. 
First, I am appealing to a figure as a process of rhetoric in which, through techniques of 
representation, meaning is both enhanced and altered from traditional expectations.7 In 
this instance, a figure, similar to a trope, invests an active sense of play to alter the 
perception or reception of meaning.8 Personification, or the rendering of human traits 
onto nonhuman objects, is one mode in which the extrahuman is figured. I also use figure 
as a verb, to reference an act that offers significance through the tracing of contours and 
textures. Marc Jensen offers a helpful example in considering how the Venus flytrap is 
personified in the popular film Little Shop of Horrors by addressing the techniques of 
figuration and representations of race in Western culture.9 Assessing figuration offers an 
                                                
7 Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2012), 178. 
8 Raphael Lyne, Shakespeare, Rhetoric and Cognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 29. 
9 Marc Jensen, “‘Feed Me!’: Power Struggles and the Portrayal of Race in Little Shop of 
Horrors,” Cinema Journal 48, no. 1 (2008): 51–67. 
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opportunity to reflect on specific instructions offered by an artifact on how to define and 
approach categories of otherness or alterity.10  
I also use “figure” in another sense: to appeal to a more ambivalent scene of 
rhetoric articulated by Davis. Because plants do not speak the language of humans, every 
attempt to establish a communicative relationship is already mediated by language and 
structural limitations. External systems of circulation (economic and cultural) precede—
(pre-)figure—any encounter between the human and the plant.11 Thus, a figure reveals a 
constrained presence, or following Davis, a shared “commonality oblivious to borders 
that precedes and exceeds symbolic identification,” nonetheless mediated by artifacts and 
interests of representation.12 
Thinking through this and related paradoxes is what philosopher and cultural 
critic Theodor W. Adorno calls immanent criticism. Adorno scholar Brian Wall describes 
immanent criticism succinctly as “seeking to remain within the terms of a particular film 
or text and fastening on the contradictions inherent there so that those contradictions 
                                                
10 Stacy Aliamo understands this as a theoretical site of work, where various fields of 
understanding come together in one cultural body or icon. See, Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures: 
Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Indiana University Press, 2010). 19. Emmanuel 
Levinas describes alterity, broadly speaking, as an external presence, while unrecognizable, 
nonetheless calls my presence into question and being. Navigating such an encounter, paradoxical 
as its description suggests, is the fulcrum of what Levinas described as ethical relations. See also, 
Emmanuel Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael B. Smith (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), 43. 
11 For use in green film studies, see, for example: Sean Cubitt, EcoMedia (New York: Rodopi, 
2005); Adrian J. Ivakhiv, Ecologies of the Moving Image: Cinema, Affect, Nature (Ontario, 
Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2013); Robin L. Murray and Joseph K. Heumann, 
Ecology and Popular Film: Cinema on the Edge (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2009). 
12 Diane Davis, Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations, (University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 2.  
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might speak to the material conditions in which a film was made.”13 Following Adorno, I 
argue that the material conditions of concern do not exist solely at the level of production. 
They are also revealed in the composition of an artifact’s concepts, in elements activated 
in an audience, and in ongoing contributions exceeding intention. In other words, I 
understand “figure” to be the product or tracing of both possibility and impossibility; a 
form exposed and fashioned by the movement of rhetorical labor in design, structure, and 
reception. 
In considering the figure in paradox, I am attentive to Adorno’s understanding of 
a relationship among an artifact’s production, formal composition, and content. As 
envisioned by Adorno, modes of immanent criticism examine relationships in numerous 
layers—what Frederic Jameson calls horizons—including the economic and political 
context of an artifact’s production; the reviews of audiences and critics; and its origin in 
broader cultural and theoretical terms.14 I will explain Adorno’s immanent criticism more 
fully in chapter two, placing it in relation to the history of rhetorical methods and honing 
in on ideological criticism before providing further detail on the steps I used to assess the 
disparate genre of artifacts and texts that vitalize my inquiry. Before I do, I would like to 
situate my question in contemporary conversation. 
In the first section of this introduction, I articulate my definition of rhetoric drawn 
from Kenneth Burke and establish the significance of my question by introducing 
                                                
13 Brian Wall, Theodor Adorno and Film Theory: The Fingerprint of the Spirit (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 3. 
14 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act ( Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1981), 76. For his work on Adorno, see: Fredric Jameson, Late 
Marxism: Adorno, Or, the Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 1990). 
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Adorno’s work. In the second section, the review of literature, I situate my question in 
relation to contemporary philosophical and rhetorical conversations. Like Adorno, I 
designed the form of the literature review to match the content; I develop a conversation 
dialectically, by examining two approaches (and a third meeting point) in a contemporary 
line of inquiry known as posthumanism. Specifically, I examine strands of scholarship 
chipping away at the centrality of the human subject in their exploration of various 
deviations from categorical expectations. Then, I examine the contemporary speculative 
turn in rhetoric, specifically object-oriented ontology, especially in scholars’ attempts to 
theorize the object as “withdrawn” or unknowable. I complete the second section by 
examining the affirmative qualities of new materialism as a stasis point between 
posthumanism and object-oriented ontology.   
I. Introduction and Definitions 
The overarching question of my study could be reconsidered as: How are the 
human and nonhuman figured rhetorically? Since my question lends itself to a number of 
theoretical entrance points, I would like to begin by operationalizing a definition of 
rhetoric. I turn to rhetorician Kenneth Burke for assistance. Second, by way of 
introduction, I turn to an important and popular text of Adorno to articulate an association 
between his scholarship and the natural world.  In so doing, I articulate Adorno’s theory 
of domination as a way of establishing significance for my question.  
BUNDLING THE APPROACH: DEFINING RHETORIC AS ORIENTATION  
To begin, I’d like to bundle or bring together a set of terms to help establish what 
 8 
I mean by rhetoric. Kenneth Burke described the critical act of bundling terms as an 
orientation.15 This is to say, attempting to understand ones’ position in relation to another 
requires working through a sense of where one is (materiality), how one got there 
(history), and where one might be going (fantasy).16 Understanding each sphere of 
sensation (and their relation to other spheres) requires an appreciation of symbols-in-use. 
Said differently, understanding our spheres of sensation requires a speculative but 
nonetheless substantive interplay of words and ideas to recount our memories, understand 
contemporary experience, and name things (physical and ephemeral) before us.17 
Orientation appeals to a living architecture: experiences are named through words, words 
string together to create concepts, concepts interact with each other to construct forms, 
forms organize to create ensembles, ensembles play together to establish ecologies, and 
ecologies in action comprise the sensed and meaningful universe. Understanding an 
orientation requires the use of a concept of scale to trace or induce a developmental 
process, from the smallest unit to a (perhaps even the) cosmic schema.  
But, we could also approach an orientation in the opposite way, that is, from how 
we deduce the components of the term “orientation” itself. Language names vitality or 
the process of organic habitation, and rhetoric is the study of various functions of 
                                                
15 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, Third Edition, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 14. 
16 Adrian J. Ivakhiv, “The Anthrobiogeomorphic Machine: Stalking the Zone of Cinema,” Film-
Philosophy 15, no. 1 (March 8, 2011): 118–39. 
17 I am liberally paraphrasing here from Burke’s writing about symbolic interplay between 
particular and universal experience. See Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968), 149-52.  
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language.18 I mean function here in at least three senses. In the first sense, language takes 
on a technical mode of composition and decomposition. Burke draws attention to three 
expressions: (1) as in the act of defining, symbol-use assembles or divides parts and 
processes into clear and discerning roles; (2) in arrangement in art or literature, devices or 
figures reveal complex associations of mode and tone; (3) in noticing repeated patterns 
over time, location, and genre, forms become noticeable and articulated. In a second 
sense, the function of language is selective. Burke noted that, like a photograph, language 
composes the world, and thus “directs the attention” of an audience to various details. 19 
In so doing, language also functions like a scope: its aperture and filter dictate 
composition artificially.  Finally, like an “alchemic moment,” the function of language is 
transformative.  Language can “magically” convert various organic substances and into 
designs or refashion previous style and experiences in entirely new ways.20 Likewise, 
language can dissolve previous calcifications, loosely distributing the particles elsewhere.  
In its broadest sense, then, the study of rhetoric appeals to an investigation into 
                                                
18 I am paraphrasing here from Burke’s definition in A Rhetoric of Motives. He defines rhetoric 
as, “rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is 
continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in 
beings that by nature respond to symbols.” I prefer this because it already opens up the category 
to non-human speculation. See: Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969), 43.  
19Again paraphrasing Burke’s definition of terministic screens as Kenneth Burke, Language As 
Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1968). 
20 Here, I am referring to what Burke calls a “contextual paradox,” which I theorize is not that far 
away from Adorno’s sense of dialectics drawn from the Greek term hypostasis. Burke noted that 
the process of definition involves the irresolvable struggle between creating boundaries around 
that which contains no boundaries; a Sisyphean struggle to offer clarity to that which by its 
nature, is ambiguous. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1969), 21-4. 
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the various pairings of inductive and deductive approaches to understanding language-as-
life and life-as-language in respect to an “orientation.”21 In my specific study, I propose 
an orientation drawn from the work of Adorno that could help us understand a specific 
rhetorical encounter between two entities of biological language: humans and plants. In 
so doing, I hope to offer a sense of the orientation I seek to transform and the various 
ambiguities limiting such an endeavor.22   
Borrowing another phrase from Burke, I’d like to proceed by articulating the 
“general schema of meanings” and accompanying motives I seek to transform through 
critical analysis.23  I turn to Adorno’s co-authored monograph, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, as a theoretical touchstone to quickly concretize his dense writing and to 
help name the orientation that needs to be challenged by means of critical force.  
DEFINING THE NEED: ENLIGHTENMENT ORIENTATION AND DOMINATION 
In his work with Max Horkheimer, Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment offers a 
perhaps shocking characterization of the what is considered wisdom from the Age of 
                                                
21 Following Stefan Helmreich, Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that linguistic meaning defines life 
in various forms; see Stefan Helmreich, “What Was Life? Answers from Three Limit Biologies,” 
Critical Inquiry 37, no. 4 (June 1, 2011): 671–96; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1973). 
22Burke describes all transformation as a process of dialectics. While in “a restricted sense,” 
dialectic appeals to the master trope of irony, in an expansive sense, “a dialectic aims to give us a 
representation by the use of mutually related or interacting perspectives…” See, Kenneth Burke, 
“Four Master Tropes,” Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 
503. 
23 Burke, Permanence and Change, 31, 169. I am also deeply indebted to Abram Anders for his 
careful reading of Burke and Gilles Deleuze. See: Adam Anders, “Pragmatisms by Incongruity: 
‘Equipment from Kenneth Burke to Gilles Deleuze,” KB Journal: The Journal of the Kenneth 
Burke Society 7, no. 2 (2011): http://kbjournal.org/anders.  
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Reason: it perfects practices of domination.24 In some traditional understandings, the 
Enlightenment is considered a preeminent intellectual and cultural movement in Western 
history.25 Providing a stark break with the authority of monotheistic religious 
organization and non-democratic government structures, Enlightenment thinkers are long 
heralded as trailblazers of cultivated reason, individualism, skeptical inquiry, and 
scientific innovation. As such, any association between the Enlightenment and 
domination, before Adorno and Horkheimer, seemed counter intuitive. In the Frankfurt 
scholars’ rendering, however, the emphasis on freedom and liberty in the historical era 
between the 17th and 18th centuries is more complicated, especially when examining the 
treatment of the figure of nature in the writings of its primary philosophers. Following 
contemporary Adorno scholar Deborah Cook’s interpretation of The Dialectic, the 
premise of Enlightenment freedom is bound to a more covert repression: humans achieve 
independence by “compulsively [forcing] natural objects into an explanatory schema in 
order to dominate them.”26 With the understanding of rhetoric as orientation in mind, I 
consider the implications of Adorno and Horkheimer’s suggestion that the contemporary 
situation is defined not by the experience of individual autonomy, but premised on the 
subjugation of the natural world.27 Since their intervention is complex by design, I want 
to use the following section to bundle together ways of understanding Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s central thesis: While the promise of the Enlightenment aimed at ushering 
                                                
24 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1989), 39, 4.  
25 Jonathan I. Israel, Enlightenment Contested (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3-15.  
26 Deborah Cook, Adorno on Nature (Durham: Acumen,  2011), 5.  
27 Horkheimer and Adorno, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” 39.  
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in a space of freedom, it also carried with it (and continues to influence) an orientation of 
domination.  
 The Age of Enlightenment is often theorized as a central transformative moment 
in Western philosophy, socio-political organization, and rhetoric.28 Drawing from new 
scientific discoveries, particularly Galileo Galilei’s astronomical and mathematical 
insight and Sir Isaac Newton’s explication of calculus, astronomy, and physics, 
Enlightenment scholars sought to articulate aspects of life in a single, unifying register of 
transparent language.29 In philosophy, deep meditations on subjective experience 
forwarded by Rene Descartes, understood that form to be scientific reasoning.  Descartes 
advanced a model based on a dualism between two “substances”—mind and matter—
with distinct attributes and essences, neither dependent on the other for operation.30 After 
Descartes, a mind/body split became a central filter for dominant Western modes of 
theoretical inquiry. Immanuel Kant’s transcendental subject arguably unified the dualism 
into the concept of an individual, which, while tethered to a sense of the body in nature, 
nonetheless also freed itself by careful and exhaustive reasoning.31  
                                                
28 For general Enlightenment position, see, for example: Roy Porter, The Enlightenment 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1990). For an understanding of rhetoric 
during the Enlightenment, see: Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg. “Enlightenment Rhetoric,” in 
The Rhetorical Tradition (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1990), 791-980.  
29 Roger Scruton, From Descartes to Wittgenstein: A Short History of Modern Philosophy (New 
York: Routledge, 1981), 41.  
30 See, for example: Gordon Baker and Katherine Morris, Descartes’ Dualism (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 65. 
31 This understanding is under contestation in contemporary rhetorical theory. For a closer 
examination of this debate, see, for example: Pat J. Gehrke, “Turning Kant against the Priority of 
Autonomy: Communication Ethics and the Duty to Community,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 35, no. 
1 (2002): 1–21 and Scott R. Stroud, “Kant on Community: A Reply to Gehrke,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 39, no. 2 (2006): 157–65. 
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New social and economic organization also emerged from the reasoning human 
subject. The long-standing historical political system, The Great Chain of Being (a 
divinely inspired organization of immutable order) was, in a sense, shattered by the 
Enlightenment articulation of reason.32 Political theorists like John Locke developed a 
theory of civil society based on principles of individual liberty, private property 
ownership, and freedom of mobility through social and political roles.33 Notions of 
wealth accumulation and rational choice influenced changing economic organization, 
including Adam Smith’s understanding of principles motivated by predictable 
distribution along the lines of individual desire and market forces.34 As Charles Withers 
notes, the Enlightenment is “a process concerned with the central place of 
reason…mediated through direct encounter and not blind faith in ancient authority….”35 
Thus, while not to be considered a homogenous set of texts, the Enlightenment reflects a 
broad sweeping change in all forms of human organization based on the adoption of an 
orientation toward the world substantially different than that which preceded it.36   
 The importance of the Enlightenment for rhetoric, following Barbara Warnick, 
                                                
32 Allen Debus, Man and Nature in the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1978). 
33 For central studies, see: Peter Gay, The Enlightenment, an Interpretation; the Rise of Modern 
Paganism. (New York: Knopf, 1966); Roy Porter, The Enlightenment, Second Edition (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Jonathan I. Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, 
Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
34 Joel Mokyr, “Mercantilism, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution,” in Eli 
Heckscher, International Trade, and Economic History, ed. Ronald Findlay (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2006).  
35 Charles W. J. Withers, Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking Geographically about the Age of 
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 2.  
36 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3. 
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could be understood by tracing the transformation of rhetorical style. While various 
classical positions sought to characterize ideas in ornate orations, Enlightenment rhetoric 
took up a clear and explanatory approach, emphasizing factual examples and logical 
reasoning.37 Warnick notes that Enlightenment thinkers jettisoned previous popular 
rhetorical styles assuming ornamentation amounted to a kind of mystification that sullied 
the truth.38 Kant for example is considered especially distrustful of rhetoric, famously 
calling it “a deceitful act.”39 As Scott Stroud, Debra Hawhee, and Cory Holding caution, 
however, exclusively reading the Enlightenment for its stylized clarity may be one-sided, 
especially considering footnoted texts displaying a rich debate between scholars at the 
time about persuasion and material metaphors.40 While Stroud and others have asked us 
to reconsider Kant from a contemporary rhetorical perspective, the need to return and re-
read is consistent with a concern with the tremendous sway held by the Enlightenment.  
Adorno and Horkheimer, notice a tendency for the Enlightenment writers to 
                                                
37 Barbara Warnick, “The Old Rhetoric vs. the New Rhetoric: The Quarrel between the Ancients 
and the Moderns,” Communication Monographs 49, no. 4 (1982): 263. See also, Wilbur Samuel 
Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1971); Joyce Flory, “Language, Communication, and the Enlightenment Idea of Progress,” 
Central States Speech Journal 26, no. 4 (1975): 253–58. 
38 Warnick, “Old Rhetoric,” 274.  
39 Don Paul Abbott, “Kant, Theremin, and the Morality of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 
40, no. 3 (2007): 274. Once again, this is not to be received as a totalized statement. Instead, I am 
attempting to position the Frankfurt school critique, which in many ways, set the stage for the 
contemporary reconsideration advanced by Stroud and others.  
40 Scott R. Stroud, Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric (University Park, PN: Penn State 
University Press, 2014); Debra Hawhee and Cory Holding, “Case Studies in Material Rhetoric: 
Joseph Priestley and Gilbert Austin,” Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 28, no. 3 
(2010): 264. 
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conceal their use of rhetorical styles of persuasion under the guise of clarity.41 Francis 
Bacon, for example, exalted a style of scientific prose that concealed his understanding of 
rhetorical elements of persuasion.42 The ability of an Enlightenment orientation to render 
such control over rhetorical style and form of argument is precisely what troubles Adorno 
and Horkheimer. An exemplar piece of Enlightenment writing, Bacon’s “Of Nature,” 
forms the basis for the critique advanced by Adorno and Horkheimer. In positing the 
defining experience of the human as posited against nature, Adorno and Horkheimer 
argue that Bacon (and by extension, the Enlightenment orientation) established both the 
condition of alienation and the locus of a specific form of Western domination.43 I isolate 
two strands of their concern: one that begins from understanding natural alienation as a 
site of control and the other as a figure of enmity.  
 Adorno and Horkheimer are concerned with Bacon’s characterization of nature 
                                                
41 Adorno writes a beautiful passage in The Essay as Form. He argues, “Thus historically the 
essay is related to rhetoric, which the scientific mentality, since Descartes and Bacon, has always 
wanted to do away with; that is, until, appropriately in the age of science, rhetoric decayed and 
became a science sui generis, the science of communication. Of course rhetoric has always been a 
form of thought which accommodated itself to communicative language. It directed itself to the 
unmediated: the substitute-satisfaction of its audience. Yet the essay preserves in the very 
autonomy of its presentation, through which it distinguishes itself from the scientific mode of 
communication, traces of the communicative with which science dispenses. The pleasures which 
rhetoric wants to provide to its audience are sublimated in the essay into the idea of the pleasure 
of freedom vis-à-vis the object, freedom that gives the object more of itself than if it were 
mercilessly incorporated into the order of ideas.” See:  Theodor W Adorno, “The Essay as Form,” 
trans. Bob Hullot-Kentor and Fredric Will, New German Critique no. 32 (1984): 168.  
42 James P. Zappen, “Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Science,” College Composition and 
Communication 26, no. 3 (October 1975): 244. 
43 For further reading, see: Francis Bacon, The New Atlantis (New York: Russell F Moore, 
1626/1947). 
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as an entity that can and should be subdued by humans.44 In his writing, nature is at once 
considered an external threat from which humans must guard themselves against and at 
the same time a placid site of resources available for extracted use.  Technological 
development is considered the primary vehicle to satisfy both goals. Technology then is a 
weapons and tool. In effecting security and production, the process of development is 
aggrandized as demonstrations of supremacy. Technological models of prediction and 
investigation explore and perfect humans’ supervisory role in subduing the wild state of 
nature. Taken up as a form of thinking—or what Adorno and Horkheimer call a 
“constellation of ideas”—Bacon and others established a prime mantra of the 
Enlightenment orientation: “whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and 
utility is suspect.”45 What troubled the Frankfurt writers is not just individual examples of 
thought-in-use, but how quickly model and mantra became abstracted into other systems 
of counting and control. They maintain that digestible data sets, predictable patterns, and 
social systems that became rhetorically appealing during the Enlightenment perversely 
found their perfection in fascist regimes, particularly in Germany in the 1930’s. Hannah 
Arendt makes a clear connection in her work, understanding the Nazi regime as a blend 
                                                
44 There is a lengthy debate about how to interpret these passages. Feminist science scholars 
argue, along the lines of Adorno and Horkheimer, Bacon went so far as to understand all 
scientific discovery as an enjoyable act of violence. See for example, Evelyn Fox Keller, 
Reflections on Gender and Science (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 35-37; Sandra Harding 
The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 113; Elizabeth 
Hanson, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 19-25.  For recent work attempting to rethink Bacon’s rhetoric in a more generous 
tone, see: Peter Pesic, “Wrestling with Proteus: Francis Bacon and the ‘Torture’ of Nature,” Isis 
90, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 81–94. 
45 Adorno and Horkheimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” 6. 
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of bureaucracy, managerial supremacy, and administrative counting.46 Despite organizing 
centuries after Bacon’s writing, Horkheimer and Adorno nonetheless argue that the 
Enlightenment’s understanding of nature and its accompanying orientation set in motion 
the conditions, logical architecture, and argumentative rationale for the emergence of 
National Socialism.  
For Adorno and Horkheimer, “nature” cannot be reduced to the Enlightenment 
figures of threat or resource. Instead, “nature” could also be considered as an analogy for 
the number of historical orientations unjustly subdued by the two Enlightenment motives 
of security and consumption. In other words, “nature” is figured, or substitutes for, 
various bodies, cultures, and orientations whose interests do not coincide with those of 
the Enlightenment. For Horkheimer and Adorno, to speak of “nature” not only appeals to 
an external world around us, but also the rhetorical ways nature is deified in myth: 
personified as an instructive or playful creature, grappled with as a worshipped or feared 
entity, or unknowable, but phenomena with which one enters a relationship. 47 Jean-
François Lyotard describes a similar understanding of myth-based cultural organizations 
associated with nature as examples of light anthropomorphism.48  If nature is considered 
something to control, and at once stands in for knowledge and cultural practices that 
affirm its reverence, then, the Frankfurt writers argue, the Enlightenment also provides 
rationale for subduing those bodies and orientations.  
                                                
46 See, for example, Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 
1994). 
47 Adorno and Horkheimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” 6.  
48 Jean-François Lyotard, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985). 
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What Adorno and Horkheimer suggest is not that we ought to return to an 
uncritical acceptance of light anthropomorphism in our everyday lives. Instead, they are 
concerned with the consequences of banishing any connection between myth and truth. In 
the move to expunge myth, the systems of Enlightenment abstraction began to assess not 
just nature, but humans and cultures that did not appear to fit the rational bill. 
Enlightenment orientation begins to “hold sway,” or assert control over all figures of 
nature—anything from unconscious desire, to the bodies of women and sexual deviants, 
to the cultures of non-Western societies and non-white bodies. Perversely, the extent and 
success of the control exerted over natural objects became a requisite test of vigor and 
liberation of the Enlightenment subject. 49 In other words, according to Horkheimer and 
Adorno, a close read of the relationship to nature articulated by the Enlightenment also 
explains a Western penchant for and model of domination. Understood grammatically as 
a subject’s position over an object, human liberation became linked to the suppression of 
an object (and all the things and people defined by the term).  Following a number of 
contemporary scholars on race, the grammar of language use itself reflects a similar logic 
of Enlightenment domination.50 
To summarize an already brief glance at complex historical and philosophical 
                                                
49 Horkheimer and Adorno, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” 13.  
50 While it is beyond the scope of this prospectus, contemporary critical race scholars interested 
in articulating the extent of anti-blackness in the United States and the relationship between civil 
society and white supremacy make this point explicitly. See, for example: Frantz Fanon, Black 
Skins, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove, 2008); Joy James, ”’Concerning 
Violence,’ Frantz Fanon’s Rebel Intellectual in Search of a Black Cyborg,” The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 112, no. 1 (2013): 57-70; Fred Moten, ”Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the 
Flesh),” The South Atlantic Quarterly 112, no. 4 (2013): 737-780; Frank B. Wilderson III, Red, 
White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010). 
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thought, the act of subduing nature in Enlightenment thinking is correlated with two 
senses of freedom: first, to cultivate and experience the pleasures of civilization and 
second, to liberate oneself from the old orders of the past. So read as a figure with dual 
purpose, the object of nature is constituted in Enlightenment orientation as a 
contradiction embedded in the very fabric and texture of all social experience: in 
attempting to expand modes of production, nature is considered an absent background 
and a powerful force to fear. In attempting to justify new forms of political organization 
based on principles of liberation, nature is both a human instinct that must be expressed 
and also a perversion of previous myth-based argument that must be repressed. But, both 
these processes of domination that remain prevalent today begin when the subject 
(human) is alienated, that is separated or estranged by principle, from an object (nature).  
It is important to note that for Adorno and Horkheimer one is not in a position to 
exit the Enlightenment now armed with this revelation; its structuring influence is noticed 
all around us and embedded in language.  Unflinching support for Enlightenment 
recommendations, however, including idyllic belief in technological progress, a false 
freedom in capital accumulation, exclusive reduction of knowledge to predictive data 
models, and the ruthless repression of what Jay M. Bernstein calls rhetorical 
enchantment, ought to be challenged.51 Adorno and Horkheimer offer a more complex 
approach, including support for deep thinking and rigorous meditation on the historical 
origin of these motivations and principles. By moving outward from cultural artifacts and 
                                                
51 By rhetorical enchantment, J. M. Bernstein means myth, desire, affect, and all the 
unexplainable phenomena that rational schemas attempt to repress or put off until later. J. M. 
Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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philosophical writings, Horkheimer and Adorno offer an opportunity to make explicit 
connections between historical and contemporary orientations and offer the opportunity 
to ask how we might intervene to imagine different orientations.  
One such intervention seems simple, yet under explored, given the preceding 
short overview: placing Adorno in the context of contemporary environmental theory.52 
As Cook makes imperative in the opening of her text, Adorno set a groundwork for a 
“green” reading of philosophy, and, in my case rhetoric, that has only recently been 
appreciated. “The rhetoric of nature,” writes Christina Gerhardt, “often neglected in 
studies of Adorno, is central to an understanding of his views.”53 Engaging the 
intersection of critical theory and vegetal life in specific figures, I argue, also provides an 
opportunity to think through Adorno’s rhetorical, political, and aesthetic orientation in 
new ways. 
The Enlightenment orientation—especially in its move to secure an extraordinary 
space for the human—can be confronted by returning to consider our primary and 
intrinsic connection to a natural extrahuman, established through an invigorated reading 
of Adorno. Before I explain Adorno’s approach in more detail, I’d like to examine some 
other ways scholars have tried to redefine elements of Enlightenment orientation because 
it will help concretize my inquiry in contemporary discussion and contrast my approach. I 
                                                
52 For other examples, see Kevin DeLuca, Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental 
Activism (New York: Guilford Press, 1999). I am less influenced by environmental social 
movements and more curious about theorizing encounters with the natural world at the point of 
object-subject relations.  
53 Christina Gerhardt, “The Ethics of Animals in Adorno and Kafka.” New German Critique, no. 
97 (2006): 159. 
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will now examine two different modes of criticism: the first tries to challenge the 
definition of the human subject as a way of opening attention to a concern for 
encountering the natural world; the second is an attempt to invert the logical conclusion 
drawn by the Enlightenment by arguing the nature is best served, not in attempts to 
reconcile its alienation, but to insist to ourselves it ought to remain objectively 
“withdrawn.”  
II. Literature Review 
Adorno identifies a core rhetorical problem at the onset of his foundational essay 
“On Subject and Object.”54 “To lead with reflections about subject and object,” he writes, 
“raises the difficulty of stating what exactly the topic of discussion should be. The terms 
are patently equivalent.”55 While his opening statement gestures toward an intended 
initial confusion over precise layer and meaning, attending to the constitution of terms—
equivalent yet opposite—is another example of how crucial navigating the paradox of 
similarity and difference is for understanding Adorno’s thought. Such a journey begins 
with an appreciation of the dialectic: an approach to logic based on assessing the 
mutually dependent and reinforcing association of terms in polar contradiction.  In a 
generic sense, dialectical logic may describe the structure of give-and-take in 
conversation or a more structured method of dispute resolution formed by two sides 
                                                
54 Theodor W. Adorno, “On Subject and Object,” in Critical Models: Interventions and 
Catchwords, trans. Henry W Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 245-51. 
55 Adorno, “On Subject and Object,” 245. 
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contesting contrasting positions in formal academic debate.56 In an abstract sense the 
dialectic refers to the existence of a process of forces that produce tension as a result of 
confrontation.57 Classically, the term also has a rich rhetorical history. For Aristotle, the 
dialectic was a term that described a form of reasoning less preferred than the more 
formal logical system based on major/minor premises followed by a conclusion.58 Plato’s 
dialogic format appreciated dialectical logic as a form of question-and-answer to reveal a 
set of positions or to subtly reduce an argument to a sense of absurdity.59 I will return to 
the dialectic in the succeeding method chapter more closely. For now, I argue a 
dialectical structure presents two contrary perspectives in conversation and crafts a new 
orientation in the process of considering points of convergence and divergence.  
I have divided the literature review into the classical structure of dialectic to 
allude to Adorno’s unique presentation of a central idea in concept and form. That is: I 
establish two competing approaches to understanding the relationship between subject 
and object, resting on a negation or stasis point. To this end, I first look at attempts by 
                                                
56 See, for example, a selected history of dialectical logic theorized in different forms of speech 
communication including: Lee Hunt, “Dialectic—A Neglected Method of Argument,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 7, no. 3 (June 1, 1921): 221–32; Charles Tolman, “Further Comments on the 
Meaning of ‘Dialectic,” Human Development 26, no. 6 (1983): 320–24; C. Jan Swearingen, 
“Dialogue and Dialectic: The Logic of Conversation and the Interpretation of Logic,” in The 
Interpretation of Dialogue, ed.  Tulio Maranhao (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 
47-74. 
57 I am paraphrasing from: “Dialectic, n.1,” OED Online (Oxford University Press), accessed 
November 22, 2014, http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/view/Entry/51883. 
58 See, for example: D. W. Hamlyn, “Aristotle on Dialectic,” Philosophy 65, no. 254 (October 
1990): 465–76. 
59 See, for example: Edwin Black, “Plato’s View of Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 44, 
no. 4 (December 1958): 361–74; Julius Stenzel, Plato’s Method of Dialectic, vol. 62 (New York: 
Arno Press, 1940); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies 
on Plato (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 
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scholars to unsettle an assumed Enlightenment orientation by challenging various 
approaches to the subject as the starting point or filter from which argument proceeds. 
Next, I examine contemporary efforts to theorize the object as an initial entrance point of 
critical inquiry. Finally, I situate an emerging group of scholars calling for a “new 
materialism” as an example of an approach that orients both preceding modes of critique.  
TURNING TOWARD SUBJECT 
 In the “Definition of Man,” Kenneth Burke famously defined the human subject as 
“the symbol-using animal.”60 As the definition suggests, while other beings might share 
some features of communicative expression, Burke, like many other academics in various 
fields of humanities, found exceptional a human’s ability to communicate using symbolic 
abstractions to convey meaning. Jeff Pruchnic argues that Burke’s understanding may 
have been motivated by a desire to protect human labor in response to increased reliance 
on mechanization.61 While the transformation from human to automatic task performance 
could offer certain benefits, for Pruchnic, Burke may have feared a deeper form of 
domination hidden under the guise of technological expediency. Drawing attention to a 
creative and communicative essence at the heart of the species—the grammar of the 
human form—Burke hoped to provide a challenge to the interests pressuring automation. 
Interpreting Barry Brummett’s exposition of Burke’s theory, reading Burke’s definition 
of human with Pruchnic could provided the resources—the equipment—to understand 
how the essence of human in language could explain and respond to anxieties presented 
                                                
60 Kenneth Burke, “Definition of Man,” The Hudson Review 16, no. 4 (1963): 491.  
61 Jeff Pruchnic, “Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the Work of the Body in Burke’s Body of Work,” 
Rhetoric Review 25, no. 3 (2006): 276. 
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by a specific moment of historical, cultural, and economic realignment.62 That is to say, 
only through an appeal to rhetoric, or “the resources of symbolicity,” Burke wrote, could 
we understand laughter or tears—the very material of life that mechanization 
eliminates—as the stuff that transforms the human from animal into being.63 As Burke 
perhaps prognosticated, in a contemporary world defined less by human-to-human 
interaction and more by the touch of machines in numeric interlocution, the laughter and 
tears of the human seems frail and threatened by the accelerated landscapes of digital 
capture. The devices, designs, and medias of digital landscape are quickly becoming the 
central mediating experience at every point of human interaction, fueled, in part, by their 
promise to make those moments of tears and happiness more readily available.64 The 
central question, however, of the critical scholars of the human subject that I will now 
attend to, begins from an opposite premise than the one established by Burke: How could 
the desire to imagine ourselves as exceptional carry with it a more nefarious and 
unintended set of argumentative consequences?  
 To be clear, I agree with Lawrence Coupe that we should avoid reading Burke’s 
appeal to the notable quality of human symbol use as “unapologetically anthropocentric, 
                                                
62 Barry Brummett, “Burke’s Representative Anecdote as a Method in Media Criticism,” Critical 
Studies in Mass Communication 1, no. 2 (1984): 166-8. 
63 Burke, “Definition of Man,” 24. 
64 Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1993); Paul Virilio, Open Sky, trans. Julie Rose (London: Verso, 1997); Douglas Kellner, 
“Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections,” Theory, Culture & Society 16 (1999): 
103-126; Robert W. Williams, “Politics and Self in the Age of Digital Re(pro)ducibility,” Fast 
Capitalism (electronic journal) 1, no. 1 (2005): 
http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/1_1/williams.html. 
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proudly asserting the distinctiveness of the human species.”65 Careful and cautious, 
Burke did not intend his definition to take on a tone of absolute exception. Instead, he 
suggested that one way of understanding the multi-layered landscape of politics in the 
20th century could begin by initiating a dialogue on key terms and examining elements of 
his definition “added, or subtracted, or in some way modified.”66 I am trying to reflect, 
with Burke, upon some consequences of the essential relationship between humans and 
language. What I mean to say (and the following scholars might agree): there is a very 
complex happening in Burke’s bundling of terms to describe “the human.”67  
 Already then, my parceling of the meaning of words (including drawing attention 
to various contexts and potential political investments) designates, to some degree, a 
moment of criticism informed by continental philosophy. While the term itself may be 
both dangerous and reductive, as Simon Critchley and Simon Glendinning note in their 
respective introductions, “continental philosophy” can be a helpful bundling device for 
referencing a rich orientation that draws together German and French philosophy and 
critical inquiry from the 19th century to the present day.68 Critchley concisely notes (and 
                                                
65 Lawrence Coupe, Kenneth Burke on Myth: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
181-2. 
66 Burke, “Definition of Man,” 491.  
67 By the end of the essay Burke argues that humans should be thought of as: “the symbol-using 
(symbol-making, symbol misusing) animal; inventor of the negative (or moralized by the 
negative); separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making; goaded by the 
spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order); and rotten with perfection.” See Burke, 
“Definition of Man,” 507. 
68 Simon Critchley, Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction,  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Simon Glendinning, The Idea of Continental Philosophy: A 
Philosophical Chronicle, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 2-4.  For Glendinning, 
he believes that the term itself has no productive possibility, but rather names, in his words, “the 
Other” of Anglo-American analytic philosophy; Glendinning, The Idea, 12. While Critchley 
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summarily complicates) seven iterations developing over a 200 year period: German 
idealism and romanticism in the late 18th century; the critique of metaphysics including 
Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud; German phenomenology; French 
phenomenology; hermeneutics; Western Marxism; and French (post)structuralism.69 
Rather than explain each chronologically, however, Robert D’Amico argues that 
continental philosophy should include the messy work of expanding understanding and 
troubling modes of experience and sedimented definitions of consciousness, being, 
knowledge, interpretation, and politics.70 Michael Rosen provides another helpful 
approach by understanding continental philosophy according to four themes of 
intervention: a break with natural science as the universal language or descriptive 
vocabulary; a preference for thick historicism and textual attention; a concern for agency 
and its relationship to theory and practice; and a concern for layers and scope in 
interpretation.71 What emerges from the historical, experiential, and thematic is not a 
cookie cutter explanation, but a rough sketch of a large and important series of debates 
that continue to provide fodder for exciting disagreement.  
 Continental philosophy, then, asks us to think more critically about the basic 
                                                                                                                                            
agrees the designation appeals to a sense of a turf war over “professional self-description,” 
nonetheless, the field’s depth of detail, descriptive drama, and “little woes and weals to which our 
flesh is prone,” comprise the values motivating the interests of Continental philosophers and 
identifies some recuperative possibilities, Critchley, Continental Philosophy, 38,11. 
69  Critchley, Continental Philosophy, 13. While many of these terms may be familiar, it is 
beyond the scope of this prospectus to work through each expression. I will return to various key 
moments, however, in more detail. 
70  Robert D’Amico, Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Gainesville: University of 
Florida/Westview Press, 1999).  
71 Michael Rosen, “Continental Philosophy from Hegel,” in Philosophy 2: Further through the 
Subject (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 663-704.  
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categories of existence, including, as I previewed, the contents, context, form, and 
motivation behind the human subject and its description. As Critchley and Andrew 
Cutrofello both note, much of the trajectory of scholars interested in continental 
philosophy begins by how much and in what ways people receive the Enlightenment 
tradition—most especially Immanuel Kant. One influential French poststructuralist, 
Michel Foucault, offered a radical description of the concept of the subject based 
primarily on an innovative reading of Kant. In his essay, “What is Enlightenment?” 
Foucault re-reads a short editorial penned by Kant, but with an attention to critiquing 
some of Kant’s detailed conclusions about “the human.”72  Foucault argued that Kant, in 
a minor 1784 article, established a new approach to modern thought by grounding 
philosophy in the search for the universal constitution of a human subject. In so doing, 
Kant believed humans could escape a position of mystical immaturity—that is, a 
tethering to nature—through use of principled reason and an assessment of law. The 
subject—an individual—best exercises autonomy by freeing him or herself from the 
natural world. In Foucault’s account of Kant, however, he encouraged us to reflect less 
on the universal applicability of Kant’s definition and instead on the historical aspects 
compelling Kant’s understanding, traced through the present, and to do so with an 
attention to some troubling aspects of its politics.  Foucault asks us not to take an appeal 
to language, scientific rationality, or liberation from nature as the only way of 
understanding the basic question of what it means to be human. Instead, Foucault invited 
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us to approach the question of the human as an aesthetic practice.73  Understanding the 
human then as a product not of biological circuits or as universal being of reason, but as a 
series of textual moves, Foucault provided resources to reconsider “the human” from a 
situated critical and historical position, not a stable and unchanging entity.  
 Drawing a different critical read from Kant, some scholars critique the 
Enlightenment orientation by examining examples of humans who do not quite fit the 
principle category of reason upon which his subject is based. Contemporary thinker 
Avital Ronell, for example, unpacks a concern with Kant in her rhetorical study on the 
complex layers of the “debilitated subject” of Enlightenment. She is especially cautious 
of viewing the subject as both sovereign and autonomous.74  Using various rhetorical 
techniques that play with scale, Ronell takes up bodily, literary, and philosophic 
encounters with the concept of “stupidity” and the impossible drive to deal with and 
eliminate it. In one formation she troubles Kant for an inability to place “simpletons” and 
“fools” in his philosophy of mind. “Somewhere between reason and madness,” Ronell 
argues, Kant could not quite make a place for  “the idiot” in his rigorous empirical 
inquiry into the hierarchy of humans. She speculates the origin might lie in liminal form; 
in her words, it might be that “these figures are other, but perhaps not other enough.”75 
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Ronell uses these examples to trouble the categorical nature of Kant’s definition of the 
human subject, and, as a result, open up the possibility of thinking subjects in existence 
beyond a rational imperative. If humans could be used to trouble Kant’s schema, can 
other figures, beyond expressions of the human, trouble and confound the category in a 
similar way?  
 Many rhetoricians believe the answer to this question is a resounding “yes.” 
Offered as a third example of an approach that challenges Enlightenment orientation, 
scholars pair the definition of the human with nonhuman animals to see if the human 
experience is not as central as the orientation might suggest. Steven Best, for example, 
asserts that animal standpoint theory has the possibility of posing a challenge to a system 
of human centrality built upon Enlightenment principles.76 Debra Hawhee explores 
animal figures in classical rhetoric, especially focused on the relationship between 
intellectual capacity and theoretical assumptions made by Aristotle.77 Diane Davis, in the 
spirit of Emmanuel Levinas, takes up “the extra-symbolic rhetorical appeal” that 
constitutes the situation exemplified by a rhetorical model of response.78 She asks what 
mode of relationality constitutes rhetoric if language emerges not as a means of human 
persuasion, but as an affective reaction to [animal] otherness.79 In other words, how must 
the terms of rhetoric be reimagined in an ethical arrangement that cannot be escaped and 
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is not limited to human interlocutors?  Finally, in his opening to a special issue of 
Philosophy & Rhetoric on animal address, Erik Doxtader summarizes these approaches to 
understanding the animal by suggesting, “the ‘animal question’ [how animals figure in 
rhetorical theory] remains an open and increasingly complex problem for the 
philosophical and rhetorical enterprise . . . teach[ing] us about our own relation to 
language, and problematiz[ing] definitions of rhetoric that would have us begin by 
presupposing a bright line between animal instinct and human thought.”80 Insofar as an 
interest in the non-human and the critique of the centrality of the human unites these 
authors, I’m led to wonder why inquiries should end at the figure of the animal?   
 Perhaps one of the major problems with a limited focus on animal figures is that 
their form seems (almost) too human: it’s easier to “relate,” for example, to something 
with a face. Peter H. Raven, James H. Wandersee, and Elisabeth E. Schussler describe a 
possible condition of “plant blindness,” that is, the tendency for people to forget the life 
of plants because they do not behave or appear like their fauna counterparts.81 James 
Wynn argues historically, the tendency for plant life to be contained in the rhetoric of 
science contributes, to some degree, to a common refusal to consider plants in more 
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ethical and theoretical terms.82 But, could the refusal run deeper?  
 Plants, often considered too “insignificant” or “mundane” a subject for critical 
reflection, according to Michael Marder, represent a “margin of the margin, the zone of 
absolute obscurity undetectable on the radars of our conceptualities.”83 Subsumed by 
discourses of aesthetic landscape design, culinary recipe, and farming practice, plants are 
easily dismissed as “less developed” or “undifferentiated.”84 “Vegetal beings,” for 
Marder, end up “unconditionally available for unlimited use and exploitation,” and not 
ethically or rhetorically encountered.85 In understanding the human as addressed by 
plants, Marder derives a few conclusions. Since plants are beings grounded outside the 
assumptions of Western humanism, how we respond can provide sustenance for 
rethinking many of the elements of our received orientations. 86  In encountering nature, 
or plant life, Marder presents an opportunity for scholars to reconsider relations to 
otherness that navigate dual pressures of assimilation and domination.87 Drawing upon 
rich readings of the Western philosophic tradition, Marder is spearheading a new 
intervention to theorize plant subjectivity.88 Joined by John Charles Ryan and Randy 
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Laist, Marder’s work represents a key turn in the theoretical humanities: a new approach 
to examining the concept of subjectivity termed critical plant studies. 89 
 Critical plant studies, however, could be thought of across disciplinary interests 
and methods. Over the last two decades, entomologist Richard Karban and others have 
assembled quantitative evidence supporting a limited theory of plant communication, 
noting specific and complex examples of care and deception in plant communities.90  
French botanist Francis Halle argues plants, not animals, could provide the central model 
for understanding the organization of all biological life.91 Michael Pollan’s popular text, 
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Botany of Desire, traces specific examples of plants’ poetic control over humans, 
including numerous interpretations of vegetal species integrating with humans to 
maintain self-existence.92 Finally, but not exhaustively, Anna Tsing and Eduardo Kohn 
take up encounters with mushrooms and forests respectively as subjects and sites of 
human-plant encounters in anthropological terms.93 Each of these approaches emphasizes 
different examples of Marder’s ethical posture; plant and human considered to be 
involved jointly in “world-construction.”94 By that, Marder may have teased out a model 
of shared life in the process of meaning making and exchange. While such meaning may 
not always be jointly legible, there exists nevertheless a deep connection binding the 
human and botanical worlds to each other with implications for and exposed by rhetoric.  
 Returning to Donna Haraway may also help expand upon the concept of world-
construction, especially her text When Species Meet.95 As one of the premier scholars 
examining the intersection of biology, culture, communication, and philosophy, Haraway 
understands world-construction as a specific form of interaction taking place in a site or 
“contact zone,” where human and non-human bodies collide, reshaping meaning in a 
process of figuration. For Haraway, “figures” are more than just representations (as they 
are in the rhetorical tradition, for example). Instead, like chemical compositions or 
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botanical hybridizations, figures represent for Haraway sites where human and nonhuman 
co-shape one another in communicative processes, simultaneously literal and metaphoric, 
poetic and prosaic.96 Haraway implores us to consider “who ‘we’ will become when 
species meet.”97 In other words, what happens to the human subject if its claim to 
autonomy is chipped away by its connection to the natural world? In a more utopian 
spirit: what means to domination are available if the entity upon which domination is 
conditioned—nature—is considered a subject to be encountered, not an object to be 
repressed? To be fair, Haraway’s contact zones are endemic of human and animal 
relations, but the larger questions posed by her work open vegetal contact zones for 
interrogation.  
What animal scholars present—and critical plant scholars extend—is a question 
figured in Haraway’s terms: what occurs in the contact zones when humans and plants 
meet? Such a question is likely to induce a kind of panic, for it challenges the basic 
“fantasy of human exceptionalism” and the “great divides” responsible for most meaning 
in human culture, including the grammatical slash (/) between human/nonhuman and 
nature/culture.98  As Rosi Braidotti, a theorist of what has been termed the “posthuman 
turn,” puts it, the idea of figures work as “vehicles to imaginatively ground our powers of 
understanding within the shifting landscapes of the present” and past.99 Following Stacy 
Alaimo, “the potent ethical and political possibilities” that result from such a retrofitted 
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rhetorical focus provide the immediate rationale, if not explanatory excitement, that 
animate my inquiry.100  
Thinking the plant-as-figure involves a tracing of the place where the material and 
semiotic intertwine. I am appealing to what Burke largely suggested is valuable about 
rhetorical inquiry (and its study) in A Rhetoric of Motives: Rhetoric attempts to 
understand language as a process of the construction and deconstruction of orientations. 
As an approach or perspective, rhetoric provides resources to theorize transformation of 
orientations outlined in an early section of my prospectus. Yet the precise mechanism of 
transformation is not always cut and dry. While the “realistic” political goal of rhetoric 
might always be reduced to humans speaking to humans, understanding an orientation, 
the depth of its potential influence, and resources for transformation require considering 
how we have come to understand the human itself.101 Keeping in mind Joshua Gunn’s 
exploration of figures forgotten, disavowed, ineffable, and fantastic, I argue for an 
“affective and ethical working-through” of our secret rhetorical encounters with plants 
and the orientations exposed and remade in those sites. 102 By secret here, I mean the 
discernable but often passed over form, and not the recovery or revelation of their (or 
our) true communicative nature. 
Other scholars interested in pursuing new orientations understand the meaning of 
“secret” a bit differently. Following a route suggested by the “speculative turn” in the 
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humanities, plants, animals, in fact all objects, will maintain a mysterious and secret life 
beyond the grasp of the human subject in a universe of objects. While certainly not 
denied by any of the scholars I reviewed here, I argue that an over-focus on a veiled or  
“withdrawn” status of nonhuman entities cannot provide the resources to consider the 
unique expression of rhetorical figuration, world-construction, and complex co-mingling 
between humans and plants. So, while the speculative turn could offer a new instructive 
challenge to Enlightenment orientation writ large, scholars could also encourage a 
tendency to eliminate a specific concern for understanding vegetal existence and our 
unique relation with the botanical world. I’d like to turn now to a closer examination of 
this literature to explain why.  
TURNING TOWARD THE OBJECT 
Generally speaking, ontology is a philosophical inquiry into the definition and 
category of being. That is to say, thinkers who study ontology want to establish what is 
said to exist (and how to say it), clarify the organization of matter, and notice categorical 
similarities and differences among material items. In his The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger, whose philosophical approach to ontology is one of the 
most influential in the 20th century, created a tripartite hierarchy of being: 
[l.] the stone (material object) is worldless;  
[2.] the animal is poor in world;  
[3.] man is world-forming.103  
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Generally speaking, for Heidegger world-forming referred to an approach to being 
established by and through language (not dissimilar to what I suggested about Kenneth 
Burke in Part One). Heidegger noted that a specific being, or Dasein, was comprised of—
defined by—a rich and complex approach to questioning a sense of place in the cosmos. 
For Heidegger, Dasein is a specific being displaying the capacity to meditate on 
existence. Since language seemed to be the vehicle for meditation, language capacity also 
becomes the sin-qua-non for assessing the human being for whom the world is a concern. 
To unpack further, since animals appeared to lack language-making ability, yet seemed to 
navigate the world, Heidegger considered them “impoverished,” meaning while they may 
display characteristics like choice-making or planning, they nonetheless do not display a 
capacity for language or conceptual thought.  Because it appears that material objects 
make no attempt at contemplative thought, then they may be said to exist, but possess no 
world at all.  
 If animal scholars previously discussed could be said to challenge the second part 
of Heidegger’s triptych on being, then a growing literature operating under the headings 
of “the speculative turn” or “object-oriented ontology” (hereafter OOO) could be 
understood as inverting Heidegger’s placement of world with the human. In other words, 
OOO scholars accept vocabulary from Heidegger’s categorical criteria for being, but 
ponder what happens when human language makes us incapable of thinking. They might 
ask: What world do humans form if the secret life of objects flourish around us and we 
have no capacity to appreciate or understand such blossoming? They speculate an answer 
may be humans’ unique claims to incapacity rather than a claim to reason, as found in the 
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Enlightenment orientation.  Following a trajectory of thought initiated by cybernetics 
(especially influenced by process-focused models and closed-loop circuits), OOO draws 
from Thomas Kuhn’s understanding of paradigm revolutions in science and Niklas 
Luhmann’s connections among ecology and consciousness to theorize a life world 
beyond the representational grasp of the human.104 Drawing from and repudiating Bruno 
Latour’s actor-network theory, OOO scholars aim to shake up thought, not by offering 
figures, but through argumentative inversions and playing with analytic reasoning.105   
 Timothy Morton, a prevalent OOO scholar, draws our attention to certain objects 
that, in confounding traditional laws of science, cause the whole system to be re-
evaluated.106 Plutonium, for example, is a creation of human processes that will exist and 
affect its environment far beyond human dimensions of time (in some cases over 24,000 
years!).107 Climate change, also a process initiated by humans, will alter the very 
constitution of the Earth’s ecosystem in ways that our conception of time and space 
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cannot account for.108 Morton writes, “objects are what they are, in the sense that no 
matter what we are aware of, or how, there it is, impossible to shake off.”109 By focusing 
solely on material presence beyond the basic human measurements—time, scale, and 
reason—OOO scholars push for a notion of world, in a sense, unreachable by humans. 
Such an endeavor, argues Morton, offers “not a compromise but a genuine way out of the 
recent philosophical impasse of essentialism versus nihilism” by considering old concepts 
entirely anew.110 Ultimately, I would suggest three key concepts define the speculative 
turn: (1) substituting the concept of “actancy” for agency; (2) severing the relationship 
between the object and epistemological representation; and (3) assuming a flattening, 
interacting world of circulation, similar to the digital model from which these thinkers 
draw.  
 Initiated at a conference hosted by Alberto Toscano and Ray Brassier, the 
speculative turn opposed traditional assumptions about human agency, emphasizing an 
ability to exert influence without the requisite components of “intention” or rational 
choice.111 Graham Harman’s reworking of Heidegger theorized that the essence of an 
object’s actant world was found in its “withdrawal” from human understanding. 
Harman’s interpretation hones in on Heidegger’s notion of “equipment,” what Harman 
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describes as a process of turning phenomenon into a readiness-to-hand. Rather than 
considered open and available for human use, an object “never becomes present to 
practical action any more than it does to theoretical awareness.”112 So while the concept 
of world is often used to support a claim of unique capacity, Harman rethinks language as 
a limitation, not as a center point of understanding. In other words, if objects exist beyond 
human understanding, then the part that withdraws from our knowledge is the space of 
their unique singularity.113 Harman argues that theorizing from a place of withdrawal 
preserves a sort of dignity in mystery, undoing some of the claim to exceptionality 
established during the Enlightenment.114 Called “guerilla metaphysics,” Harman 
speculates that placing objects in a total material context, that is to say, in a context 
completely outside of human thought, offers a sufficient and new challenge. Objects have 
a flexible pull on human perspective, for as they withdraw from our understanding, their 
mystery forces a full collapse of all being(s) into one material plane.115 To help 
concretize these claims, I’d like to draw out these scholars’ appreciation of withdrawal a 
little further.  
 In his 2006 foundation text After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux challenged the 
concept of Cartesian duality by asking whether the capacity for thinking preceded bodily 
existence. In so doing, he offered a critique of correlation that severed the relationship 
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between mind and body entirely.116  Thus, objects need not be thought in relation to 
subjects, but could be considered to exist separate from human epistemological 
experience.117 In attempting to undo the Kantian position (transcendentalism), 
Meillassoux argued that letting the object’s lived experience exist separately or outside of 
human perception referred to an ontological position, a space prior to language and 
outside the humans.118  
 Levi Bryant extends Meillassoux’s critique even further. If, speculates Bryant, the 
co-dependent relationship between subjects and objects could be severed, then humans 
would be situated more equitably among them, and thus lose access to any 
anthropocentric claims to being.119 Seeing all objects in arrangement and in material 
terms, an “ontological realism” in Bryant’s vocabulary, challenged the core 
epistemological debates characterizing the theoretical humanities in the late 20th century. 
For Bryant, concerns over representation or constitution in discourse, popularized by 
Foucault, would be replaced by a sole focus on “what objects are.”120  In other words, an 
object’s essence exists alongside, yet nonetheless very outside, the architecture of human 
understanding. He cites four primary characteristics of a speculative “flat ontology.” 
First, he argues that a flattened ontology rejects an understanding of the world from 
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primary origins or transcendent premises. Second, he argues that “the” world does not 
exist, but in fact many worlds interact. Third, Bryant argues that object-object relations 
exist outside of and independent from human-nonhuman and subject-object relations. 
Finally, he argues that reducing all objects to the same plane ensures all begin and remain 
on the same footing or grounding.121  
 Bryant draws upon Ian Bogost’s Alien Phenomenology, who argued, “all things 
exist, yet they do not exist equally.”122 Using a number of examples, including Pollan’s 
work on plant seduction, Bogost argues that a “flat ontology” offers the invitation “to 
suspend our own human ways of operating and encountering the world so as [to] 
investigate non-human ways of encountering the world.”123 The benefits, he argues, 
consists in developing a method of mapping relations among larger “assemblages,” 
resituating an ethical openness to otherness, and sidesteps what he considers to be failures 
of liberal remedies or legislative victories.124  He argues that the result of “alien 
phenomenology” is a “thermodynamic politics,” or “a form of political engagement that 
targets a machine’s source of energy and capacity for work.”125 If Bogost’s philosophy is 
to be accepted as a political suggestion, as Bryant argues, then OOO pedagogy provides 
students a new repertoire for thinking and offers a set of language and principles for how 
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we understand the world.  
 But, herein lies at least one challenge with an ontological approach to “the object.” 
In its attempt to efface the importance of representation for mediating an experience with 
the object while also establishing a political claim, OOO scholars minimize the paradox, 
rather than making the dialectic logic a center point, as Adorno does. For example, 
Bryant draws a fast and hard line between thermodynamic politics and what he describes 
as semiotic politics.126 Because structures are not based on the same flows of 
communication as humans, he argues that the investment in rhetorical criticism is neither 
relevant nor successful. But, the paradox is that even as he situates himself against the 
practices of persuasion, the aim and effort of his critical intervention appears to be just 
that: semiotic politics to transform political practice in a particular way. So, while 
students may assume a set of new concepts with which to imagine objects (worthwhile, 
as it may be), OOO scholars have not discovered a new great escape promised by Morton 
and others. Once again we are returned to a primary antagonism or fault line: one can 
assert the ethics of flat ontology, but until an audience is convinced to change their 
epistemological practices (which OOO could very well achieve), speculative materiality 
is no more grounded than any other idealism. 
 Moreover, it seems as though the substitution of one scientific principle for another 
as the unifying principle of all life and politics is a move that ought to be critically 
assessed, rather than foundationally asserted. If the appeal of OOO is in the conceptual 
opening it offers, then perhaps the criticism should be taken to the very rhetorical form in 
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which it is presented. That is, we should understand how and in what ways the 
speculative turn could influence material political arrangements, which requires rhetorical 
investigation. Further, the unique constitution of otherness and its expression in political 
sites and histories is more relevant than another flattened universal schema with which to 
erase and efface specific difference, even in the potential speculative experience of 
various objects. 
 Despite these two basic appeals to rhetorical caution, the speculative turn has had a 
profound influence on contemporary rhetorical practice precisely, according to James J. 
Brown, because of the belief in the possibility of its potential to move past 
representational debates of the 20th century.127 Alexander Reid uses OOO to bridge the 
divide between an understanding of composition in the analog and one in the digital. In 
so doing, Reid and others replace one mode of technological rhetoric (newspapers, 
speeches, and so on) with another (digital culture including Twitter, Facebook, and 
blogs).128 With Nathaniel Rivers, Brown articulates a “new” writing process that can 
avoid the traditional categories of persuasion by focusing on digital attunement.129 
Finally, Casey Boyle fully theorizes a flattened world by applying the digital metaphor to 
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the practice of rhetoric and actants who compose and occupy the network.130  
 As I alluded to earlier, however, I am not quite ready to leave the secret life of 
objects to an insurmountable mystery or to a life of permanent digital circulation. Marcus 
Doel and David Clarke remind us that simply asserting an objects’ mystical withdrawal is 
not that far from a political economy concerned with advertising.131 Following Jean 
Baudrillard here, they write, “the subject is caught up in a swarm or calculus of objects. 
Not even a junk shop, in which objects are simply abandoned willy-nilly, does the subject 
escape the multiplicity and duplicity of objects.”132 Thus, I might speculate that without a 
rigorous investigation of rhetoric and material arrangement, including structural 
production, the opening offered up by OOO may be limited to enhancing flexible spaces 
for new forms of commodification, including immaterial advertisement and digital labor. 
 Retuning to the scholarship of Adorno could offer some insight. Cook notes that 
Adorno begins from an understanding that, “material object are distinct from, and not 
fully accessible to, the concepts we use to apprehend them.”133 But, as J. M. Bernstein 
notes, relying too much on withdrawal as a response to human-centrality (what I 
described earlier as light anthropomorphism) also opens the door for reason and scientific 
                                                
130 Casey Boyle (2011). Abundant Rhetoric: Memory, Media, and the Multiplicity of 
Composition. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from 
http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/1046. Also see:  Casey Boyle, “Rhetoric as a Posthuman 
Practice: Writing Media in Abundance,” Accessed on September 9, 2014 at 
10:57am.  http://caseyboyle.net/project/rhetoric-as-a-posthuman-practice-writing-media-in-
abundance. 
131 Marcus A. Doel and David B. Clarke, “Dark Panopticon. Or, Attack of the Killer Tomatoes,” 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 17, no. 4 (1999), 444.  
132 Doel and Clarke, “Dark Panoptican,” 444. See also: Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects, 
trans. James Benedict (London: Verso, 2006). 
133 Deborah Cook, “Adorno, Foucault and Critique,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 39, no. 10 
(2013): 966. 
 46 
rationality to over-determine human encounters with the world. In a sense, overreliance 
on a concept of withdrawal also encourages humans to withdraw unscathed from the 
ethical responsibility to grapple with its general (or specific) histories and futures.134 So, 
while OOO uses digital culture and contemporary physics to make sense of objects, I am 
reminded of a section from the Dialectic of Enlightenment: “The ‘many things’ which, 
according to [Francis] Bacon, ‘are reserved,’ are themselves no more than instrumental: 
the radio as a sublimated printing press, the dive bomber as a more effective form of 
artillery, radio control as a more reliable compass.”135 In other words, the ‘newness’ that 
digital life presents, and that OOO scholarship hones in on, has the possibility of being, in 
reality, an outgrowth of an older Enlightenment kernel, perfected but repressed, secretly 
operative and motivating the speculative turn. In light of Enlightenment history, object-
oriented ontology risks (re)presenting an old instrumentality in new digital form.  
We can speculate, contra the conclusions of OOO, that fully embracing the digital 
model as a space of material freedom also ushers in a full disenchantment with the 
natural world, an obsession with integrating the culture industry into our everyday lives, 
and acquiescence to a mundane but total surveillance state rendering no space free. As 
such, I’d like to turn to a stasis point between the subject-focused and object-oriented 
scholarship that takes up the difference between reason and nature, to examine human 
and nonhuman relationships. A refreshed interest in materialism could understand [and] 
situate a claim to plant vibrancy, without relying on flattened withdrawal or infatuation 
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with its digital figuration.   
TURNING TOWARD A CENTER: NEW MATERIALISM 
Posthumanist scholar Rosi Braidotti reminds us that if any sense of the object is to 
be assessed, it must be based on an understanding of vitality through which 
transformation occurs.136 I interpret vitality here, following Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari 
and Jane Bennett, to mean simply an understanding of life as an “energetic,” “quivering,” 
or “evanescent” process of composition and decomposition.137 Although a sense of 
vitality need not begin and end with the human, Carey Wolfe adds that one does not need 
to naively eviscerate the concept of the human subject either, as the insights gleaned from 
OOO might suggest. Instead, Wolfe argues that approaching the world from a place of 
life could enhance our notions of “communication, interaction, meaning, social 
significations and affective investments with greater specificity.”138 William Connolly 
offers a helpful initial entrance point, noting a few converging points emerging from the 
body of new materialist scholarship. 139 Connolly argues that vitality offers a way of 
challenging a mechanist model of the universe by emphasizing energy-matter in dynamic 
processes of change. Humans in Connolly’s model are formative—but not the ground—
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for thought.  Connolly situates new materialism as an orientation that can be attentive to 
the politics of texture: scale, form, and creativity without dispensing the need for strategic 
or tactical interventions into structure and organization.140 Culminating in a call for an 
“ethic of cultivation,” Connolly draws our attention to a process philosophy attuned to 
assessing new modes of relations.  If the goal of the speculative turn could be reduced to 
a new interest in playing with digital argumentative ontology, then the goal of the new 
materialist move might be something like a generous affirmation of rhetorically informed 
conceptual intervention.  
The first core concept for new materialists, like their OOO counterparts, is to 
rethink the position of objects in relation to agency or to push beyond choice and reason-
based consciousness as the rubric for theorizing activity. Diana Coole and Samantha 
Frost note that new materialism shares a contemporary concern for submitting 
“objectivity and material reality to a radical reappraisal.”141  Inspired by a cadre of 
innovative philosophers including Henri Bergson, Georges Bataille, Baruch Spinoza, and 
Deleuze, new materialists situate their intervention as one that invests new ways of 
thinking about the matter we interact with on a daily basis. Of particular importance, 
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contra Thomas Hobbes or Julian Offray de La Mettire, new materialists want to re-
explain the laws of force and matter describing life-systems. Coole and Frost present 
examples such as quarks, Higgs-boson experiments, and black holes which act as 
conundrum for old laws and demonstrate the need for new concepts and methods. 142 In 
so doing, new materialists draw from what is termed “complexity theory” as a challenge 
to linear cause-and-effect logic.143 For, “rather than tending toward inertia or a state of 
equilibrium,” Coole and Frost argue, “matter is recognized here as exhibiting immanently 
self-organizing properties subtended by an intricate filigree of relationships.”144 
Conceived as tapping into a raw flow of energy (described otherwise as a law of motion), 
new materialists invest creative power in the concept of self-organizing actancy as a 
principle that draws the human into a similar plane as other organic beings.  
 Bennett, perhaps the central figure in new materialism, attunes us to the active, 
non-human related power of exertion that things have on the human in various publics. 
Assembling ideas of Nietzsche and Foucault, Bennett describes vitalism as a political 
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process of self-transformation.145 Drawing on Thoreau’s interest in a “wild and uncanny 
presence” in the environment, Bennett notes that phenomena should be approached with 
a willingness to consider nonhuman interests beyond traditional categories of human-
centered utility.146 Bennett’s posture is purposefully playful with its description. Rick 
Dolfinj and Iris van der Tuin note in their composite volume of new materialist thinkers, 
the playfulness of Bennett and other new materialist writers is designed to push dualisms 
to an extreme.147 Vitalism becomes important as a concept precisely because it references 
spontaneous composition and organization, acknowledges a lack of predictive capacity, 
and focuses on the productive investment in theorizing social change as the result of 
openings and fissures in the smooth operation of a system. As such, understanding 
vitality as a rhetoric and not an ontology breathes more grounded possibility into 
imaginative historical and aesthetic intervention.148  
 As pioneered in the work of Brian Massumi, new materialism also substitutes the 
natural sciences’ penchant for classification with a metaphor of cartography, trying 
thereby to understand arrangements of interest or intensity.149 Similar to new media 
                                                
145 Jane Bennett, “Thing-Power,” in Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy, and Public 
Life, eds. Bruce Braun, Sarah J. Whatmore, and Isabelle Stengers, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), 35- 62. 
146 Jane Bennett, “A Vitalist Stop on the Way to a New Materialism,” in New Materialisms, eds. 
Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).  
147 Rick Dolfijn and Iris van der Tuin, “A New Tradition in Thought,” in New Materialism: 
Interviews and Cartographies, eds. Rick Dolfijn and Iris van der Tuin, (Ann Arbor: Open 
Humanities Press, 2012), 85. 
148 Ben Anderson, “Becoming and Being Hopeful: Towards a Theory of Affect,” Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 24, no. 5 (2006): 736. 
149 Brian Massumi, “Autonomy of Affect,” Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, 
Sensation, Post-Contemporary Interventions (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 
 51 
technologists that charts the use of words or idea mappings, new materialism, according 
to Karen Barad, emphasizes affect and affirmation. In her words, “matter feels, 
converses, suffers, desires, yearns and remembers.”150 Barard believes these affective 
“intra-actions” draw attention to forms of response and configuration, especially to the 
interaction between the audience building connections through encounters.151 In a crucial 
difference with OOO, Barad and a rich collection of thinkers including Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, Ann Cvetkovich, Janet Stiger, and Katie Stewart, focus on understanding 
relationships between subject and objects tactilely in terms of texture. 152 A focus on 
relief, opposed to flat mappings, for new materialists is preferable because it offers a site 
of joining and connecting, while leaving our perceptive spaces open to different 
consistencies and compositions.     
Like Haraway, Barad describes a textured reading as a political approach. Similar 
to Burke’s description of orientation, concepts develop as they become invested with 
power and situated in affect-based relationships with each other.153  Affect systems can 
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be assessed, according to Fox and Aldred, as a rhetorical economy where symbols get 
invested with feeling and circulate in and through new media technology.154 Textures 
approaches also resolve the tendency to omit the “economy” (as I noted in the OOO 
section) by describing value in affective affirmation as it appears in a medium.  
I also have a sense in which new materialism, as with OOO, however, may 
become too flimsy or flexible in articulating an approach to politics. Following critics 
like Dana L. Cloud, theorists may overvalue their own conceptual labor at the expense of 
theorizing structural antagonism. As Cloud and others caution, if excitement for 
“complexity, cultural difference and postmodern sophistication” substitutes for 
organizing around interests of exploited people, then the result “would be a political and 
ethical failure.”155 Instead, shifts in practical consciousness require a commitment to a 
politics of interests and solidarity.156 While I suspect I may approach new materialism 
more generously than some, I am inspired by the need to attend to structures that can 
account for another kind of relational movement beyond the ephemeral appeal to self-
organization, even as I agree that relations must be theorized beyond the human. As 
Justin Willford argues, new materialism could benefit from a return to the dialectic; that 
is, not limiting inquiry to theorizing various expressions of objects, but by examining 
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subjects and objects with reference to orientations of domination keyed specifically by 
contradictions. The sense of affirmation inspiring new materialism needs to be tempered 
with historically inspired negation to retain an ethical dimension. I argue that a return to 
the work of Adorno could offer the potential for assessing vitality and affect, forged 
through rhetorical labor, yet avoid becoming enamored with the immaterial.  
 If, according to Burke, the human is unique in its capacity for affirmation and 
negation, then structurally I have attempted to demonstrate his finding in numerous ways 
throughout the literature review. I positioned two different challenges to the 
Enlightenment orientation to demonstrate a basic rhetorical principle of transformation 
best articulated by Adorno. Dethroning the centrality of the human as received by the 
Enlightenment, especially situating claims to ethically and rhetorically consider plants 
with subject capacities, can both reveal whole ongoing worlds of engagement at the same 
time it risks effacing what makes plants unique objects. Solely considering plants as 
objects withdrawn, as I have argued of OOO, wishes away the very means through which 
we might encounter otherness itself. New materialism could be considered a stasis point, 
especially because scholars acknowledge an important claim about life in the digital 
world, but leave open rhetorical and affective texture to explain vital relationships that 
exist mediated, but independent from digital models of the world. Slightly skeptical of 
the sense of unbridled affirmation animating new materialism, I have argued that we need 
to also advance a spirit of negation in order to fully appreciate a complex political 
relationship between the human and the plant. From this vantage point, let me offer an 
itinerary of the complex entanglement I will theorize.  
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PREVIEW OF FIGURE STUDIES (CHAPTERS) 
Each chapter understands the figuring of plants in the motif of a journey.  That is, 
each figure study explores different kinds of passages in which human and plant relations 
are encountered and critiqued.  So while the motif may reinforce certain Enlightenment 
archetypes, I mean it to also confront them as well. The research is one that is not limited 
to one field of study or one disciplinary practice. Instead, I approach academic thought as 
I do the everyday encounters inspiring my writing: as multidimensional edge work and 
embodied experience. In this way, knowledge does not sit in agricultural silos, hoarded 
and isolated for further use. Rather, I aim for an understanding of thought that is 
ecologically shared, nourishing an orientation toward writing that is as rigorous as it is 
playful and performative.   
In the first figure study I approach the human and plant relationship by reading a 
site that often stages such encounters: natural parks. I theorize a specific encounter I had 
with two close friends at Red Rock State Park in California. I use Theodor W. Adorno’s 
lecture on natural history through out the chapter both to vitalize his work and also as a 
means to understand the dialect communicated in these preservationist settings. In taking 
up the park’s invitation to participate in “guiding walking,” the figural journey also traces 
two specific exhibits—a displayed piece of petrified wood and a diorama of early human 
tool use—to reflect on a staged relationship between humans and plants presented by the 
museum located in the heart of the Mojave Desert. In so doing, I amplify Adorno’s 
concerns about keeping our sense of what counts as natural and history in conversation 
with the forces of Enlightenment maintaining their motion.  
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The second figuring approaches the study of human-plant relations by exploring a 
specific varietal: the Sipo-Matador, known affectionately as the murdering liana. In 
tracing the plant trough different genres including poetry, science fiction, contemporary 
biology, Western philosophy and nineteenth century travel logs, I reveal the way the 
plant is figured in modes of affirmation and negation through historical and divergent 
registers. In exploring iterations of these vastly different sketches, I present opportunities 
to reflect on ways the plant has been figured to assist in projects of colonization, as 
fulcrum for a Western system of ethics, and as an actant in community formation. Using 
Adorno’s dialectical method to understand both affirmative and negative expressions of 
this figure, I end with a more poetic formation of the human enmeshed with the plant. 
In the third study, I offer a much more intimate odyssey through human and plant 
relations in the register of sound, offering a review (heavily informed by Adorno’s large 
corpus on sound) of the 2012 art-album Years by Bartholomäus Traubeck. In seeking to 
understand a dialectical ambivalence in Traubeck’s digital and fantastic rendering of tree 
sounds, I apply immanent criticism to my vinyl copy of the work as: as an opportunity to 
reflect on the contours of European woodlands but also as a specific commodity in itself. 
I travel through different states of the objects production, examining its relationship to 
other expressions of technological advancement and more well established mediums of 
reception. In so doing, I aim to reveal an ethical orientation of listening best suited to hear 
the human-plant relationship, one attuned to a rhetoric based on an Adorno-inspired 
ambient form of persuasion.  
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Ecologically read, each chapter provides a different understanding of sense, scale, 
and scene when considering the three distinct settings of figuration: deserts, rainforests, 
and woodlands. The environment subtly surrounds us in each figuration, where the 
endemic plant life characterized by each unique habitat is subtly imprinted in the 
readings. Oscillating between subject and object, the connections between human and 
plant becomes multidimensional when read across the figural habitats each chapter 
evokes.  
The final concluding chapter returns to the discussion of human and plant 
relations more fully, looking at ramifications for understanding contemporary 
communication models in biology and rhetorical theory that could be more or less suited 
for ascertaining the extrahuman turn. I conclude with a short demonstration of my 
argument in application by examining a key influential artifact in the conversation: Stevie 
Wonder’s soundtrack to the 1979 film with the same name: Journey through the Secret 
Life of Plants.  
Culminating from each figure study is a call to meditate on a principle of 
journeyed movement: how can we keep the subject-object relationship in motion, in 
rhetoric?157 For me, a sense of motion—of not resting—defines both the project as a 
whole and the trajectory of Adorno’s critical method toward which, I argue, we ought 
return more closely. For that, I now offer a closer look at Adorno’s immanent criticism 
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and its relation to rhetoric before I offer the case studies and a deeper return in the 
concluding chapter.   
 58 
CHAPTER TWO: METHOD 
 
 
The power of the status quo puts up facades into which our consciousness crashes.  
It must seek to crash through them. 
— Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics 
 
Reading Theodor Adorno is difficult; it’s laborious in fact. Because Adorno’s 
theory assembles many different layers of thought at once, a close reader has to stop and 
catch a breath. As the central figure in the Institute for Social Research (more widely 
known as the Frankfurt School), Adorno heavily influenced a broad range of movements 
in philosophy and rhetoric, including aesthetics, ideological criticism, and Marxist 
theory.158 A Jewish exile from the Nazi regime who taught in New York and Palo Alto 
before returning to Germany after World War II, Adorno centered his criticism on 
challenging domination by understanding the relationship between content and form.159 
In major pieces like the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Minima Moralia, Negative 
Dialectics, and the posthumously published Aesthetic Theory, he took aim at a wide array 
of opponents: what he termed “the culture industry”; numerous sects of philosophy; some 
communities of scientific researchers; and fascist political organizations.  He challenged 
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each for cultivating an attitude toward mindless consumption, training people to submit 
to violent bureaucratic administration, and for encouraging people to avoid thinking 
deeply about politics and history.  
As Max Paddison notes, Adorno’s writing is prone to provocation because of its 
density.160 In a sense, Adorno’s texts present themselves as an address: a challenge and 
opportunity for the reader to interpret and respond. In opposition to immediate and easy 
comprehension, Adorno’s writing demands readers think deeply about the principles and 
assumptions that make up the current social fabric or constellation for understanding the 
world, its history, and their place in it. In fact, most introductions to Adorno begin, as 
does Alexander John Peter Thomson’s, with a nod to the intensity required in reading and 
applying Adorno’s method.161 Taking cues from Thomson, we can understand Adorno's 
method as asking readers to assume a place of rigorous reflection and deep meditative 
thought about the relationship between domination and language while reading. 
Especially when focused on objects of culture (from avant-garde art to technical 
composition in music), Adorno wrote in this way not just to reveal how an object 
reflected the systems of production and social life that produced it but also, in turn, how 
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the object mediated and communicated those systems to an audience. Adorno’s method is 
a form of inquiry he termed, “immanent criticism,” stressing that neither object nor 
subject in an exchange existed ‘outside’ a set of structures conditioning the critical 
process.162 Such back and forth between “the object” and “the subject” of criticism is a 
process he understood as one of oppositional or dialectical encounter. At the opening of 
Negative Dialectics, Adorno presents a complex, yet succinct explication. “Dialectics,” 
Adorno argues, “is the consistent sense of nonidentity. My thought is driven to it by its 
own inevitable insufficiency, by my guilt of what I am thinking.”163 What does he mean 
that thought is driven less by certainty and more by a knowledge of a thinker’s 
limitation? What could he mean that guilt rather than conviction drives his thought? How 
do these admissions relate to rhetorical method? In exploring these questions, I will 
continue to explain these two important concepts, dialectics and immanent critique, 
which help us get closer to a clearer answer.   
To this end it is necessary to rehearse a brief history of rhetorical methods to 
situate better Adorno’s work. I will focus on one important method in rhetorical studies, 
ideological critique, to help make Adorno’s contribution more apparent. Next, I return to 
the dialectic as a way to regain focus by understanding the term in its application in the 
field of speech, particularly in its expression in contemporary academic debate and in 
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Western philosophy. Finally, I will turn to the Frankfurt author and offer some general 
examinations including a closer step-by-step guide to dialectical analysis, or immanent 
critique, illustrating how I approach each figure study.  
I. A Contemporary Story of Rhetoric 
BRIEF HISTORY OF RHETORICAL METHOD 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell in the opening of her “Rhetorical Criticism 2009: A 
Study in Method,” explains “that the persistent issue in rhetorical criticism today remains 
the same as it was in 1965—method.”164 In other words, rhetorical method, much like the 
artifacts that lend themselves to investigation, as Lloyd Bitzer points out, are a unique 
“complex of persons, events, objects, and relations….”165 As such, a standardized 
approach to analyzing or critiquing rhetorical phenomena is neither possible nor 
preferred. Contemporary rhetorical method, however, generally begins with an 
understanding of strategies of early 20th century innovators, including: close textual 
analysis drawn from the New Critics (I.A. Richards, Cleanth Brooks, W.K.Wimsatt & 
McBeardsley); universal form analysis developed by Russian formalists (Roman 
Jakobsen); and linguistic sign structures articulated by Ferdinand de Saussure.166  
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Rhetoricians in the early and mid 20th century took these insights and applied them to 
occasional speeches; their methods applied what were assumed to be universal principles 
of persuasion to the internal structure of a single speech. Craig Baird, Marie Hochmuth, 
Wayland Maxfield Parish, and Herbert Wichlens established a formal approach to 
oratorical persuasion, by using talent and technique to appraise a speaker’s response to a 
local occasion.167 Edwin Black developed a rhetorical method distinct from a formalist 
concern by stressing the importance of understanding persuasion in the context of 
external conditions and the composition of audience members.168 Challenging the 
dominance of the Neo-Aristotelian influence in rhetorical methods, Black’s concern was 
arguably cultural, centering on understanding the relationship between speech making 
and audience transformation.  
But Campbell remains historically one of the most influential scholars of method 
influencing contemporary approaches by suggesting scholars examine not just the 
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internal composition of a speech, but also the choices of selection made by the speaker.169 
For Campbell, merely assessing the skill or technique of an orator in response to a 
situation minimized the interests of a particular speaker and culture in the crafting 
process. By emphasizing inclusion and omission, Campbell linked a speaker to a cultural 
context and emphasized the responsibilities of the critic beyond technical assessment. 
After Campbell, the practice of rhetorical criticism became political. Campbell’s 
groundbreaking criticisms of Richard Nixon’s “Vietnamization” speech and her 
subsequent focus on the (excluded) role of women in foundational rhetorical study, R.L. 
Scott’s engagement with confrontational rhetoric, and Parke B. Burgess’ rendering of the 
unique persuasive elements of Black Power movements, pushed rhetoric on the speech-
side beyond the objective assessment of public address.170 Instead, Campbell notes, 
criticism took up responsibility for advancing political concerns, especially in exploring 
expressions of domination in culture.  While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
cover all the approaches that take up Campbell’s intervention, the most conspicuous kind 
of rhetorical approach that centers political and ethical questions has come to be known 
as “ideological criticism.”  In order to understand Adorno’s method in relation to 
rhetorical studies, I will now turn to a focused description of one specific form: 
ideological criticism.  
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IDEOLOGICAL CRITICISM  
According to Joshua Gunn, in general “ideology is a concept that refers to the 
collective beliefs, attitudes, and values of a given group of people.”171  In their overview 
to a special edition on ideology in criticism in the Western Journal of Communication, 
Dana Cloud and Gunn situate the term ideology as it is picked up and manipulated at 
different time periods for different interests.172 Originally understood by Destutt de Tracy 
as the science of ideas, Terry Eagleton, note Cloud and Gunn, argues that any scrutiny of 
ideology is in part motivated by an attempt to understand how “people may come to 
invest in their own unhappiness.”173 As Emmet Kennedy argues, the term "ideology" 
transitioned from a cooperative to competitive valence around the French revolution. 174 
Thus, in contemporary reception, ideology is broadly thought of as an umbrella term 
associated with the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles, especially describing a 
range of methods articulating a relationship between the modes of production and the 
landscape of ideas and class interests which arise from economic structure.175  
In rhetorical studies, a criticism of ideology first emerged in two pivotal articles 
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by Philip Wander. Wander took up Campbell’s intervention by exploring the patterns of 
identification in public address for the communities and groups excluded in the act of 
naming.176 Calling it  “the ideological turn” in rhetoric, Wander drew attention to the 
formative interests of the critic in assessing texts and understood successful criticism as 
those which heightened critical reflexivity (in contrast to methods aimed at clearly 
describing successful tactics in speech).177 
Operating from an explicit set of Marxist terms, Michael Calvin McGee was 
among the first in rhetorical studies to link rhetoric with ideology and materiality. “A 
materiality theory of rhetoric,” notes McGee, “would not aim at making rules of 
composition, but rather at the description, explanation, perhaps even prediction of the 
formation of consciousness itself.”178  McGee encouraged scholars to explore a text from 
multiple layers, including: (1) the microhistorical (specific 
“speaker/speech/audience/occasion/change”); (2) the sociorhetorical (fantasy, role or 
persona acted out); and (3) the macrohistorical (institutional or collective 
organization).179  For McGee, each text carried a residue of historical arrangements and 
could be examined explicitly to notice relations of domination operating in the text. 
Attempting to forge a form of ideology critique specific to rhetorical studies, McGee 
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proposed the concept of the "ideograph," (a basic "unit" of ideology) that can be used as a 
tool allowing a critic to draw connections from a piece of rhetoric (the artifact or 
expression) to its ideological constellation (the structure of ideas, interests, and economic 
conditions of its production). As a symbol (or unit of analysis), the ideograph stands in 
for a host of relations, often meaning different things to different people depending on 
their social location or goal (or the synchronic dimension). More importantly, ideographs 
exist in relation to the larger time-context and can shift over a period of time (or the 
diachronic dimension). According to Ronald Lee, the goal of ideographic-based criticism 
is to notice how antagonism—the struggle over power and control in any given context—
is present in discursive residue or its representation. In this reading, the audience, 
assumed or actual, is also a product of rhetoric, in the sense that ideographs operate as 
short cuts, easily persuading audiences by subtly reinforcing interests and assumptions in 
the very language a text or speaker may use.180 
 By 1993, note Cloud and Gunn, the criticism of ideology became embroiled in a 
wider debate about the scale, scope, and constitution of the method of rhetorical 
                                                
180 See: Ronald Lee, “Ideographic Criticism,” in The Art of Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Jim A. 
Kuypers (Boston: Pearson/Allyn and Bacon, 2005), 292-97; Also see: Celeste Condit and John 
Lucaites, Crafting <equality>: America’s Anglo-African Word (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993); Also see: Philip P. Wander, “The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism,” Central 
States Speech Journal 3-4 (1983): 1-18; Philip Wander, “The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn 
in Rhetorical Theory,” Central States Speech Journal 35, no. 4 (1984): 197–216. Wander also 
notices how prevalent is Heidegger’s relation to landscape. Wander notes, following George 
Steiner, that landscape metaphors are used centrally in the text. But Wander returns it to a central 
human theme, “Heidegger” he argues spoke not just in using the themes of ‘agrarian romance, but 
that the organizing metaphor of the land, spoke, “also of the primacy of the earth in the human 
world and the need to till the land that babies might not die in their mothers arms.” See: Wander, 
“Ideological Criticism,” 12. 
 67 
inquiry.181 Critics who were interested in assessing the political and interest-driven 
context of ideology became aligned with a resurgent appreciation for texts as a form of 
public address, following Stephen Lucas.182 Critics interested in articulating a text’s 
aesthetic elements or its place in cultural circulation (generally speaking, a Foucauldian 
approach) argued for a greater emphasis on power and interpretation.183 While it is 
beyond the scope of my dissertation to explore the difference fully, I argue that the latter, 
termed “critical rhetoric,” influenced by Raymie McKerrow (also Lawrence Grossberg, 
Carole Blair, and others), took the spirit of Wander while the former (including James 
Aune, Cloud, and other historical materialists), encouraged closer reading of structure 
and production following Marx.184 While I do not claim to resolve the debate (nor do I 
think it is beneficial to do so), I am arguing in favor of a different return to ideological 
criticism. Following the Frankfurt School, I read Adorno to draw attention to the context 
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and politically-situated elements of a text’s production while also, following the critical 
rhetoricians, offer an appreciation of aesthetics and power relations. From this ground, 
I’d like to return to a reading of what critical theorists term "the dialectic" as way of 
gathering an applied approach to rhetoric and to situate Adorno’s method, particularly in 
respect to how his mode of immanent criticism understands structure as adhering in 
thought and language.  
II. The Persistence of the Dialectic 
 Fredric Jameson suggests that one of Adorno’s greatest contributions to the 
theoretical humanities is his understanding of the term dialectic. Jameson writes in Late 
Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence of the Dialectic that the “originality” of Adorno’s 
contribution “lies in his unique emphasis on the presence of late capitalism as a totality 
within the very form of our concepts.”185 This is to suggest, “no other Marxist 
theoretician has ever staged this relationship between the universal and the particular, the 
system and the detail, with this kind of single minded yet wide ranging attention.”186 
Against the seemingly surface play of texts divorced from lived experience in a system of 
domination favored by theorists more attuned to French post-structuralism, Jameson sees 
in Adorno a “celebration of the dialectic” influence by the German tradition.187 Before I 
situate what Jameson detects in Adorno’s sense of the dialectic, it is helpful to review the 
term itself. In what follows, I offer some applied examples to help get at the lived version 
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of the dialectic, and then examine the history of the term as told in the story of Western 
philosophy.  
APPLIED DIALECTICS  
Any introduction to “the dialectic” begins with the understanding that while the 
term may be easy to define it is impossibly caught in the struggle of the time period in 
which it is used in discussion. The Oxford English Dictionary directs us to understand 
“the dialectic” in its Platonic form, as a certain kind of logic or reasoning, an ongoing 
investigation into truth often through dialogue or discussion”188 Media theorist Peter 
Lunnenefled situates the term as a nod to pragmatics or “grounding the insights of theory 
in the constraints of practice,” whose origin comes from a sense of “the art of 
conversation.”189 Some forms of psychoanalysis, according to Arnold Goldberg, consider 
the dialectic to be “the to-and-fro exchange of information between two persons.”190 
What connects these approaches is an embodied practice, where the live exchange of 
ideas (including attempts to come to consensus or to articulate disagreement) establishes 
understanding and offers an opportunity to reflect.  
In the discipline of speech and communication studies, many early articles from 
the so-called Cornell school in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, especially Evert Lee 
Hunt, understood the dialectic as “any process of argumentation conducted by question 
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and answer rather than by continuous discourse is here regarded as a dialectic process.”191 
What Lee called cross-examination, he argued, was an applied dialectic found in 
academic debate clubs of the time.192 Handbooks beginning at the turn of the 20th Century 
[notably James A. Winans’ Notes on Public Speaking (1911), Albert Craig Baird’s Public 
Discussion and Debate (1928), Carrol Pollock Lahman’s Debate Coaching: A Handbook 
for Teachers and Coaches (1936), and Russell Wagner’s Handbook of Argumentation 
(1938)] also make the case for a special kind of knowledge emerging from the dialectic  
of debate formats.193  
Contemporary speech practices, especially present in academic forensics 
programs and speech and debate competitive teams, in U.S. higher education have 
absorbed the dialectic into pedagogy and practice. Examining the practical application of 
the dialectic in these formats helps illustrate its logic and use. I should also note forensics 
is where my personal experience with the pedagogy of dialectic is located. As a student, 
coach, and curriculum designer for many universities and styles of debate competition 
over the course of 20 years, I have both participated in and been crafted by this unique 
pedagogical model; It’s influence is clear in the rhetorical methods I am developing.  
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In contemporary debate, dialectic could refer to more than just the period of 
exchange between the participants, as assumed in the Platonic version, but to the form 
itself, a shift introduced in the writings of Hegel. Generally speaking, students prepare 
divergent argumentative strategies to a shared controversy, called "the resolution." In 
tournament competition, students present their strategies in two-hour rounds, the winner 
decided by an agreed upon judge who renders a public decision. Because students will 
debate numerous times in one tournament, they are required to think multiple 
perspectives through two primary poles: the affirmative, or side that endorses the 
resolution and negative, the side that challenges the affirmative. Students must be 
prepared to execute compelling positions over the course of the weekend that both affirm 
and negate a shared proposition. Dialectic helps to explain that formal debate is not 
similar to a pro/con book in a library or a debate around the family table. The setting, the 
structure, and the third-party decision on the debate by a judge make debate a distinct 
dialectical situation, more akin to the Hegelian tradition of thesis-antithesis-synthesis 
than to the dialogues of Socrates. The formal practice of affirmation and negation, 
performed over and over, creates a movement of interpretation in which students are 
asked to cultivate a perspective only to have it be altered by contingency. But in each 
repetition of the form, students are asked to transform their opinions of the world into 
public perspectives for the purpose of evaluation and judgment. In this way, the form 
affirmation-negation-judgment creates a triangulated understanding of argument 
motivated by dialectical inquiry. 
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Debate remains one of the few public navigations of a "dialectical triangle" with 
innumerable benefits to participants and to deliberation and dialogue. Often, however, 
debate and its accompanying term “argument” can be read with negative valence, 
especially to those unfamiliar or new to the activity as it is practiced in the United 
States.194 What I have found valuable, however, is something important about the 
dialectical triangle I have been outlining: it contests the opinion-centered understanding 
of contemporary public consciousness. In his article, “Opinion Delusion Society,” 
Adorno challenges the contemporary aversion to debate, reflected in the desire to frame 
public argument as a mere expression of opinion: 
Opinion is the positing, no matter how qualified, of a subjective 
consciousness restricted in its truth content … by proclaiming his [sic] 
opinion—unsound, unsubstantiated by experience, conclusive without 
deliberation—to be his own, though he may appear to qualify it, simply be 
relating the opinion to himself as subject he in fact lends it an authority: 
that of a profession of faith…Conversely, when confronted with a 
convincing and well grounded judgment that nevertheless is discomforting 
and cannot be refuted, there is an all-too-prevalent tendency to disqualify 
it by declaring it to be mere opinion.195  
 
The problem is a narcissistic one, according to Adorno, and creates a consumptive 
subject. “Personal opinion becomes, as one’s possession, an integral component of one’s 
person and anything that weakens that opinion is registered by one’s unconscious and 
preconscious as though it were a personal injury.”196 Here Adorno argues that, “opinion 
is above all consciousness that does not yet have its object,” one in which opinion sutures 
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the present contradictions of society into the most palatable form and erases the structure 
of origin.197 Adorno’s solution, I will argue later, is not more dialogue based in opinion 
more akin to consumption than research. Instead, Adorno asks that we cultivate “an 
ability to make the exertion of reflection required by a concept of truth that does not stand 
in abstract and reified contraposition to mere subjectivity but rather develops itself 
through critique, by means of reciprocal mediation of subject and object.”198 What is to 
be gained by an understanding of an applied dialectic in the form of contemporary 
academic debate, though, is an ability to understand and challenge various forms of 
ideology, especially the hidden politics of common sense.  To take on the practice of 
dialectic is to cultivate a rhetorical consciousness that mediates the individual and social 
dimensions of experience that are structured ideologically. Adorno argues that “opinion is 
not due simply to people’s inadequate knowledge but rather is imposed upon them by the 
overall structure of society and hence by relations of domination.”199 And thus, the 
purpose of pursuing a persistent dialectic in thinking or debate is to understand the 
“nature of thought,” as it clings to its own revelations and for whom only the thinker can 
undo such attachment. A strategy of challenge can be advanced through cultivating an 
ability to make judgments, engage in critique, and formulate different responses that 
challenge students to think both the affirmative and the negative.  
 Of course, aside from the debate practice in higher education in the United States, 
the dialectic has a more philosophical history that is helpful to understand for explaining 
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Adorno’s critique of opinion. Taken as part of the method of immanent criticism, 
Adorno's critique of opinion is responding to the history of Western philosophy and its 
mangled story of the dialectic from Plato to Hegel and Marx.  Having explained how the 
dialectic works in debate, I now turn toward a brief explanation of the concept in Western 
thought by glossing four different historical moments in philosophy: Ancient Greece, 
Kant, Hegel, and Marx. 
ANCIENT ORIGINS 
The story of the dialectic starts at the origin of Western thinking in Ancient 
Greece and reflects an early attempt at theorizing struggle itself.  Nicholas Rescher 
characterizes these approaches to the dialectic broadly as “an oscillation between 
opposing forces in a productive tension where each turning makes a constructive 
contribution to the effective functioning of the overall process.”200 Early Greek thinking 
established this positive principle in two ways. For Sophists and Plato most 
conspicuously, the goal was to present information in the form of an intentional dialogue, 
that is, the asking and answering of questions in a staged practice.  The hope was that in 
submitting a proposition to a series of questions, an internal contradiction in the heart of 
knowing itself would be revealed. As Rescher points out, for Plato the primary goal was 
more an exercise akin to the flexing of cognitive muscle than in revealing a specific kind 
of truth or surety of action.201 While such approaches gave the dialectic (and by extension 
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rhetoric) a bad rap in the name of sophistry, for Plato, a formal questioning agenda 
offered a fundamental experience with curiosity and creativity.202  
 In contrast, Aristotle had a sense of the dialectic motivated by a concern for 
investigative principles.203 But rather than induce principles, Rescher notes that Aristotle 
oriented his understanding of dialectical inquiry deductively, arguing from general agreed 
upon principles toward specific conclusion that emerge by comparing premises. 
Aristotle’s syllogistic proofs, a statements building shared premises followed by a final 
conclusion, resemble formal logic aimed at guaranteeing confidence and mutual 
acceptance.  In an example provided by Rescher, “in an Aristotelian dialectic we ‘sweep 
the horizon’ of plausible possibilities and show that something obtains irrespective of 
one’s commitment to any particular alternative by identifying it as an implied 
commonality on all sides.”204 Aristotelian logic, including his understanding of the 
dialectic, offers a similar departure for contemporary studies or persuasion and analytic 
philosophy.  
The difference in approaches to knowledge and proof—that is, deductive and 
inductive reasoning—was established by the difference between Plato and Aristotle over 
the term “dialectic.” An agreed upon premise or a shared understanding of the meaning 
of terms is, for Aristotle, the origin of the dialectical process and not, as an implied or 
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perhaps impossible outcome as argued by Plato.205 While both Plato and Aristotle agree 
that the dialectic produces “positive results,” the former attempted to arrive at “ultimate 
truth” while the latter hoped for a more foundational or “fundamental truth.” Other 
scholars built on this dilemma over the next millennia (including the skeptics, Cicero, and 
Tomas Aquinas for examples). But the term gets a vastly different treatment in 
Enlightenment thinking established by Immanuel Kant. 
KANT’S CRITIQUE   
Kant was suspicious of the potential for a dialectical questioning to degenerate 
into a series of illusions. Instead, he sought a transcendental set of terms to firmly 
advance a reasoning based on certainty.206 Resiner argues that Kant initially rejected the 
dialectic as a sort of magical manipulation, worried that  “illusory logic prevails where 
one cannot settle matters convincingly with either a yes or a nay and arises whenever we 
inappropriately reify (hypostatize) an actual object that exist in reality as some item 
which in fact is a mere contrivance of thought.”207 The tendency for dialectical inquiry to 
devolve away from certainty into misreading, misidentification and obfuscation made the 
process established by Plato (and to a lesser degree Aristotle) prone to “deception and 
delusion.”208 For Kant, the self-contradiction inherent in the structure of the dialectic is 
the result of a failure, one in which thinking ought neither privilege nor sustain. Thus, the 
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project of the Enlightenment, initiated by Kant and described more fully in the literature 
review, hinges on his rejection of the dialectical encounter entirely.  
As Diana Coole notes, however, it is impossible to understand any part of the 
project of thinking in the West and especially a newly appreciated sense of the dialectic 
without Kant.209 The resurgence in dialectic theory promoted one of the most important 
innovations in philosophic thinking, and one whom played a large role in Adorno’s 
thought: German idealism and Georg W.F. Hegel.  
HEGEL’S INFLUENCE 
Considered primary in any approach to ideology, the thought of Georg W.F. 
Hegel established a form of modern philosophy called German Idealism. As Frederick 
Besier puts it, “every major philosophical movement of the twentieth century—
existentialism, Marxism, pragmatism, phenomenology, and analytic philosophy—grew 
out of reaction against Hegel.”210 Hegel began with a philosophy and concept of 
consciousness initiated by a sense of wonder at encounters with the natural world. His 
method included the following: the assumption of a perspective human subject, capable 
of collecting “facts” or experiences from encounters in the world that led to generalizable 
conclusions followed by primary principles of change that explained those conditions. Of 
course, given the immensity (and density) of his writings, I’ll try to offer a few of his key 
arguments inspiring contemporary ideological criticism and previewing his invigoration 
of the dialectic.  
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Hegel sought to articulate a theory of unity emergent from the division he 
observed in and about his surrounding environment.211 The natural world, for Hegel, 
could be understood as “co-existing, qualitatively distinct” from humans, but nevertheless 
developed progressively, “[in] mutually external stages,” through a movement of division 
and synthesis in a similar fashion to human history and consciousness.212 For example, in 
the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel writes: “Nature confronts us as a riddle and a problem, 
whose solution both attracts and repels us: attracts us because Spirit is presaged in 
Nature; repels us because Nature seems an alien existence, in which Spirit does not find 
itself.”213 While not a vitalist, Hegel nonetheless sought to draw from his experience with 
(and observations of) the surrounding world a central principle: change in the form of the 
dialectic.  
For Hegel, contact with what he considered the natural world both explained the 
concept of “change” and provided the formative experience for the development of 
human consciousness. Since these experiences would develop and deepen over time, they 
provide the resources for the moments of transformation of human consciousness as well.  
Because one could never grasp the absolute essence of nature, to ponder on the 
conundrum “when consciousness asks itself what is its object, the object in itself,” is the 
opening and ground of thinking itself.214 For Hegel, figuring out the difference between 
                                                
211 Beiser, Hegel, 37.  
212 Cinzia Ferrini, “The Transition to Organics: Hegel’s Idea of Life,” in A Companion to Hegel, 
eds. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 209.  
213 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, ed. and trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1830/2004), 3.  
214 Beiser, Hegel, 59-60. 
 79 
humans and the environment reveals and establishes a form of subject-object 
identification.215 This equation, what counts as what, is an example of Hegel’s 
understanding of dialectical logic. Hegel, in other words, presumes thinking to be 
enmeshed in a constant struggle over how to concretize the difference between “the 
subject” and “the object” that is, in a certain essence, defined as a dynamic process of 
isolating and consolidating the difference and similarity between the terms human and 
nature.  In Beiser’s terms, “both the subjective and objective are equally real, and the 
opposition between them is apparent from our everyday experience….”216 As antecedent 
to immanent criticism, Hegel’s approach emphasized the reinforcing relationship between 
human consciousness and the surrounding environment, as well as the noticed 
contradiction between the two, as a way of representing his concept of the whole.217  
Hegel opposed certain features of the Kantian reliance on a principle of 
transcendence. For Kant, the term transcendent aimed at expressing a type of faith, the 
very limit to what can be known. Hegel argued that for one to know a limit, one must 
have a sense of what exists beyond it and thus to have troubled the feature of a limit 
itself.218  The transcendence Hegel challenged could be visualized literally as a rising up 
toward a different plane, most likely drawing from a resurrection myth. Hegel sought 
instead to relate vitality to a mundane world, and in effect, defined materiality as all the 
activity, including consciousness, bounded by Earthly experience. Since all of 
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consciousness is defined by an ecological encounter, then, Hegel reasoned, no such 
transcendence was likely to occur. In so arguing, he also affirmed the model of human 
reason favored by the Enlightenment and used it to systematize a world of immanence.  
But, as Hegel points out, assuming that consciousness emerges from a human’s 
encounter with nature has a tendency to remain unsatisfyingly endless. Hegel wanted to 
understand “change” concretely and historically.219 Hegel placed the dialectic not in the 
structure of human thinking but as an explanatory form found in the natural world and  
inspired by a Spirit of design.220 Instead of situating dialectical thinking as structure of 
argument, Hegel understood a more comprehensive assessment of dialectic as that of 
correspondence. This is to say, humans were not absent from an involvement with nature 
but instead reflective of this involvement. So the contradiction brought forth by 
dialectical thought is one that reflects our experience: nature and thus humans are built on 
a contradiction that is “worked out” in experience and through reflexive thought applied 
to that experience.221 Thus what presents itself to us, either as life or culture, is a product 
of the interaction of forces working an idea of contradictions out.  The process connects 
the material world and the cognitive world jointly. Thus, even though there may be a 
conflict between the fact of the world and that which we perceive, Hegel understood the 
sequence as one that would bring closer and closer to an absolute unity, where those 
conflicts of contradiction would be so straining that inevitably they would be overcome 
through synthesis and harmonization.   
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What many found troubling in Hegel’s writings, however, was his tendency 
toward totality, or a theory of unification or unity. Human-nature relations appeared 
naively romantic or idealist, drawn by an explained Spirit, which itself may be a 
mystification. Drawing out the dialectic in historical and decidedly real or material terms 
was accomplished by a second formative thinker of the 19th century (and ideological 
critic): Karl Marx.  
MARX’S REVISION 
 Like Hegel, Marx argued that “[t]he first premise of all human history is, of 
course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is 
the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of 
nature.”222 But Marx took issue with what he understood to be a fundamental 
metaphysics bound up in Hegel’s appreciation of both Spirit and Nature. Instead, Marx 
wanted to articulate a theory of change thoroughly assessing modes of production and 
economic interest.  For example, in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 
Marx meticulously examined Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Jean-Baptiste Say’s 
Treatise on Political Economy in order to “comprehend” their origin in “relations of 
production.”223 For example, he argued against a central assertion of Smith’s, that society 
is only happy when the majority of its members live in a state of contentment. Instead, 
rather than assuming all bodies enter into the economic and social world with equity, 
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Marx argued that the proverbial deck is stacked against the individual who has to sell 
their labor in order to survive.224  Workers must compete against each other (and 
machines) for their livelihood.225 Even in “boom times,” workers uniquely sacrifice 
leisure.226 Such “static misery,” even under the best political economic outlook, Marx 
argued, demonstrates a primary, fundamental, and irreversible flaw in capitalism’s 
design.227  
 Since political economists claim capitalism maximizes “society’s interests,” Marx 
assumed one would deduce society itself “always stand[s] opposed to the worker.”228 
Struggling against nostalgic aristocracy and urban sentimentality, Marx theorized that 
only the capitalist and the landowner have the ability to live without selling labor.229 For 
example, in “[Estranged Labor],” Marx established the significance of his thinking in the 
concept of alienation: workers relate to labor as a foreign object; product and process 
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exist independently of producer. For workers, objectification of labor is a double loss of 
their nature: (1) energy, the means of labor, is externalized into an object; (2) control over 
the “sensuous external world,” the terms of their own livelihood. Object-bondage is the 
only perverse gain: since the life of the worker creates the object, every time they 
confront an object of their labor of which they no longer control, they confront loss.230  
Nature is twice alienated: first, externally as an object open to labor and then, second, 
swallowed up by capital interests through the process of labor.231   
 From these two descriptions, Marx identified a third experience of alienation: 
"species-being."232 Agreeing with Hegel, Marx understood the process of identifying 
objects (humans, products, and nature) as central to the experience of the human. The 
more humans sought to distinguish themselves from objects, the larger the sphere of what 
counts as an object expanded. Viewed in a positive register, a process of objectification is 
required for any theory, science, or art. Consciousness emerges as we experience 
ourselves distinct from others. But, since labor also positions the worker as object, then 
humans also become estranged from each other.233 Estranged labor, in its reduction of 
thought to means and human to need, distorts consciousness. A principle of alienation, 
for Marx, explains labor relations of domination (between humans) and the paradox of 
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private property as both “product” and “realization” of systemic alienation.234  
 Marx still considered an encounter with the natural world to be formative. Like 
others building upon Enlightenment principles, Marx hoped liberation from the three 
estranged modes of labor could blossom into an experience of “universal human 
emancipation.”235 In other words, Marx believed that in order for humans to be free, each 
had to have the opportunity to labor outside of exploitative conditions. Marx may have 
moved too quickly from an initial encounter with nature into the benefits and constraints 
of resource management in economic structure. Over-determining the natural world may 
only provide temporary liberation and, perhaps, could introduce too linear an 
understanding of historical change.  
Thus, rather than imagine a telos or an arch of inevitability, István Mézáros 
argues that Marx sought to thoroughly demystify dialectical struggle.236 Creativity was 
understood as an expression of the human mind as it considers the physical reality and 
alters its contours through labor. Labor implemented ideas in a process of transformation. 
Eschewing the mysticism and idealism in Hegel’s notion of the Spirit, instead 
understanding human process in a historic moment as the result of economic 
contradictions. For contemporary writers, such as Bertell Ollman, this is the central 
contribution of Marx: “a way of thinking and a set of related categories that captures, 
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neither misses nor distorts, the real changes and interaction that go on in the world.” 237 
For Marx, there is no way of abstracting an Idea, concept or form from its historical 
period any more than a historical period can be abstracted from its economic formations.  
Marx understood—hoped for?—an inevitability: the contradiction between forces 
compelling (over)production and the experience of alienation would create such pressure 
that the structure would transform into a more equitable distribution or a different and 
more complex form of organization. In this way for Adorno, however, traditional Marxist 
theory smuggled in too much optimism in its claim of inevitable transformation and 
placed too much faith in a conscious populace. For Adorno, who fled Nazi Germany after 
the rise of National Socialism, the idea that all revolutions would be leftist seemed too 
historically ideal. While he would retain a close Marxist understanding of the dialectic, 
his immanent critique, to which I now turn, would emerge from a distinctively negative 
mode.  
ADORNO ON THE DIALECTIC 
For Adorno, the purpose of investigation, and for my purposes rhetoric, is 
poetically articulated as a desire to understand and sustain the feeling of rhythmic 
pulsation in experience (from thinking, to reading, to writing). Rainer Nägele describes 
Adorno’s critical cadence similarly as  “thinking breath,” or “a meditation through 
negation.”238  Motion, pulse, cadence, breathing, meditation are all descriptions of the 
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critical process for Adorno. While such depictions appeal to Hegel’s sense of wonder, 
Adorno attempted to express the critical act as an entwinement between the categories of 
subject and object through what we might call a “rhetorical form.” Said differently, what 
animates Adorno’s criticism is also what he sets out to unravel; in order to understand the 
messy meshing of material and symbolic worlds, we have to loosen and clarify specific 
threads and the processes producing an orientation in order to balance and not dominate. 
The foothold for doing so is the dialectic, or contradiction not in affirmation or synthesis, 
but in negation. 
Negative Dialectics represents the final, most theorized set of Adorno’s writings, 
even though ideas that show up in the collection were long assembled and worked 
through in his previous writings. According to Adorno scholar Brian O’Connor, part of 
Adorno’s brilliance is his ability to invert a concept in what he terms “critical 
appropriation.”239 In this instance, O’Connor notes that Adorno makes the German 
Idealist affirmative understanding of dialectics (commonly understood by the terms 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis) into a negative formulation. That is, rather than believe a 
compromise that combines the useful elements of two positions into one super posture, 
Adorno argues that the two positions remain incommensurate until they collapse into 
themselves.  That is, even as the subject seeks to grasp an object that it knows to be other 
than itself, the attempt and failure of synthesis is the instantiation of movement. 
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Therefore, the question of what it means to “be responsive to contradiction” entails using 
an experience of failure to understand consciousness that does not suture the conflict in 
false rationalizations, but instead welcomes this struggle as a way to move through the 
world. In O’Connor’s reading, “the sense of the ‘thing’, the ‘matter,’ the ‘object,’ is 
heightened by our experience of failure to encapsulate it.”240 The mediation taking place 
is  one in which we understand the world in richer and more textured ways. The end goal 
is not to come to a revelation of positive truth, but an on going process of disintegration, 
one that challenges efforts at mastery and surety, a grounding in constant movement.   
While Adorno agreed with Marx that antagonism ought to be considered the cause 
of social problems and that criticism could and should reveal that locus as such, he 
considered the primary dialectic to be a relationship between subject and object that 
played out across various strata including form and content, particular and universal, 
production and reception, and many other iterations.241 Thus, one of Adorno’s 
philosophical contributions is his disagreement with Hegel and Marx over the mode of 
the dialectic, and includes considering the question of what constitutes the absolute 
difference between the subject of the human and the external object that spurs reflection, 
often cast as “nature,” best suited for the dialectical form. While seemingly paradoxical, 
the very grappling with the incongruity between subject and object, according to Cook’s 
reading of Negative Dialectics, depicts Adorno’s method of understanding the unending 
historical contours of a subject’s complicated, often contentious, and co-dependent 
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relationship with an object, never considered separate.242 But this is not to suggest that 
the subject and object unify or become one. It is instead to figure out moments they are 
both the same and different. This is the crux of Adorno’s understanding of dialectic form 
and is the crux of his process of immanent critique; this simple understanding of 
nonunderstanding vitalizes Adorno’s complex writing.  
Werner Bonefeld describes Adorno’s dialectics not as a “formal procedure or 
method applied to reality” preferring “instead of asking what the things are, it asks how 
best to view and arrange them.”243 One example he uses pertinent to this study is an 
understanding of the human, the typical subject of Western philosophy. “The Human 
subject does not exist for and by itself … It objectifies itself in the object.”244 But what 
might that mean? To understand the definition of human in exception is a flawed 
assumption. We are never free from a constant internal struggle to make sense of oneself 
and to situate oneself in surroundings, a conclusion a liberated autonomous subject 
cannot entertain. Instead, Adorno’s formulation gestures to a dialectic form of the human: 
in an attempt to define a free subject, the subject must be an object of reflection, in a 
sense, already not free from constraint. In the reverberations and the constant struggle to 
come up with an exclusive definition and failing at that endeavor does one arrive at the 
constitution of human: a vital life (like other vital life) lost in the vibration between 
subject and object. Subject to ourselves and yet object to institutions, object of reflection 
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and subject to that reflection, subjective object and objective subject, the thought of the 
human and its constitution is already bound to a dialectic encounter exposing the pretense 
of opinion already dependent on historical situation and economic structure.  
While some may want to wish away this exercise, one might ask along with 
Adorno, what if that messy expenditure of energy, while inefficient, is nonetheless 
closest to that which is "true?" In this way, it is not only the difficulty of writing, but also 
taking up the edges, the moments of contradiction, or being willing to be addressed by 
unanswerable complexity where the power of rhetoric and the “success” of Adorno’s 
understanding of the dialectic may lie. Real problems and real encounters must be taken 
up, but the need for obvious solutions and easy conclusions is foregone in the wake of the 
need to struggle with, and perhaps fail, takes over and is celebrated. In this way Bonefeld 
asks us to consider Adorno’s method as a reflection not about things but how to think 
“out of “ things.245 
As Terrence Thomson notes this “out of” is not an exit, but a turn of orientation 
that makes Adorno’s investigation distinct. Adorno invites us to draw from but 
understand a distinction between what is philosophical and what is not, that is what 
extends beyond the pure philosophic approach I have tracked so far in the term the 
dialectic and that which might be different, and that difference is what we might term 
rhetorical.246  In still other words, Lisa Yun Lee understands the ‘out of-’ clause 
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methodologically. “Immanent critique” she writes, “remains what it criticizes, using the 
internal contradictions of a work to criticize the work itself.”247 And that cannot be 
limited to the application but also to Adorno’s work in which “to understand that some of 
his most shattering insights are to be found in moments of failure.”248 Thomson also 
notes this sentiment when he suggests that the work of thinking to be found in the method 
of Adorno “perpetually reverberates in an impasse.”249 
Concretely, for Cook, immanent criticism represents a unique form of dialectical 
materialism. In Adorno’s writing, the relationship between humans and nature is 
reconsidered in relation to a historical materialist assessment of social structure.250 As I 
previewed elsewhere, historical materialism considers: (1) “consciousness” as the result 
of antagonisms located in structural design; (2) ideas (including rhetoric) emerge at the 
intersection of economic relations and forces of production; (3) interests drive rhetoric; 
(4) transformation stresses shifts in laboring consciousness to recognize an interest in 
asserting agency against dominant forces to gain control over production and experience 
liberation 251 In other words, for historical materialists, ideological criticism must begin 
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and foreground the real exploitation of real people in the world beyond the page or 
outside the mind. 252 
Some theorists, including Ernesto Verdeja, object to Adorno’s theory, arguing 
that his approach does not achieve this goal.253 Others, including Jürgen Habermas, 
suggest Adorno too abstractly focuses on totality, resulting in a reinforcement of the tools 
of Enlightenment reason and not their dissolution.254 Chris Rocco challenges both these 
concerns.255 Instead of what these critics see as impossible assertions of high theory, 
Rocco sees as a productive “tension” that stops the systemic closure of systems. For 
example, often the most feared systems are ones that assert a certain sense of 
inevitability, a refusal to consider any alternative. Immanent critique acknowledges that 
such a promise offered by more oppressive systems of reason and economic exchange 
require a constant opening that challenges the system on its own terms, thereby in real 
terms displaying an alternative assumed impossible. For Rocco, “thinking must make 
system and perception accord by reconciling the antagonism between the general and the 
particular, the concept and the facts.”256 Rocco argues that a focus of immanent criticism 
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might include an emphasis on that which has been excluded from Enlightenment thought, 
rational activity, and profit-driven decision making. One might examine that which has 
been denied a status of rational recognition, which might include the representations of 
the enchanted, the unconscious, the oppressed (and for this dissertation, the plant), to be a 
place where a deep meditation on the structural contradictions might be revealed and thus 
develop resources for creative thinking and connection, inspire ethical categories of 
address, and in so doing eliminate the smooth closure of the contemporary ideological 
system.  So while also imperfect as a solution, “the capacity to think from the standpoint” 
against the interests of dominant ideology is an important tool in and of itself.257 
Adorno’s immanent critique stresses the importance of considering the human-
nature connection. Adorno draws attention to a set of adversarial circumstances that 
emerge from encounters with nature, through and beyond the alienation in/of labor. 
Humans create a variety of vehicles to navigate the paradoxical state of being both 
subject and object, most in service of domination. Some humans exert tremendous energy 
designing concepts (theories of instinct, genetics and self preservation) and make 
equipment (framing techniques, data surveys, civil infrastructure) to demonstrate 
supremacy through control. Examining various artifacts around us, we notice with 
Adorno, as Cook does, that “we have posited ourselves throughout our history as 
radically other than nature with a view to dominating nature both practically and 
conceptually.”258 To understand labor alienation and transformation requires grappling 
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with a primary (and perhaps preceding) rhetorical division between the absolute 
externality of nature and its relationship to human consciousness formation. Central for 
Adorno’s method—and thus, the rational for its use in ascertaining human and plant 
relations—is a dual imperative: first to understand how and in what ways humans figure 
nature as an object and what resources humans muster to understand and intervene in that 
relationship.   
Finally though, and to return to a paradoxical note I have been carefully working 
through, if  “instrumental orientation towards [natural] objects” is to be fully understood, 
as Cook argues, then inquiry must include a dual recognition of understanding nature 
(and domination) within our own systems.259 Recognition, in terms of method, might 
include not just the initial philosophic origins of the dialectic or as a primary division 
between humans and nature, but also various artifacts steeped in the contradiction 
between the two.  
In establishing a condensed understanding of the historical origins of Adorno’s 
thinking and some of its orienting principles, I’d now like to turn attention toward the 
steps of immanent critique in order to make clear how I use it in this dissertation.  
III. Immanent Criticism: Steps in Constellations in Orientation 
Adorno was fond of thinking "constellations," what I termed figures or 
figurations, as the process of tracing the connections among objects and experiences 
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through the dialectical form.  Thomson argues that Adorno understood “constellations are 
nonhierarchical; concepts forming a constellation relate to one another in nonlinear, non-
binary, horizontal webs.”260 I like to think of this in relation to what Walter Fischer noted 
about rhetoric in the narrative paradigm.261 Fisher suggested that the work and power of 
rhetoric related to the stories that we tell to each other, the magic that could transform 
little specks of light into battles for worlds, deities struggling with desire, and great 
reminders of our own limited place in the universe. There is not a necessary 
correspondence between the placement of stars and the images they invoked in stories. 
Rather, it is the job of the critic to place light in conversation, in everyday moments of 
ritual, and bring together the audience through these stories.  
Adorno’s understanding appeals to a sense of the dialectic relationship between 
oral and aural in criticism, even in its written form. Constellations—like speech itself—
harmonize in the way they vibrate ideas together in the presence of an interpreter. The 
dialectic in operation here, that is to say the contradiction, is that the real image, the real 
stuff of stars is not at all what the image-story evokes. The subject and object collapse 
into each other in ways that make it difficult to say what is what, who is who and so on. 
For David Sherman this manifests as “a grouping of contemporary (sochiohistorically 
generated) concepts that mediate one another in the construction itself, which serves as a 
pedagogical device to come to new insights regarding its constituents.”262 Constellation 
metaphors can helpfully keep the subject and object in tension without collapsing into a 
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relativist or universalist perspective. Second, they can approach the object as a real 
product of history without placing it as an inalterable fate or arch. Finally they can place 
relations in struggle outside of a practice of domination, in that we might catch glimpses 
of understanding only to watch them fade away under further examination. 
Like other practitioners of Critical Theory and members of the Frankfurt School, 
Nägele argues that Adorno was primarily concerned with explaining constellations as a 
process of mediation. Mediation is an explanatory term describing an artifact that 
reconciles a relationship among three different spheres or levels of meaning: the 
phenomena or the world, the socio-historical condition, and theoretical terms and 
conditions for individual and collective intervention. The Frankfurt School’s goal, while 
perhaps “utopian” in desire, aims at theorizing an end to domination by examining texts 
of mediation.263 For Adorno, a complex rhetorical strategy of writing and reading that he 
called immanent criticism is essential.  
As Steven Helmling notes, immanent criticism is one of Adorno’s most valuable 
contributions because it not only tries to develop his approach in contrast to other 
Frankfurt scholars, but also because it tries to submit criticism to itself—that is, to 
critique the method of critique while using it simultaneously.264  Immanent means “‘from 
the inside,’ not external; all writing and production takes place inside of ideology and is 
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thus implicated in it.”265 Unlike some connotations of contemporary philosophy (notably 
Object Oriented Ontology), immanent criticism does not believe in an exit or escape into 
a space of something like “pure” nature. Such places are already conceptual ruses; they 
don’t exist independent from mediation. Following the new materialists, if scholars focus 
on the representational encounters with nature or the vegetal world—the ideological site 
and connection between the two spheres—perhaps we might be able to understand the 
unique and formal terms of interaction.266  Since immanent criticism understands the 
practice of writing and reading as one expression of labor (although not to be vaulted or 
idealized), forging new theoretical connections (or divisions) may provide a means of 
altering the conditions of mediation. How does this work?  
 In addition to the style of writing, criticism for Adorno refers to an active process, 
or an engagement with thinking, with an attention to limited transformative possibilities 
available in writing, reading, and thinking. Helmling describes the transformative process 
as a kind of liquefying what has become sediment.267  For Adorno, sedimentation 
describes concepts that have become compacted—reified—into hardened ideological 
thought, including the subject/object distinction itself.  The critical process tries to soften 
calcified orientations by using deep theoretical meditation to undo some of bonded 
connections.268 We should understand Adorno’s criticism as not simply descriptive, but 
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contemplative in its approach to history.269 By “contemplative” Adorno does not claim to 
have discovered an origin or revealed a hidden universal truth. Adorno instead, following 
Thompson, attempts “to interrogate the incapacities” of a claim to a specific form of 
reason to explain contemporary conditions. The method then begins by examining an 
existing object, and submitting it to the following steps. While Adorno would object to a 
clarification of his method in terms of instrumental operations, I will use this section to 
explain my approach for the reader.  
TECHNIQUES 
In the following section, I will explain my adaptation of Adorno’s method of analysis, 
immanent criticism. I hone in on three crucial steps: the pairing of terms to situate the 
dialectic, an application to a specific object or artifact, and re-reading the object in its 
primacy in Adorno’s unique understanding of identification.  
(A) Pairing of contradicting terms  
 As I argued in the introduction, the pairing of terms to reveal a tension is the 
primary starting point for immanent criticism. Similar to Burke’s “perspective by 
incongruity” or Friedrich Nietzsche’s “active nihilism,” when viewed as the juxtaposing 
of two terms together, Adorno’s method is designed to diffuse concentrated concepts and 
in so doing open a space for contemplation of process and arrangement.270 As Ross 
Wolin notes, as rhetorical technique, term pairing is designed to push “the limits of 
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meaning making” to arrive at a different site or location of argument.271 Thinking 
temporally, Barbara Biesecker notes (of Burke) that an “interval” is one in which the 
future no longer seems determined, but open to refashioning272  
In critical research, formal interpretation and tactile experiences become 
referential, not discrete sets of experiences. That is, in order to understand how a plant 
“works” one would have already encountered its leaves. But, in order to give words to 
those experiences, one must also have a frame of reference and formal points with which 
to communicate those points to oneself or others. As such, neither is discrete, but co-
constitutive. Put in terms of the methodological difference I traced in the previous 
section, the objectivity close-reading strategies require, and the specific reflexivity 
critical rhetoric demands, seem to appear impossible to join, and yet must be in order to 
make sense of the world around us. Meditating on the impossibility of reconciliation is 
productive for thinking, even if it does not rest on a final or finished concept.  
Since each term will in some ways reflect on the grammatical difference between 
subject and object, one needs to look at a specific site, artifact, or entity in order to 
understand how the tension is revealed in its content and formal qualities. For example, in 
Aesthetic Theory, Adorno ponders the difference between natural beauty and a piece of 
art as the “paradox of aesthetics.”273 Adorno notes, on the one hand, a stark difference 
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appears to exist between the feeling of wonder at witnessing nature and the experience of 
examining a painting in a gallery. The beauty of human products and the natural world 
are constituted differently, separately. Since art is premised, for Adorno, on the same 
sense of wonder at otherness, then each experience is also intimately tied together. A 
gallery participant, in other words, will often draw upon the same resources when 
encountering an artifact of art and those of the natural world (a site like the Grand 
Canyon, for example). The positioning of nature and art demonstrates two productive 
tensions. On the one hand, art is explicitly unnatural; an image is not the same as the 
thing itself. On the other, art appeals to a register of aesthetics revealed in and through 
encounters with nature, making the experience of receiving and interpreting art and 
nature joined or constitutive of one another.  
To understand the relevance, Adorno offers a second step in immanent criticism: 
examining a specific text for the way it navigates a dialectic tension between two poles.  
(B) Dialectic examination in an object or artifact 
Art and nature, like subject and object, when understood dialectically, can be read 
not just through one level of social experience, but in multiple levels. As Helmling notes, 
dialectic terms “operate,” like so many of Adorno’s principles, “as functionally 
convertible.”274  How a text or object reveals dialectical tension can be read “outward” 
through process of production and “inward” through its technical elements and formal 
composition. Traditional uses of the dialectic, though, often operate in terms of binary 
oppositions. Traditional and contemporary uses of term assert a permanent and separate 
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division. Adorno does not deny that items may be in opposition, but instead, he believes 
that dichotomy, or absolute difference, is a product of ideology.275 Helmling understands 
Adorno’s use of dialectic as a method of identifying poles of tension, understanding their 
expressions in specific instances, and then using the revealed slippage between the two to 
understand an orientation differently.276  
Again to draw from the section of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, understanding the 
resonance of natural beauty is caught in-between two poles. On the one hand, 
appreciation of contact with the landscape is essential for any appreciation of art, poetic 
or communicative difference, and otherness itself. On the other hand, keeping nature too 
much at bay results in “idealist tourism,” relegating nature to a diminutive status in the 
form of landscape paintings, tokenization in the form of natural parks, or 
instrumentalized as in the language of preservation.277 So, while it is possible to see art in 
nature and nature in art, often when nature is presented in the form of commodity, it loses 
the appeal to difference because of the form of presentation.  
 As I’ve already hinted in earlier sections, Adorno’s bundling of principles already 
exposes a number of important reflections from understanding dialectical tensions. First, 
Hegel and Marx thought of history in the form of a grand narrative: two opposing 
positions clash and from that encounter one will emerge victorious to control the means 
of production. Instead, Adorno challenges a false unification; harmony is never possible. 
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At the same time, the opposite is also untrue. To think of poles in permanent opposition 
or permanently separate from each other mistakes how central it might be to each 
constitution. So, for Adorno, a scholar of immanent criticism might look at ways the site 
or artifact reflects the terms of contradiction and how it oscillates between the two at 
various times.  
Brian Wall’s cinema case studies are good examples of Adorno’s critical 
method.278 Wall examined at the status of objects in The Maltese Falcon (1941), 
masculine materialism in Kiss Me Deadly (1955), comic form in the Repo Man (1984), 
and commodity and sexual fetish in The Big Lebowski (1988).  In each chapter, Wall uses 
a variety of Adorno’s theory to approach a contemporary film to understand what it says 
about different sets of relations in the artifact and as it relates to genre and economic 
culture. For example, in The Big Lebowski, Wall hones in on a famous utterance of “the 
Dude” played by Jeff Bridges. After his arrest and subsequent interrogation by the police, 
“the Dude” scoffs at the suggestion that Jackie Treehorn, a pornographer and villain of 
the film, ought be considered a more reputable community member than himself. 
Bridge’s character exclaims: “Jackie Treehorn treats objects like women, man!”  For 
Wall, the inverted status of subject (object) and object (women), coupled with the 
gendering of the police (man), demonstrates a contemporary dialectic exchange. On the 
one hand, postmodern identity is explicitly concerned with thinking outside of essential 
categories. On the other, merely altering the signifier does not dramatically alter 
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relations, because the form of domination reveals a structure beneath performative 
choices. What remains is a relationship defined, according to Wall, primarily by 
consumption of the object and the domination of women.279  
Robert Miklitsch also applies immanent criticism to multiple mediums, film, 
sound, and television by tracing a series of postures and consumptive positions brought 
out by changes in technical and cultural production.280 As Wikins reminds us, each of 
these forays into texts of popular culture demonstrates the dialectical principles of 
structuration.281 The technical means of production (instruments used, the composition or 
arrangement, and intended-audiences) reveal a formal structure. Examining a text, in 
content and context, as it struggles with and reveals dialectic logic, also exposes practices 
of domination in both spheres. Adorno’s immanent criticism then, in a third step, 
theorizing social relations based on these two expressions, both revealing an emphasis on 
the primacy of the object.  
(C) Primacy of Object 
 Immanent criticism is concerned with challenging identitarian logic, or avoiding 
“coercive homogenization.”282 Identification works through rhetorical means of reductive 
association, in Cook’s terms, by “wrongly substitute[ing] unity for diversity, simplicity 
for complexity, permanence for change, and identify for difference.”283 Relations of 
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identification too easily slip into misrecognitions of equanimity of terms or a logic of 
A=A . To draw another parallel, Adorno understood the origin of the subject along the 
lines of psychoanalysis. Quickly, like Jacques Lacan’s description of the mirror stage of 
human identification, the subject comes to know itself based on a moment of 
misrecognition.284 In Lacan’s famous staging, as a baby looks at itself in the mirror (or on 
an iPad) s/he begins to understand its body—its shape—distinct from the environment 
around it. In an attempt at differentiation, the infant begins to see its discrete body as the 
projection s/he examines in the mirror. That is, the image we have of what we are, is 
already based on the experience of ourselves as a reflected upon object. To put it still 
differently, our material body collapses into the mediated image we struggle to make 
sense of. As such, we navigate a constant battle between the limit of ourselves as 
projected-object and material-operator.  
 To pick up Adorno here, rather than begin with the interests or identity of the 
subject, we should understand the primacy of the object, the image, in the production of 
consciousness and mediation. To once again draw attention to Adorno’s discussion of the 
difference between art and nature may be helpful. Assuming the reader has agreed with 
the previous examples, Adorno concludes by suggesting we can understand nature as 
subject, only by first understanding its status as an object for us. While nature may be 
contained in an image (photograph, landscape painting, or park), it cannot be contained 
by the image; so much more remains. In fact all the nonidentical elements—”the spirit of 
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otherness” in Adorno’s words—is revealed by theoretical reflection of all elements 
refusing to be captured by a text. Thus, to think about the difference between natural 
commodity (images of the Grand Canyon) and the Grand Canyon itself (both as entity 
and preserve), opens not only reflection on the way humans treat nature, but also on the 
inevitable failure of our attempt to control or dominate the natural world. In other words, 
despite our best efforts, severing the subject and object is impossible; it forms the very 
foundation of consciousness. Since aiding efforts seeking to end domination remains the 
ethical and political goal, finding routes in theory and writing—in rhetoric—situates 
various expressions of subject and object to help offer moments of meditation and 
perhaps chip away at the calcification of historic orientations.  While such possibility is 
extremely limited, it is not possible, according to Adorno, unless the primacy of the 
object is foregrounded. If, as Willford notes, “the object is the impetus for the normative 
moment - the truth of which it speaks,” then to examine the contradictions in an object or 
text offers “a glimpse into the state of the subject’s relationship with the world.”285 So, 
when a scholar examines a text, revealing the way an object is constituted offers an 
opportunity to expose the subject and contest the subject’s hidden interests. Helmling 
describes a final step as “dialectical self consciousness” or the undoing of ideological 
calcification and reestablishing of different terms with which to build new possibilities 
for subject emergence.286 If a structural relationship makes up all parts of the social 
world, then the dialectic struggle revealed in one artifact can be abstracted into other 
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layers of culture, including the domain of civil society and the economic base.287  Since 
subject/object, art/nature, man /woman articulate a formal grammatical relationship of 
domination, then understanding how the content of a text relies on a positioning of a 
dialectical pole (either externally as in the case of a natural preserve or internally in the 
form of dialogue in a film) offers the opportunity and opening to reflect on the structure 
itself.  
Asserting the primacy of the object as a rhetorical technique offers the 
opportunity for readers to contest the text as well. Immanent criticism achieves success 
by illuminating mechanisms of (mis)recognition. Thus, an orientation assumed to be true 
is exposed as ideological form and becomes open to reinterpretation and (perhaps in 
limited moments) liquefies. Invoking what Cook refers to as “an estrangement effect,” 
complex language plays with accepted phrases and inverts meaning, loosening up some 
of those ideological threads weaving together social experience.288  
To complete the extended reference here, what Adorno suggests is the difference 
between art and nature is that “art aims at realizing the articulation of the nonhuman by 
human means.”289 Since the audience is an active member of the critical process, the play 
with terms and layers of thought exposes transformative possibility available. It is 
impossible for nonhumans to communicate with humans, and yet they do. As Thomson 
notes, Adorno’s method is paradoxical by design, but aims “to take seriously the most 
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ephemeral and supposedly worthless elements of social life,” and elevate them to a space 
of conceptual and philosophical complexity.290  
I am drawn to Adorno for precisely this reason. At the origin of his thinking is a 
political call to understand and challenge a kernel of domination inherent in the historical 
constellation we did not ask for but nonetheless receive and enact. Adorno’s approach to 
culture, however, is complex enough to provide resources to think through the ethical 
requirements in the face of our dominating practices. His approach can be applied not 
only to contemporary media but also current philosophical movements as broad as 
posthumanist challenges to the subject and digital ontologies about objects withdrawn. I 
argue his perspective or method of analysis is flexible and methodical enough to be 
paired with an interrogation of plants, but offers an emphasis on retuning the efforts to 
theorize plant-human relations to an ambivalent (not ambient) rhetorical relationship. 
Thus, I’d now like to return to the call of the dissertation to demonstrate what the method 
in application might look like.  
IV. Figural Plants: An Immanent Critique 
 Sigmund Freud, a primary theorist for Adorno, recounts a dream he once had 
about plants: “I have written a monograph on a certain plant. The book lay before me and 
I was at the moment turning over a folded colored plate. Bound up in each copy there was 
a dried specimen of the plant as though it had been taken from a herbarium.”291 In what I 
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argue is more than a curious coincidence, Elizabeth Grosz notes that the dream, named 
the Botanical Monograph, “is one of only two dreams that Freud elaborated in any detail 
and depth in Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams.292 For Grosz, plants provide a 
helpful, if not foundational, organizing figure for psychoanalysis. 
“Composite figures,” wrote Freud in “The Dream Work,” were condensed 
illusions. Never simply random, swirling elements in dreams, but unified commonalities 
not always easily discernable in waking life.293  Ambiguous by definition, composite 
figures work by consolidating disparate layers of thought, anachronistic historical or 
personal experience, and disassociated scales or affects into one readable or 
communicable visual heuristic (both for the “dreamer” and the “interpreter”).294 In the 
Botanical Monograph, Freud reads a figure as an allusion, or condensation of the life 
experience.295  Freud described figures as “regular nodal points,” or symbols of complex 
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convergence to be explored by analysis and not a dream book or astrologer’s guide.296 As 
such, focusing on each figure required the dreamer to articulate, much like a critic, all the 
complex elements in a dream, perhaps exposing sediment experiences or patterns.297 
Thus, in addition to the two previous understandings of figure (as rhetorical technique 
and scene of encounter), I’d like to refine a third. In the dialectical orientation I have 
advanced, “figures” compact long historical chains of signification into a singular 
expression and mediate between the unconscious operations at the level of the individual 
subject and symbol making at the level of society. I offer three figural studies of the 
dialectic between humans and plants.  
In the first figure study, I use an encounter at the Red Rock State Park in 
California to understand the tension between what counts as natural and historical as 
revealed by experiences in the park. Using Adorno’s first lecture on natural-history as an 
orienting point of the study, I read the two forces of nature and history through a piece of 
petrified wood and a tool-holding figure that capture that fantasy of human progression. I 
am concerned with the ways Adorno encourages us to understand the dialectical 
relationship between nature and history as a way of considering the dialectic between 
human and plant.  
In the second figure study, I examine the figuration of one plant, the Sipo-
Matador through various historic and disciplinary discourses. I reflect on the specific 
plant, constellated through travel logs, contemporary biological texts, science fiction, and 
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Western philosophy to understand how it is caught up in naming practices motivated by a 
dialectic of affirmation and negation.  
In the third figure study, I take up Adorno’s writing on sound understanding its 
grooves through a contemporary vinyl art-album Years by Austrian artist Bartholomäus 
Traubeck. In this study, I use the album as a jumping off point to examine scales of 
dialectical experience, from structure, to commodity, to specific object in order to revel 
layers of meaning revealed in the act of listening.   
 Each study takes up Adorno’s characteristic sense of the dialectic in the negative 
as a journey. Returning to this chapter’s movement, I would like to recall Adorno’s 
impetus to reflect on method. I began with a reference to Adorno’s sense of guilt 
motivating thinking. For him, it seems, he could not capture fully and completely in more 
succinct terms, his experience with domination nor offer any sure fire way to eliminate its 
grotesque practices completely: the system, the structure, the history seemed, like a wave 
always ready to overwhelm him. Perhaps, like many of us, that is why he turned to 
rhetoric.  
 Adorno concludes the introduction of Negative Dialectics with a defense of 
rhetoric and its relationship to philosophy describing the work as  “the carrier of the lie” 
the former does for the latter. He writes, “in despising rhetoric, philosophy atoned for a 
guilt incurred ever since Antiquity by its detachment from things, a guilt already pointed 
out by Plato.”298 What did he mean by this? He writes, “in philosophy, rhetoric represents 
that which cannot be thought except in language.” In Adorno’s sense, a rejection of 
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figuration in favor of the analytic is a hallmark of domination precisely because it is 
designed to “to punish undisciplined gestures.”299 But in the wake of thinking that carries 
us, Adorno invites us to take a different journeyed approach, to “splash around in the 
linguistic cascade,” and not be so held to a corrupting exactness.  In Adorno’s reading, 
rhetoric, a “dialectics-literally” is actually figured as an important and indeed necessary 
counter weight to the “alliance of philosophy and science.”300 For Adorno, dialectics and 
rhetoric are momentarily one. If philosophy is “the prism in which color is caught,” 
rhetoric is figured, at least here, as an understanding of the present possibility of “utopia” 
not blocked by the moments of thinking requiring it to present and prove itself. Instead, 
rhetoric is the achievement of thought in which reality is what it is not: either free and 
blissful-like some pleasant dream or terrifying and unsettling as in waking into a 
nightmare.  
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CHAPTER THREE: FIGURING NATURAL HISTORY 
My aim in this first figure study is to unsettle a slippery alliance between two 
words that often rhetorically situate the experience of plant life: “natural history.” Most 
people will recognize the Smithsonian Institute’s Natural History Museum in Washington 
DC as an exemplar site for the term. Popular understanding of the term “natural history” 
is identified with such halls of scientific display and wonder.  Understood by disciplinary 
convention to be a thick, descriptive account of wildlife based on observation not 
experimentation, I wonder whether an act of noticing “natural history” itself might reveal 
something about human habits of perception (both natural and historical).301 In so doing, 
I am not taking aim at naturalist historians nor historians of nature, but rather I hope to 
demonstrate a need for rhetorical inquiry at sites where nature and history blend together 
in a more generalized sense. Inspired by Theodor W. Adorno’s posthumously published 
lecture “Idea of Natural-History,” I discern layers of meaning revealed when one figures 
the term natural history.302 In other words, building on Adorno’s method of immanent 
criticism as an exploration of content and form, I hope to offer a critical journey through 
a dramatic and ongoing dialectic between the concepts of nature and history in academic 
and popular texts, philosophy, criticism, and everyday experience.  
                                                
301 See: "Natural history, n." OED Online. June 2017.  
302 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Idea of Natural History,” trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Telos, no. 
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Since most natural histories begin with a field guide, let me offer a few itinerant 
notes for our journey.303 Like Virgil, Dante Alighieri’s ghostly guide through the stages 
of the afterlife in the Divine Comedy, Adorno’s speech provides the poetic resources to 
orient my investigation of the idea of natural history. Rhetorician Kenneth Burke also 
performs such a role, showing up from time to time to corroborate Adorno’s account. 
The scene of figuration is a small museum and accompanying landscape at 
California’s Red Rock Canyon State Park located in the hellish Mojave Desert. The form 
of this study aims to inspire what the park’s "General Plan" proscribes: to instruct with an 
experience of “guided walking.”  As a method of constellation, patrons come close to 
certain notable features, explore some of their contours, and then walk toward another 
exhibit. Patrons may be enticed by some exhibits more than others and may wish for 
more detail or less. As opposed to other parks, Red Rock Canyon has no injunction to 
stay on the trail; patrons may wander as they please. In exploring the “Symphony of 
Stone,” as the park’s guide invites us to do, I hope to place a rigorous and enchanting 
understanding of life in conversation with Adorno’s reflections on the constitution of 
natural-history as a way to unsettle thought.304   
 Welcome to this guided adventure through a theoretical abyss of red buttes 
framing life in the desert.  
                                                
303 Itinerary, from the Oxford English Dictionary, suggests that the word entered the English 
language sometime around 1475 to describe a mode of transporting meaning, a course tracking 
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particularly one that tracks a certain crossing of roads.  See: itinerary, n." OED Online. June 
2017.  
304 State of California Department of Parks and Recreation, “Red Rock Canyon State Park 
General Plant,” Unit 577 (Sacramento, CA, 1981), 1-73.  
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I. Natural History, Introducing an Idea 
Our journey begins on July 15, 1932, the delivery date of Adorno’s lecture on the 
“Idea of Natural History” to the Kant Society. He starts with an admonishment of origin 
stories:   
I am not going to give a lecture in the usual sense of communicating results or 
presenting a systematic statement, Rather, what I have to say will remain on the 
level of an essay; it is no more than an attempt to take up and further develop the 
problems of the so-called Frankfurt discussion. I recognize that many 
uncomplimentary things have been said about this discussion, but I am equally 
aware that it approaches the problem correctly and that it would be wrong always 
to begin again at the beginning.305  
 
By challenges, Adorno is referencing the ongoing conversation and debate about the 
relative merits of materialist dialectic inquiry the Frankfurt School was just beginning to 
popularize. But as a meditation, Adorno initiates a speculation on a mode of thinking also 
popularized in various discourses as natural history.  Many scholars have already 
approached this piece with a close read and analysis.306 Responding to Martin 
Heidegger’s philosophy of ontology, Adorno asked the audience to understand nature and 
history dialectically: that is, neither could be considered an outside essences that formed 
the grounding of thought but instead mutually reinforcing and contesting each other 
through thought. His address aimed at taking each concept to the extreme, noting the 
impossibility of considering nature as a pristine entity that exists outside of human 
concept any more than history appears to be an unending movement of forward 
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306 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics (New York: Free Press, 1977); 
Deborah Cook, Adorno on Nature (Durham: Acumen Publishing, 2011); Max Pensky, “Natural 
History: The Life and Afterlife of a Concept in Adorno,” Critical Horizons 5, no. 1 (April 2004): 
227-258; Adrian Wilding, “Ideas for a Critical Theory of Nature,” Capitalism, Nature, Science, 4 
(2008): 49-67. 
 114 
momentum.307 His lecture is rich in philosophical conversation, most of which will not be 
explored here. Instead, I’d like to place this opening in reference to disciplinary ways of 
understanding natural history.   
Natural history is generally characterized as the study of life within an 
environment. Marston Bates encourages us to understand natural history as “the study of 
life at the level of the individual—of what plants and animals do, how they react to each 
other and their environment, how they are organized into larger groupings like 
populations and communities.”308 As “an explanation of the living process,” it requires a 
paused observation of the forces contributing to diversity (or challenging it).309 Brian 
Ogilvie understands natural history broadly as a mode or an orientation of understanding 
the world steeped in a desire “to observe, catalogue, and describe.”310  In their edited 
volume The Essential Naturalist: Timeless Readings in Natural History, Michael H. 
Graham, Joan Parker, and Paul K. Dayton offers an instructive overview of the field as 
“the systematic study of natural organisms through observation.”311 Graham draws 
attention to an organism that include the study of the components making up a life form 
and asks that the vehicle of description remain open to various descriptive genres. 
“Natural History writing is the description of the results of such study and that such 
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writing may take different forms: from colloquial nature writing to expeditionary reports 
to more formal scientific pursuits.”312 As such, their volume is meant to reveal a set of 
“collective knowledge” about the way the world is based on the collection of observation 
of humans. It suggests a separation between one who experiments and one who 
experiences, preferring a descriptive mode rather than a results-based analysis. While the 
contours of natural history, as I will explain, have shifted over time, the site of 
investigation—a  pristine external world—is juxtaposed against the closed laboratory. 
 A quick scan of any university or public library reveals a number of texts that 
take up the approach based on different categorization techniques. Peter Thomas’s Trees: 
A Natural History moves deductively from the classification of species to ecological 
threats, asking readers to understand “the tree” in various situations.313 Lawrence J. 
Eilers, and Dean M. Roosa present a distinct focus but similar approach, limiting their 
study to one geographic area, in this case, the US state of Iowa.314 Other studies, like 
Richard Spellenberg, Christopher J. Earle, and Gil Nelson’s Trees of Western North 
America approach life continentally, examining the similarities and differences of vital 
organisms distributed across the crust of moving plates.315 Similarly, Clarence A. Hall 
Jr.’s Introduction to the Geology of Southern California and Its Native Plants describes 
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the goal of natural history as an attempt to raise awareness of regional environmental 
surroundings for the everyday student, not the specialist.316  
The growing list of texts devoted to the study of natural history, from various 
spatial and temporal starting points, references what historian John G.T. Anderson notes 
in his metahistory, that “the first decade of the twenty-first century saw a growing call for 
a renewal of the practice of natural historians as an increasing number of authors pointed 
out the importance of taxonomy and better understanding of life histories and inter-
specific interactions, including the critical role of multiple species in the modification and 
transmission of pathogens.”317 For Anderson, there is a return to a sense of excitement in 
a practice that began at the origin of Western thought.   
But this renewed excitement begs the question: what is the history of natural 
history? While Aristotle perhaps initiated the investigative and descriptive pose 
characterizing natural history, the Roman science-rhetorician Pliny the Elder first coined 
the term in his encyclopedia Naturalis Historia.318 Pliny’s efforts at categorization, while 
limited by its anthropocentric view of nature, nonetheless, demonstrated the first 
“unparalleled” scope of cataloguing the complexity of the life world.319  
His encyclopedia would have been lost if not for Arabic scholars like Abu 
Muhammad ibn Qutayaba and Sharah al-Zaman ahir al-Marwazi, whose The Choice of 
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Transmitted Information carried the tradition as free-thinking went underground during 
the European Middle Ages.320 Adding more complexity, Arab scholars began to chart not 
just individual species, but began noticing the struggles among various living entities and 
often paid special attention to plant use in medicine.321 Ross Wilson notes that at the 
emergence of the Renaissance, Western scholars took up these texts, enchanted once 
again by the vital life world around them.  At this time, natural history took on increasing 
characteristics of humanism; scholars were known to gather local and exotic collections 
in cabinets, displaying natural curiosities for investigation and revelation.322 
Cabinet curiosities motivated Charles Darwin, who initiated a new kind of natural 
history based—not on keeping one entity under inspection—but understanding natural 
entities as dynamic in themselves. Darwin maintained that the beings of nature were not 
isolated objects but were composed of life in various states of flux and change, reacting 
to forces in the environment around them.323 Natural history in the modern era took up 
his process-oriented study and, as John Angus Campbell notes, was one of the rhetorical 
features that made the study so successful.324 It is with the attitude of “wonder and awe” 
with an “integrity and coherence uniquely its own” the natural world became something 
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to behold and not just something to use.325 Such a posture also animated conservationists 
in the US like those of Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, Aldo Leopold, and Edward 
Abby, all of whom popularized natural history as an argument for preservation against 
the encroachment of human domination.326 
As conservationism developed beyond the need to protect pristine nature, natural 
history could also be said to shift toward ecological and network thinking. Particularly in 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and more recently Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth, 
strands of natural history took on an active and political demand not just to protect spaces 
but also to intervene and alter human behavior threatening the environment.327 
In a sense, the history of natural history reveals a cycle of boom and bust. Interest 
in the environment and playful approaches to catalogue and display seem to show up and 
recede. “Time matters,” Anderson curiously reminds us, “and it is important that we keep 
this in mind when we go to explain what people see and what they might think about 
history and the natural world.” 328 Noting that “in the contemporary period “everything is 
either ‘recent’ or ‘ancient,’” Anderson laments the tendency for people to consider 
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historical investigation of the natural world as “boring.” 329 And while Anderson notes a 
return to the principles of natural history on the horizon, one might pause here in this 
very brief reflection.330  
Adorno asks not that we spend more time either perfecting our descriptive 
techniques nor in using approaches to natural history to understand epochal shifts in 
culture. Instead, he might ask across these fields, how is the idea of natural history in 
operation? When did nature shift from threatening to boring? How did contemporary 
experience of time collapse so fully that all time not present seems ancient?  To return to 
the beginning, it may be necessary to not start with the observing eye, but the structures 
informing such a gaze.  
II. Red Rock Canyon State Park  
Kate L., a friend who works in the California State Park system, passed me a PDF 
copy of the 1981 General Plan for the Red Rock Canyon State Park. A 27,000-acre state 
park established in 1968, near the small mining town of Tehachapi and 80 miles outside 
Bakersfield, the hub of the agricultural empire of California’s Central Valley frames the 
Park.  The park’s declarative purpose, according the General Plan, remains “to protect 
and perpetuate the spectacular high desert landscape, associated natural ecosystems, and 
important archeological values for public enjoyment and inspiration, and for scientific 
study.”331 Instrumental in this regard is the creation of, “an improved visitor center,” 
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whose goal should be, “interpretation of desert ecology, history, and visitor 
orientation.”332 A brochure available at the visitor’s center supports this policy agenda 
noting: “at times visitors may think of the desert as an empty and uninteresting badland. 
However, appreciation and interest grows as one becomes more acquainted with the area 
and the extreme conditions in which the different biotic communities exist.”333   
Along with my two friends Alexis L. and Dom B., I entered the small museum at 
Red Rock State Park just miles north in the Mojave off state Highway 14 with a sense of 
wonder and anticipation on March 16, 2017. We happened upon the park after witnessing 
the super-bloom in nearby Antelope Valley, an explosion of wild flowers that happens 
only when the perfect constellation of conditions encourage the seed that may lay 
dormant for decades to cover the sandy floor with explosive hues of yellow, red, and 
purple.334  The super-bloom is a particular touching moment, given that the Mojave, “the 
high desert” is one of the driest deserts in the world.  For a brief period, a space that is 
thought of as uninhabitable explodes with verdant challenges to that assumption. As a 
child of the Sonoran desert in Southern Arizona, these moments take on a particular 
tenderness for me. Scorching heat makes water and shade luxuries for all living beings in 
the desert. In Tucson, the creosote bush takes in carbon dioxide only under the wettest 
conditions, in the early morning and just before a mighty monsoon rain. You can know a 
downpour is immanent when the sweet smell of creosote “breath” hits your nostrils. The 
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temperature drops and for a brief instant (often only 10- 15 minutes) a wall of water 
splashes against the chalked desert floor and provides resources for life to thrive for the 
dry months when no rain will fall at all.  
While the Sonoran desert is iconic for its saguaro cactus, which grows barrel-like 
arms to store water, the Mojave is home of Yucca brevitfolia, a monocot Agave member 
characterized by strong trunks made of small fibers and spindly bayonet-like needles as 
leaves.335  Growing from seed or rhizome, this indicator species, can live for thousands of 
years; since it lacks annual growth rings, it’s anyone’s guess the actual age of any one 
plant.336 It’s nickname the “Joshua tree” came from Mormon missionaries who imagined 
the cactus as a representation of the religious figure in Hebrew texts praying for freedom 
from harsh conditions.337 The Joshua tree’s life cycle is almost as dependent upon rain as 
the super-bloom making it much more at risk from climate change than almost any other 
entity in the region.338   
It is both these two harbingers of life—the Joshua tree and the super bloom—in a 
stark and harsh climate that brought us, like many other travelers and settlers, to the park, 
the point where the Sierra Nevada and El Paso mountain rangers converge. Years of 
geological pressure have created majestic and towering walls of exposed rock formations. 
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Red and white buttes jutting up from the desert floor testify to 12.5 million years of Earth 
history. Whittled away in the middle from the daily grind of wind and short bursts of 
rainfall the formations are held together by a hard flat top crust offering 360-degree views 
of the endless desert in all directions. This park is on the Western most edge offering the 
setting sun the final look before it passes into night’s oblivion. A small campsite of 50 
units nestled into the side of the cliffs offers easy access to the Desert View Nature Trail 
and the small museum and visitors center.  
Inside the small, one room museum, the human history of the park’s mighty 
exposed exterior is recalled in various installations. The site understood historically as a 
water stop on Route 6, is naturally a home for the now displaced Kawaiisu Indians and 
Coso People. The museum would like patrons to remember the more than 100 famous 
films featuring the park, including The Mummy, Jurassic Park, and a host of other 
western-style box office draws.339 It’s also fantastically the site for the 2005 music video 
“Cater 2 U” by Beyoncé-led 2000’s musical group Destiny’s Child. 340 One poster 
features a colorful hand drawn desert tortoise moving through wild flowers with text 
above framing Win the Race Against Extinction. In each instance, the Park frames the 
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desert dramatically, recalling,  “Romance, fortune, and death are integrated parts of the 
American Southwest.” 341  
Acting as “taste-tempter,” the museum hails visitors into “discovering the desert 
for themselves.”342 Typical to exhibits of natural history, petrified objects and animal 
taxidermies are presented to peek visitor curiosity and to establish the foundation for 
scientific investigation of desert life. In accordance with the itinerary of natural history 
exhibits, the museum presents the study of life as objects on display and then invites the 
patron to go out and experience them in what is considered an unmediated or pure state 
beyond the walls of the built archive. The Visitor’s Center and gift shop hosts a number 
of diorama that narrates the cultural and geological history of the surrounding area. 
Fossilized bone and plant species ensconced in plaster, lay in unnamed homage to their 
former resting place of the Dove Spring Formation of the Ricardo Group, a well known 
former sea bed come chaparral.  Two specific displays caught my attention. In one 
corner, an “early human” is molded into a silent and permanent genuflection, forever 
caught, gazing longingly in the distance, smashing pestle into mortar. On yet another 
side, a cross section of a local tree sits, rings exposed and sliced into a cognitive map, 
where people can look at great events in time mapped onto vegetal carcasses.    
The site is also advertised as a perfect place for stargazing, isolated and thus 
insulated from light pollution of modern American settlements. It offers a natural vantage 
point to reflect on Adorno’s sense of rhetoric as constellation, a grouping or bundling of 
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meaning brought together poetically by an interpretive association.343  Constellation is the 
practice a critic makes when connecting the dots among objects to create a collective 
vision, in this case between the external display of the desert ecology and the narration of 
meaning in the specific displays. The patron-critic places the representative objects of 
meaning in rhetorical conversation—the songs of tree rings syncopated by the clash of 
early human tools can represent Adorno’s “idea of natural history.” The sound is not just 
the story of how humans and plant live and die over the years, but also the conversational 
exchange between concepts of what counts as “natural” and what counts as “history.”  
“Extracted from a literal analysis of the term’s ambiguity,” notes primary 
translator and Adorno scholar Robert Hullot-Kentor, “the history of nature is grasped as 
historical; natural history is the historical grasped as natural.”344 In other words, the 
natural world around us is not without its own sense of time, geographic contingency, 
agonist life and death and antagonist struggle; plant life, indeed all of nature, tells it own 
historical tale. On the other hand, to speak of natural history, especially in popular 
television programs like Planet Earth or the Discovery Channel, the very method of 
presentation assumes a natural quality concealing the uniquely human techniques 
bringing us up close to the nature.  “The idea of natural history,” according to Adorno 
scholar Deborah Cook in her aptly titled monograph Adorno and Nature, “makes visible 
the damage that has been inflicted on both human and nonhuman nature by our 
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compulsive attempts to dominate nature to satisfy imperatives.”345 Any time history 
shows up, nature is sure to follow and likewise, anytime there is a sense of nature, 
already there is history. Just like subject and object, or time and space, to meditate on one 
calls forth the other so much so that the distinctions are both seemingly firm and apparent 
and yet also begin to dissolve.  
The befuddling contradictions in the human mind between the terms history and 
nature can be revealed in constellations like the Red Rock Canyon State Park, where 
similarities and differences are sutured together in narrative wholes. Following Adorno, 
Cook invites us to consider these stiches as fruitful and dangerous affinity frames. 
Affinity frames, for Adorno should not be considered positively charged. Instead, Cook 
argues that the formal abstraction of humans from the natural world represents the 
fulcrum of material exploitation.346 To separate humans from an entity of nature also 
encourages humans to manipulate nature for their own ends. Thus a formal relationship, 
which posits humans against nature, represents a rhetorical symbolic exchange in the 
dialectical form. That is to say, humans begin to substitute the two terms when doing so 
suits a specific interest. I say formal here, because Adorno’s point is that this relationship 
exists beyond a single individual: the dialectic is structural, expressed in economic and 
social terms. Let me offer a few examples.  
Gregory Clark’s work on Kenneth Burke and public parks is instructive. Clark’s 
instructive rhetorical history of parks in the US considers the creation of public identity 
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constituted by an address of shared experiences in landscapes.347 The common 
experienced shared by patrons, scripted by the legislation keeping parks secure from 
development, also establishes identification through the navigation of designed paths in 
which travelers gaze with wonder on natural geography and share a sense of connection 
to each other and to the national imaginary.  Public parks are on going rhetorical 
environments that traffic in attitudes; people can encounter them without thinking of 
themselves as anything other than spectators but are transformed by the experience. In 
that role, they are being educated in matters of individual and collective identity, civic 
duty, and narrations of the past. But as a way of motivating new immigrants to assimilate, 
to encourage westward expansion from urban areas in the East, as incentives take up the 
automobile through public ritual, or as a way of suturing identity after the Civil War, 
Clark reminds us that our experience of parks has more to do with structural interests, 
perhaps, than at first glance.348 
As a uniquely American project, British historian Ross Wilson agrees that parks 
offer an opportunity to identify in a shared grandeur even as they erase the material 
structure that brings people to them (the transportation infrastructure, for example). 349 
Massive consumption, construction, and human expansion all contributing to the need to 
protect natural life are often not discussed. Rather, most national and state parks ask 
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patrons to appreciate nature outside these structures. In this way they function as a form 
of escapism. As tourist, one can enjoy the exotic views and return safely to vehicles, 
hotels, and homes before any true danger (any real nature) show up. Perversely, nature 
somehow becomes unreal.  Parks then contribute to a misunderstanding in that life under 
capitalism is mistaken as true realty and that the natural world around us becomes a place 
of enjoyable retreat from the harsh conditions of labor and stress of modern life. In this 
way, parks provide an outlet for adventure or an experience lost in the humdrum modern 
American world.   
Part of this misrecognition may also be the result of their concealed design. Parks 
are manufactured—selectively pruned— yet in the process communicate and conceal 
deep commitments to the material structures of domination. In her brilliant, but 
theoretically dense essay “Teddy Bear Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, 
New York City, 1908-1936,” Donna Haraway offers an example of how to rhetorically 
read a typical natural history display in a way that is consistent with Wilson’s read. 
Haraway focuses on one installation: a great Silverback ape, stuffed and held in timeless 
arrest, moments before its execution by the man for whom the hall is named.  She uses 
this now timeless encounter between Carl and the ape in Akeley African Hall at the 
American Museum of Natural History to understand the material and discursive networks 
that comprise the structure of capitalism, colonialism, racism, and patriarchy made in the 
museums’ display of a trip on Safari.350 In examining the artifact, she moves scale, from 
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the perception of the seeing eye in specific design decisions as they reflect hidden 
histories of colonial performance related to the hunt (including the hidden exploitative 
labor needed to satisfy the fantasy) and finally to a scale of consciousness. Her purpose is 
to unify these experiences under a shared understanding of time, history, and the natural 
world and then to explode those notions as having never been shared at all, but rather, 
held, constructed, and made to serve one specific orientation.  
She refuses to let the museum display, itself an everyday encounter, stand “as is.” 
Instead she relentlessly interrogates the display, over and over, until what once seemed 
hackneyed, almost kitsch, suddenly takes on grave and inescapable historical 
significance. Her article, impossible to read and impossible to put down, explores the 
nature of history and the history of nature in the stories we tell and the interests who fund 
the domination of both.  Resting on themes of exhibition, conservation, and eugenics, the 
article is a cautionary tale about the assumption of neutrality in both the design and 
consumption of “natural history.” In the most abstract sense, structure and representation 
co-constitute themselves in museum displays, activated by the perception of viewers. It is 
difficult to encapsulate all the content and formal relations in one article, yet Haraway 
achieves this rhetorical feat in the activation of the critical attention of the reader. Her 
constant unfurling of layered meaning is also, I suspect, one of Haraway’s many 
important points. The rhetorical action is left to the judgment of the reader, who begins to 
understand the hidden agenda of conservators and historical figures.351 It is the 
audience’s responsibility to constantly make and unmake these nods, whose new 
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consciousness is produced and subsequently dismantled in the process of mediation. 
Haraway’s writing, like other forms of production, exhausts the reader with detail; her 
scope, like other factories, impresses in constant output; her point, like other nuclei, is 
desperately simple despite its complex world creation. The essay invites constant re-
readings. It seems that history is naturally an endless process of production, explosion, 
and reconstitution. It’s almost as if the process reflects a continual dialectic of life and 
death in a poetic permanent dance.  
Reading Red Rock Canyon State Park with Clark, Wilson, and Haraway, 
Adorno’s declarative tone makes more sense: no matter what humans attempt to do, the 
concepts we use to describe the natural-ness of ourselves in and of the surrounding world 
represents a formal abstraction; the displays already place us within arms reach—yet 
separate from—the natural world that surrounds us.352 The location of displays and our 
yearning are not only bound to nationalist projects reflected in the constitution of the 
American park but also themselves a result of our place within work lives.  
Adorno’s recommendation is to remain faithful to a formal truth: human history is 
the story of the struggle of our repression of nature, yet ought to be a thoughtful 
reckoning with the ways we are both natural and not natural.  For Adorno, this might not 
mean “settling” on the distinctions, but processing them again and again, unsettling them 
when they’ve become too comfortable or letting distinctions rest when imaginative 
momentum takes us out of a material context.  
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This is an instructive lesson for recent communication scholarship that has sought 
to stress affinity frames more positively in natural parks. Kenneth S. Zagacki and 
Victoria J. Gallagher’s ”Rhetoric and Materiality in the Museum Park at the North 
Carolina Museum of Art” in the Quarterly Journal of Speech takes up a site specific 
approach to natural parks from the frame of material rhetoric, examining how spaces 
persuade beyond the intent of the rhetor.  In examining “rhetorical enactments” Zagacki 
and Gallagher examine meaning-making in situations where the natural and human 
worlds come into contact and recede from each other.353  They argue “in a parallel 
enactment of the inside/outside experience, museum-goers become more actively self-
conscious of human and natural history as they encounter the tensions between nature’s 
ongoing processes and human efforts to manipulate and control these processes for 
human use.”354 They recognize a process of consciousness constituted by the instruction 
to examine space presents itself. They also point toward a renewed interest in examining 
natural history in rhetorical studies. But, in their concluding sentence, Zagacki and 
Gallagher perhaps slip too far back into affirmation. In their assessment using the site as a 
way of drawing attention to environmental causes can help leap from identity to action. 
“By performing a particular kind of co-existence between people and nature that is both 
complex and hopeful,” they write, “museum parks can create spaces of attention wherein 
visitors become more actively self-conscious of the possibilities and pitfalls of this 
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relationship.” But what kind of structural consciousness is perhaps a more concerning 
question. If natural history supports a desire for ready-at-hand content and immediate 
action, indulgent in a demand for utility with assuaging results, then little is achieved. 
Following Adorno, we should struggle a little bit, reflect on portions of our stories that 
reveal themselves to be fictitious, and admit truths about our instinctual desires we may 
not yet be prepared to do.  Conscious experience of history and nature is produced by our 
contact with objects, and yet also produces the objects that encourage us to name them.  
Thus, parks are not a refuge from the material conditions, they reflect, support, 
and advance the ongoing material structure. For example, in December of 2017, Donald 
J. Trump became the first President to scale back natural parks in Utah, arguing that the 
land needed to become available for the energy sector, what he considered a public 
use.355 In arguing that, “your timeless bond with the outdoors should not be replaced with 
the whims of regulators,” Trump reinforced what public parks prepared—human control 
over the environment—by inverting the intended aim.356 Trump addressed the audience 
directly, caretaking the nationalist connection to land and fusing it with a preservationist 
spirit in a perversely ideological terms. “You know and love this land the best,” the 
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President argued, “and you know the best how to take care of your land.”357 In this way, 
he reveals perversely what may be true in the minds of natural park patrons: the bond of 
ownership over nature is one that can be directed toward preservation or use value 
depending on the operating desire of the moment. What Adorno argues is that while the 
goals may be radically different, the orientation is the same. 
  While parks may offer opportunities and openings for us to understand various 
affinity frames between different organic expressions of nature, they function at the same 
time to conceal and repress deeper senses of control and domination if not met with 
critical consciousness. What Adorno, Clark, Wilson, and Haraway ask is that we 
relentlessly examine the dimensions of parks to the point of exhaustion, so as not to get 
bound up in the exotic excitement of tourist adventure and all the other accompanying 
misrecognitions contained in the journey presented by sites of natural history.  
III. Natural History, A Dialectic 
If Adorno’s call could be simplified, it might be to understand ways nature is 
grasped historically and the way history is grasped naturally. I’d like to return to the 
displays of petrified trees and the tool-bearing being at the Red Rock Canyon State Park 
in order to demonstrate this dialectic a little more closely 
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NATURE GRASPED AS HISTORICAL  
Like the stuffed owl that greets visitors as they enter the Red Rock State Park 
museum, a petrified black locust tree tells the natural story of the surrounding area. But 
while the owl tells the story of one type of historical process, petrified trees recount a 
sense of time according to nonhuman criteria. The petrified tree encourages viewers to be 
connected to history, not in the form of a line, but by undulating rings that vary in size, 
shape, and color, made manifest in the rock itself. This particular locust tree, 
unremarkable almost, stands at the corner of the museum in just such a fashion. It’s 
intention, perhaps, to reveal an appreciation for the human experience of time or the 
severity of life in a desert climate. But, in terms of academic research, petrified wood, 
and in particular tree rings, have a long history of hindsight.  
Dendrochronology, or the study of tree ring dating, establishes an interpretive 
ability for researchers to ascertain a level of temporal precision. The year a ring was 
formed reveals climate and atmospheric conditions unique to that moment or era. The 
practice became popularized by Jacob Kuechler’s use of cross sections of west Texas oak 
to study climate change in the early 1800’s. But, the practice of dendrochronology is 
much older. Greek botanist Theophrastus first noticed that one could study trees by 
examining slices of their body, like their layers.358 While he understood arboreal structure 
to be more akin to an onion, Theophrastus was the first to inquire about the recording of 
life in a ring. Like the buttes outside, cross sectionals of tree rings act as a diary of vital 
life on a scale lived outside human experience. What unites Theophrastus and Kuechler, 
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is a scientific assumption known as the Uniformity Principle, or a belief that 
understanding patterns of environmental change (precipitation, drought, seasonal change, 
atmospheric change) reveal the lived conditions of the past, but also establish 
prognostications for the future. Each ring marks a complete growth cycle of a tree’s like – 
a seasonal rotation include age, climate, disturbance, and random error, or the principle of 
aggregate tree growth.359 These studies have been important not only for radiocarbon 
dating, but also play a fundamental role in the way that humans approach the study of 
climate and the role humans play in effecting or changing the ecology far beyond our 
limited body and into a wider ecological scale.360 
The second way this sounding of the tree is captured is as a chronological way of 
displaying history or time. Andre E. Douglas’s work on cross dating, which is “exactly 
synchronized” annually across large swaths of space, assigns calendar years to life.361 
Like all forms of cartographic representation, tree ring displays stand in for the 
mechanism of counting time. For example, a cross section of a giant sequoia display at 
the American Museum of Natural History is but one of many examples of using slices of 
felled trees to impart an understanding of history—time—in linear progression. At 
important intervals, the tree is marked so patrons can stand in front and appreciate the 
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grandeur of the world. Time escapes our sensorial grasp and is yet captured in the 
display. Daniel Rosenberg and Anthony Grafton argue that tree rings truly represent an 
important role in establishing the concept of the timeline as an objective condition for 
measuring events.362  
In both cases—dendrochronology and cross sectional mapmaking—the 
intersection between the nature and time revealed in the display of natural history 
constitutes the human public in the reflection upon the scale of life. I say this to 
underscore what Adorno meant by nature. He noted, “the concept of nature employed 
here has absolutely nothing to do with that of the mathematical sciences.”363 Instead, 
what Adorno seemed to be after was the nature worked up in the stories we tell, in the 
way the concept itself anchors our perceptions of time in the figural framing a tree ring 
provides. We share a sense of time passing, of time moving forward, of the future before 
us, read through our interactions with dead vegetal bodies. Yet at the same time, what can 
be read is something even more profound: each display is also one, specific tree, with its 
own specific history. Despite human attempts to capture the tale, to metonymically 
substitute one for the whole, the tree can be read individually as the story of a singular 
life. To begin from this vantage point, the tree rings can also be used to transform an 
object of inquiry into a subject of existence. Thus, to read the tree ring with Adorno 
offers an opportunity to constitute nature, historically, in three ways: as a product of the 
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atmospheric conditions of its age; as a map of progressive time; and as a diary of the life 
of a subject.  
HISTORY GRASPED AS NATURAL  
Shifting our view in the Red Rock State Park Visitor Center, viewers see an 
entirely different, perhaps more familiar presentation. In an exhibit at the center of the 
museum, a fictionalized scene is presented of an “early man” garbed in loin cloth and in 
genuflected stance initiating tool use surrounded by plastic replica of the buttes and space 
fake shrubbery mimicking the landscape outside. His gaze though is not directed at the 
pestle and mortar he holds, but instead outward—past the patrons who now look upon 
him—toward some unknown horizon. It is unclear whether the figure is supposed to 
represent the Coso or Kawaiisu people who no longer live in the land the park preserves; 
the people are almost extinct due to federal and state policy that stripped them of their 
place, forced assimilation, built railroads through the desert, and inflicted disease and war 
upon them.364 Instead, alone, in the scene, the wax statue of early tool-wielding man takes  
on many possible reads beyond the memorialization of genocide.  
I’d like to imagine first the cave scene as a fictionalized icon, an idiom of the 
natural progression of humans. It casts our imagination backwards to a humble 
beginning, demonstrating a moment in which control over the forces of nature is first 
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achieved. It’s an old story of the use of technology, one humans enjoying reliving in its 
testament to our tenacity in the primordial clash with nature. In this tale, the use of tools 
is what sets humans apart from other members of the natural world; the exceptional 
ability to labor and manipulate is our greatest asset and assists humans in their struggle 
for survival over a natural world who wishes us dead. The effigy invites imaginative 
exuberance over what seems now like an inevitable victory, a past already decided and 
determined.  As a form of identification, it unifies the audience in its absolute difference 
from the figures of the past. To gaze upon the body of now extinct indigenous body, what 
may be the last remains of the Coso and Kawaiisu people who once inhabited this site, is 
also to know that “we” are not “them,” either because of the temporal and technological 
chasm that divides rhetor from audience or in the very real receptive space between fake 
display and living patron.  
The “past,” Adorno wants to remind us, however, is not over and is as contingent 
as both the present and the future. Presenting “time” in an enclosed way, as the figure on 
display at Red Rock State Park, makes it seem inevitable, far removed, and always 
occurring in that specific way. In unintended conversation with this exhibit, Graham 
Harman (whom I first mentioned in the introduction as a member of the Object Oriented 
Ontology school of thought) might appreciate this attention to tool use. 365 For Harman, 
the story of tool use is the dramatic arch of human story and one that “ought to take 
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center stage.”366 The presentation of the tool goes beyond the specific practice of hammer 
usage or mortar and pestle practices; it describes a different kind of relationship 
“belonging to every entity;” that is “a continual exchange between presence-at-hand and 
readiness-to-hand.”367 Harman, like most readers of Martin Heidegger, initiates his 
investigation of human uniqueness through tool-use. So, while he takes a critical 
approach, arguing that an essence of tools exists beyond human perception, that is 
something about “chisels, nuclear warheads, and sunflowers," ought to remain 
mysterious, he nonetheless continues to concretize the human experience in the same way 
the museum invites us to consider the Coso and Kawaiisu: the specific individual remains 
withdrawn from our understanding but the figure remains formally within grasp.368 While 
Harman reads an incredibly powerful possibility in letting the secret lives of objects 
remain withdrawn, there is a sense in which the dramatic story of tool use already 
reinforces a calcified history one that many would prefer to remain mysterious so as not 
to account for the violence it reveals.  
It should be no surprise that while we are asked to reflect on the beauty in a 
nameless Native person practicing the origin of human history, this location also prides 
itself as the site to a number of “western” films, whose stylistic genre is one interested in 
painting a much different kind of relationship to the same first people presented in the 
museum display.  Indeed to quote the General plan again, “In the last 20 years, the desert 
has drawn a great deal of attention from the movie industry…Western movies and other 
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productions like “The Vanishing Desert” have given these desolate parts an exciting 
feeling of worldwide renown.”369 One might ask after the romance of a Western genre 
here. Following Janice Hocker Rushing, the rhetorical form of the frontier myth is seeped 
in dialectic contradiction.370 Operating somewhere at the meeting point between rugged 
individual and cooperative community organizer, the romance of Western films is one in 
which colonial, racial, and patriarchal norms are establishing and communicated. Usually 
the hero is white and male, one who subdues the environment including Native 
Americans, women, and the harsh desert landscape, to ride off into the sunset victoriously 
satisfied in conquest.  Indigenous people, in these renditions, become synechdocal with 
the environment—barriers—to westward expansion.371 For Rushing, (as for Adorno), 
these linkages between Hollywood films, western frontier imaginaries, and the tool using 
man are familiar ideological contingencies represented here as natural inevitabilities.372 
They are dangerous in their allure: communicating both a historical past far away while 
satisfying a colonial appetite all too present.  
                                                
369 State of California, “General Plan,” 27.  
370 For a deeper rhetorical understanding of this relationship, see for example: Janice Hocker 
Rushing, “The Rhetoric of the American Western Myth,” Communication Monographs 50 
(March 1983): 14-32 and Janice Hocker Rushing, “Evolution of ‘The New Frontier’ in Alien and 
Aliens: Patriarchal Co-optation of the Feminine Archetype,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 75 
(February 1989): 1-24. 
371 See for just some examples: Anne Marie Todd, Communicating Environmental Patriotism: A 
Rhetorical History of the American Environmental Movement (New York: Routledge, 2014); 
Jason A. Edwards and David Weiss, The Rhetoric of American Exceptionalism: Critical Essays 
(Jefferson: McFarland, 2011); Mary E. Stuckey, “The Donner Party and the Rhetoric of 
Westward Expansion,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 14, no. 2 (2011): 229-260.  
372 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception,” Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, 
trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 94–136.  
 140 
But like the rocks themselves, the Western figure is both formidable and fragile, a 
contradiction at the heart of Enlightenment. In this “face of nature” Adorno writes, “…all 
that is human” is revealed.373 “Not only the nature of human existence in general” 
Adorno notes, “but also the biographical history of an individual is enunciated in this 
figure of the most extreme subjugation to nature…”374 This specific tool-bearing figure, 
shaped from plastic, is both dignified and subjugated. The figure is dignified because it is 
represented, subjugated in the erasure of terms of its elimination from the space it now 
haunts. It sits, namelessly held and arrested like Haraway’s Great Ape, in a moment 
before death. Hallowed in its sacrifice, we are not asked to understand ourselves as part 
of the colonial enterprise—the consumers for whom expansion was built—but rather, 
isolated viewers consuming images of the past: devoid, detached, and unencumbered by 
the responsibility of our presence. Theresa M. Kelley concretizes this viewing experience 
within the frame of violent natural selection, which becomes an apology for colonialism. 
“Devouring and being devoured,” writes Kelly, “is the only game in town.” 375 In other 
words, a certain constellation of frontier narratives and manifest destiny is thus glorified 
in the museum’s exhibit: a lone figure of early man recalls a humble origin, one that is 
recognized, even applauded for his innovation at subordinating the natural world, but is 
in fact doubly subordinated to the western imaginary, in which the progression of tool use 
invites a certain posture of domination. Reality check: the Kawaiisu no longer live in the 
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space in which they are represented due to removal and extinction. In a subtle way, the 
romantic rhetorical work being performed is one in which we come to understand our 
current situation as an inevitable refinement of tool use as the natural order; we are 
invited to erase the contingencies of decision within a frame of historical inevitability. 
The historical story then becomes naturalized, that is, the conflict (and thus the drive to 
mastery) is fictitiously installed in our consciousness as an inevitable feature of our 
nature.  
The idea of natural-history at the Red Rock Canyon State Park is performed by 
patrons who watch these two tales of tree rings and tool beings as they might watch one 
of the many films made at the park. Both petrified tree and tool-being sit in permanent 
silent conversation, waiting to be remembered by tourists and naturalists on road trips 
through the American desert. I’m reminded of a certain colonial purgatory these ghosts 
share, one ushered in by the dramatic dialectic slippage between subject and object 
Adorno asks us to be so cautious of.  
IV. Natural History, A Constellation 
Red Rock Canyon State Park is certainly a typical natural history collection, in the 
sense that a traditional approach to rhetorical studies might understand as archival 
display: the petrified wood and the tool being are expressions of a struggle with how to 
display knowledge. The visitor’s center concretizes a specific rhetorical act of which 
museums are designed. Nina Levant and Alvaro Pascual-Leone, understanding the 
museum as a crucial intersection between art and cognitive neuroscience, explain the 
 142 
“experience as a multilayered journey that is proprioceptive, sensory, intellectual, 
aesthetic, and social.”376 Susan Mancino, in her review of communications scholarship 
dedicated to museums, argues that as memory crafters, the experience of museums is 
rhetorical because they frame public experience, encourage embodied experience, and 
encourage critical reflections on time and power.377 M. Elizabeth Weiser argues that 
museums create a physical space of instructional ambiguity that can gather and collect for 
public education divisive and often challenging ideas even as they create shared 
audiences of expectation.378 But it is with Barbara Biesecker’s aim in mind—to unseat 
what has become a, “provincially settled scene”—in human understanding of nature and 
history—that drives my understanding of this museum and my reading of Adorno. While 
Biesecker may have “opened the way toward writing a different kind of rhetorical history 
that will not be governed by the notion of referential plentitude and the motif of truth,”379 
that path is difficult to traverse. It’s challenging, of course, to challenge.  
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I am inspired by my short visit to Red Rock State Park not just because of the 
interesting conversation I charted in the first section of this chapter, between different 
ways of telling time and stories, but because I imagine (wrongly, I am sure) this to be just 
the sort of space the Frankfurt writer must have delivered his lecture on natural history. 
Surrounded by a hall of curiosity, interested thinkers (including his advisor and long time 
friend Walter Benjamin) were present to hear his material publicly delivered, including a 
performance of word plays and subtle academic burns at inspiring figures of the time. 380 
Just as this museum is a site of public speech, so too was Adorno’s lecture. Who knows 
what casual coincidence in thinking flowed through that scene? Perhaps people used the 
opportunity to meet in unpredictable ensembles or randomly walked in, thinking it was 
some butcher or random coffee shop. Often times we think the past is so divorced from 
out present that it only extends its influence in the objects, the things we choose to 
enshrine in it.  
Adorno’s lecture is one of these objects. Published after his death, scholars 
trouble over the writing now characterizing it as an immature start. Biographer Lorenz 
Jäger reminds us the lecture was Adorno’s “…first attempt to do systematic justice to the 
process of seeing nature and history reflected in a reciprocal mirror…”381  Hullot-Kentor 
argues perhaps Adorno had not quite reached the conclusion of his own line of thought; 
he was still too open to affirmation.  Not yet moved to the limit of language and 
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frustrating his frustration, Hullot-Kenton suggests the “Idea of Natural History” lecture is 
a “not yet been mastered,” style, an early (perhaps failed?) attempt at what Adorno would 
become known for in more sophisticated works like Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic 
Theory, ironically because he was also  “too rigid.”382 Indeed Hullot-Kentor notes the 
essay is a failure precisely because it “decomposes” terms rather than let the terms live in 
a dialectical cycle; Adorno still sought a structural exit before realizing one may never 
appear ready-at-hand. In other words, he was too honest, approaching the writing with 
too much philosophical certainty. The address is still content driven; Adorno had not yet 
begun to reinforce those concepts in form.383 It is as if Hullot-Kentor believes Adorno's 
lecture failed because he performed the opposite of the characteristic pessimism driving 
his thinking; I think Adorno created something new, giving life to concepts rather than 
watching them live in death.384 
Adorno always struggles, as Fredrick Jameson argues, to “defamiliarize” the 
familiar formulations of the dialectic concepts of historical knowing and natural 
grounding in his writing. 385 Penksy understands “the most troubling and most resistant 
theoretical elements” in Adorno’s early thought was how to display the performance of 
the dialectical relationship, one that connotes as it denotes. 386 In this sense, Pensky notes, 
“history and nature are concepts that mutually and dialectically define one another, and 
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can ‘flip’ into their other at the moment of their most extreme conceptual formation,” 
including in the rhetorical relationship between writing and reader or speaker and 
audience.387 In attempting to challenge Nature as “that which always is…static and 
predetermined,” Adorno, Penksy argues, struggled with keeping that category of thought 
free from a certain New Age mystique (a sense of the pristine and untouched natural 
world against human contamination) as much as he struggled against the understanding 
of the natural world as totally open and available for assessment. Adorno initiates a 
materialist understanding of history, one that is not based on, say, a building set atop the 
ground, but rather as a series of events formulated through and with the substance of the 
natural world, including our own.  Nature, in this sense, is not the raw material of use for 
humans, but also a player, a certain contingent set of beings caught and contributing to 
events. In Pensky’s understanding, Adorno offers some critical resources to help us 
understand how to craft orientations in “the world of shattered relationships (between 
subjects and nature no less than between subjects and one another) in order to uncover its 
characteristic pathologies and cloaking techniques.”388 In this way, Pensky invites us to 
consider investigations into natural history as “a form of shocking, disorienting, or 
disintegrative world-disclosure.” 389 In the plays with the idea of natural history and 
human history, both become intertwined; former relevant distinctions collapse, while new 
and deeper ones are revealed. Each, however, are semblances built on misrecognitions of 
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past misrecognitions, so far abstracted we’ve digested them as real, forgetting their fictive 
origins.  
Adorno’s notion of “natural-history” is not that far from rhetorician Kenneth 
Burke’s “planned incongruity” in Attitudes Toward History. Burke writes that it is not the 
shock of revelation, a sort of deity that descends upon us to impart fate, but rather, the 
“nature of language itself,” that is, the principle of its formal constitution. It “leads us to 
be shocked at the idea of putting opposites together.”390 Burke argues, like Friedrich 
Nietzsche, the concept of morality, taken as natural, is really a sign system composing 
these planned incongruities, a dialectical struggle between good and evil, bound up in the 
history of reception. For Burke (as with Adorno), the approach to natural history, or the 
dialectic represented by the placing of these two terms together, is to understand with “a 
firm certainty” but not the “deceptive comforts of ideological rigidity.”391 Burke is 
describing a critical posture of listening, hearing, and reading, that avoids “mystification” 
in favor of “clarification,” description and not deception.392 
Adorno’s lecture, then, ought to be examined with other historical occurrences of 
structural colonialism coincidentally occurring on July 15, including: Christian forces 
first occupying Jerusalem in 1099; the US government’s demand that Sioux nation 
relinquish control over what would become Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri in 1830; 
nuclear tests executed by the US (1957), the then USSR (1967), and France (1968, 1991); 
Boy George banned from British television for gender bending in 1987; a permanent 
                                                
390 Burke, Attitudes, 290.  
391 Burke, Attitudes, 291.  
392 Burke, Attitudes, 292. 
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Israeli ceasefire with Egypt in 2014;  and in 2016 the birth of Twitter.393 To tell this story 
is to understand the cumulative effect of historical contingency, a lived nature ongoing, 
still around us, but receding from view. The experience of recognition of this ongoing 
material structure is a specific kind of shock, or jolt–one that moves you from a 
perspective of viewership into a consideration of orientation.  
At the beginning of his chapter on “Orientation” in Permanence and Change, 
Burke argued that humans and the natural world share a crucial interpretive system: “all 
living organisms interpret many of the sign around them, “ he wrote.394 But humans were 
exceptional in their capacity to reason the difference between “the food process and the 
bait process.”395 That is to say, unlike a fish, humans can begin to discern the difference 
between a meal and a trap. But, he noted, we ought to be cautious of this reasoning 
ability, and avoid being fooled into our own stardom; we’ve created so many solutions 
and more problems that often, especially in cases of the environment, we’ve forgotten 
that our abstractions are not our meal, but our own trap. “Though all organisms are critics 
in the sense they interpret signs about them,” Burke writes, “the experimental, 
speculative technique made available by speech would seem to single out the human 
species as the only one possessing an equipment for going beyond the criticism of 
                                                
393 “On This Day: July 15 - The New York Times,” accessed April 23, 2017, 
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University of California Press, 1954), 5. 
395 Burke, “Orientation,” 6.  
 148 
experience to a criticism of criticism.”396 But this orientation, our capacity to “interpret 
our interpretations,” is an ambiguous property, as likely to reinforce prisons as it is to 
dismantle them.397  
This is ultimately what Adorno meant by the “idea of natural-history:” an 
examination of the human as subject and object of history and nature as subject and 
object of humanity: where each vibrate across and through each other but also remain in a 
vastly unknowable and relatable relationship. We must be cautious about the semblances 
we create in working though our relationship, so that what we think of as our historical 
reality does not become second nature any more than our history gets separated from the 
nature that surrounds us. It is through rhetoric though, I argue, that we can journey 
dimensionally through the semblances and symphonies of our stone castles.  
The call to think in this way has been sounded in a variety of ways. Tom 
Jagtenberg and David McKie (among countless others) who, following the spatial turn in 
critical thinking, asked communication studies to think ecologically, that is with a 
dimensionality, that looks at the phenomena of communication studies as “interaction, 
flows, fields, systems, and space-time as well as the private spaces, worlds, and value 
systems of individual organisms.”398 J.M. Gray prefers the discipline to consider history 
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and nature as a kind of process as ushered in the performative turn.399 Marshall 
McLuhan’s media ecologies and Douglas Kellner and Jeff Share’s  “critical media 
literacy” ask that we understand the exchange of information in terms of organisms 
competing in the situation of environmental pressures.400 As I have demonstrated, these 
are neither unique to communication studies nor new revelations, but instead different 
ways of describing the orientation towards the idea of natural-history. At its core, the 
concept of dialectic, read through nature/history and form/content is the foundation for 
rhetorical inquiry. It is supple enough to allow us to examine particular instances in time 
and space, but expansive enough to account for scalar changes and to encourage a more 
viable and honest relationship of judgment 
In their text of correspondence on “vegetal being,” Michael Marder and Luce 
Irigaray also notice mythic dimensions in assessing human and plant relations.  Whether 
the stories of angry or loving deities, the stories about the natural world, the history of our 
encounter with it, is ripe with mythic detail. And part of its spectacular nature is one that 
“is always changing and becoming according to the seasons and the geographical 
place.”401 But that process of change is not one that is unstructured, even as it is chaotic. 
Attunement to dimensions understands multiple processes at once including: various 
rhythms, syncopations, and timings operating not as a chain reaction, but as a symphony. 
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The goal is neither to abandon the enjoyment of national parks any more than it is to get 
at the true way of representing trees or Kawaiisu people. Instead, it is a continual journey 
of reminding ourselves of these features and not get carried away by the false illusions 
designed to insulate us from brute historical realities and our participation in them. The 
goal is to unsettle our abstractions, our ideas, even the ones we enjoy about our nature 
and history.  
But, I fear even now, what Adorno must have felt at the end of his lecture. In 
presenting “a renewed interest in reinterpreting historical material,” I too have 
transformed the material away from its own nature and into a myth that serves my own 
interests.402 Perhaps, as Burke and Adorno note, sadly, that process is what “we” do and 
thus it is also the role to offer critical journeys to remind us of that. It is indeed a 
challenge.  
V. Happy Trails 
Before exiting the Red Rock Canyon State Park, a sign enclosed in glass, leaves 
patrons fleeing into the abyss of the Mojave with a final nostalgic injunction, borrowed 
from the Roy Rogers western song of the same name: happy trails to you. The expansive 
desert certainly stands ready to receive exuberant patrons as they travel back to their 
unnatural histories. A ghostly Adorno might recoil though at the ideological hailing: what 
trail is ever happy?  
  
                                                
402 Adorno, “Natural-History,” 124.  
 151 
CHAPTER FOUR: FIGURING THE SIPO-MATADOR 
 
I. Strangler Fig 
Strangler Fig  
 
Like a boa constrictor,  
this gargantuan tree will squeeze 
everything in its path, bore 
through city blocks of concrete 
sidewalks, outer walls and roofs,  
crush store signs, kiosks, just to put down roots,  
so strong is its longing, 
its notion of place.  
 
It’s a testament to adaptation, 
a monument to survival 
and to a singles of desire.  
 
No matter where we live,  
we are all tourists,  
we are all transients.  
The only roots we put down are branches 
gone crazy, like the ones on this 
monster tree in Maui they call 
the Strangler Fig 
 
    —Jill Jennings403 
 
II. Introduction 
In comparison to the “softness, earnest, and repose of European woodland 
scenery,” writes naturalist H. W. Bates in 1872, “tropical forests…seem to be striving to 
outvie its fellow, struggling upward towards light and air—branch and leaf and stem—
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regardless of its neighbors.”404 The ethical virtue Bates instructs his audience to learn: 
“live and let live is clearly not the maxim taught in these wildernesses.”405 As evidence 
for this claim Bates offers the Sipo-Matador, or Murderer Liana, “obliged” to exploit the 
trees around it for “the base of its stem would be unable to bear the weight of its upper 
growth.”406 Describing in some detail the process of execution, we get a sense of Bates’ 
own observational agenda. “The murder springs up close to the tree on which it intends to 
fix itself,” spreading its vines around in circular fashion up the base of the tree; its rings, 
choking the tree until “the victim, when it strangler becomes fully grown, collapses.” It is 
this ring like formation that allows the Matador to flourish: “the selfish parasite clasping 
in it arms the lifeless and decaying body of its victim.”407 Virtuous in its success,  ruthless 
in its execution, for Bates the Sipo-Matador is misguided for its craving ushers in its own 
demise. How are we to understand Bates’ Sipo-Matador? Is it akin to Lousia May 
Alcott’s vampiric plant in her 1869 tale, “Lost in a Pyramid,” a mere sensation thriller 
and nothing more?408  
 In Minima and Moralia, Theodor W. Adorno’s soulful mediations on ethics in an 
age of Nazism written in aphoristic style similar to Friedrich Nietzsche, he noted that 
obsessions with exotic creatures (Scotland’s Loch Ness Monster, the great ape King 
Kong, lions and so on) serve speculative functions: “people prepare themselves for 
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terrors by familiarizing themselves with gigantic images.”409 The structural sites for 
managing those terrors—zoos and gardens—perform a figural task: at once, they preserve 
the exotic objects for inspection and yet, in bringing the objects of terror closer, humans 
can begin to demonstrate control and mastery over that fear. Perversely, the sense of 
exoticism is heightened while the danger that animates it is held in recess.410 Especially 
present in enclosures with “invisible barriers” (and not all garden barriers are invisible) 
the mechanisms of domination, not far from Michel Foucault’s understanding of the 
panoptic prison, remain in place but concealed, heightening the sensation even more.411 
In noticing “the desire for the presence of the most ancient,” or the most exotic plant and 
animals Adorno writes, “the more implacable it is dominated.”412 Adorno understood that 
the desire to be surrounded by, distanced from, and in control of exotic flora and fauna as 
a rhetorical or symbolic vehicle through which fears and hopes are trafficked and 
controlled. The description of unique organic features can be an entrance point to 
understand human interpretative and ideological framings more broadly.   
The way plants are displayed or written about, as I will theorize based on this 
short excerpt from Bates, reveals unnoticed detail about the dominant interests, 
relationships to otherness, and the edifices designed to receive or manage the world. 
                                                
409 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. 
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Communication scholar Tema Milsten calls this specific practice “nature identification,” 
or the “specific pointing to and naming aspects of nature.”413 As a mediating practice, 
Milsten argues, understanding nature identification is one of the key points where 
ideology, structure, discursive representation, and lived experience meet.  As previously 
discussed in chapter two, mediation is another term in Adorno’s corpus that describes 
relationships between subject and object, immanent criticism, and methods of 
constellation.414 While Milsten’s Burkean study situates itself in present Pacific 
Northwest tourist communities examining the exotic aquatic orca, in this chapter I am 
interested in contemporary and historical naming practices surrounding a curious 
creature: the Sipo-Matador.  
This chapter constellates, or figures, around various naming practices of the Sipo-
Matador across multiple historical periods. In applying the method of immanent 
criticism, I examine the ways the Sipo-Matador shows up in numerous texts that also 
span genre, approach, and goal. From disciplinary vantage points, including 
contemporary biology, natural history texts, continental philosophy, art/poetry, and 
science fiction, I examine the way Sipo-Matador mediates experience. I do not claim to 
arrive at the truth about the Sipo-Matador, but instead try to accomplish an ethical task 
recommended by Adorno: to continually know and unknow vibrant life (and thus 
ourselves) in the various ways as it is cast rhetorically and historically. To figure in this 
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way is to understand how the Sipo-Matador is both domesticated in rhetorical gardens 
and how it continues—indeed exceeds—those enclosures.  
III. The Sipo Matador, by any other name 
The plant goes by a variety of names, and not always in the negative. Initially, the 
guaco got its name from the aroma emanated from its cut leaves and as an antidote for 
poison, a property instructed by kite birds who spread it on their winds before preying on 
snakes, their natural food source.415 In the European romantic variations, particularly 
Spanish and Portuguese, it’s called the sipo (or cipo)-matador, loosely translated to an 
"exhausting," "killing," "horrible," or "terrible bushrope."  It may also go under the 
nickname mato-palo or “woodkiller;” or mata-pau the “woodpecker.” Sometimes it’s 
bejuco matadoro, a general connotation for a vine or plant with restorative or curative 
properties.  In botany, the fiscus clusiifora of the moracea fig family is more commonly 
called the “strangler fig.”416   
                                                
415 “A climbing composite of tropical America: also a medicinal substance consisting of, or an 
aromatic bitter obtained from, the leaves of the plant. Guaco is reported to be an antidote to the 
poison of serpents and was at one time considered a remedy for cholera and hydrophobia. It has 
been proposed as a cure for cancer.” See: William Dwight Whitney, The Century Dictionary and 
Cyclopedia: A New Alas of the World: Work of General Reference vol. III (New York: The 
Century Company, 1897), 2644.   
416 Carol Miranda Chor, “#13 Fleeting Parasites, bane of Greta Trees in the province of Rio de 
Janeiro,” Remember the Rainforest, trans. Ben Hennelly, accessed on December 21, 2017, 
http://remembertherainforest.com/shop2/rtr1/ebook/etchcoms/co13j.html. See also:  Johann 
Baptist von Spix and Phil von Martius, Travels in Brazil, in the Years 1817-1820, Undertaken by 
Command of His Majesty the King of Bavaria. (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown 
and Green, 1824); “Guaco,” Encyclopedia Britannica, volume 12, ed. Hugh Chisholm 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), accessed on December 16, 2017, 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Guaco1911.  
 156 
While the Sipo-Matador may be a rare varietal, the vine is one of the most 
common entities in the Earth’s rainforests, according to John Kricher. 417 Appreciative of 
the 130-250 days of precipitation and tropical temperatures between 88 and 72 degrees 
year round, various species of vine grow best in these conditions. Since all rainforests 
share these conditions, one might expect vines with structural similarities to exists all 
over the world; yet because the smallest variations in soil conditions, weather patterns, 
access to light, and interaction with other species involvement, the majority of vines 
similar to the Sipo-Matador are predominantly found in the America’s and most often in 
the Amazon in Brazil.418  
The idea of the rainforest is a catch all term for a complex forest structure, 
ranging from emergent trees that tower into the sky from the forest floor to epiphytes, air 
plants that may never touch the soil, instead drawing nutrients from surrounding plants 
and water from the humid air of their surroundings.419 “Because of their abundance,” 
Kricher writes, “vines form a distinct and important structural feature within tropical 
forests. They exhibit high biomass in some rain forests and compete with trees for light, 
water, and nutrients…Woody vines, called lianas, entwine elaborately as they hang from 
tree crowns”420 As such, liana it not really a specific kind of plant, but a way of connoting 
a type of growth structure, or a “distinctive cross sectional shapes of their stems.”421  
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Air plants, growing in popularity in contemporary American culture are 
epiphytes, meaning they gather water and resources from the environment around them 
(as opposed to a root structure in the ground). The Sipo-Matador is a specific type of 
liana hemiepiphyte: a vine organism that lives some portion of its life this way.422 Seeds 
are dispersed and propagated by birds and wasps in tree crowns and draw on those 
complimentary species for the resources as their roots grow toward the soil to establish 
foundations of their own.423 It is also a misrecognition to suggest that only the Sipo-
Matador attacks its host; half of the 750 known species of ficus posses the quality.424 
David Attenborough in a BBC worldwide documentary clip demonstrates the effect 
beautifully.425 Hemiepiphytes are not instinctually vicious: they use their hosts for 
support.  They send tendrils around the host’s trunk, seeking assistance as they stage their 
journey toward the soil. But, the stronger the vine grows, the more it begins to inhibit the 
growth of the host tree. Eventually the host can no longer develop—dies and 
disintegrates—leaving an empty core surrounded by a complex cross-sectional of vine 
architecture that may last the life span of the plant, over hundreds of years.  
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All variety of liana are keystone species, including, perhaps the Sipo-Matador; 
they are an essential element of the ecosystem.426 Fruiting varieties provide sustenance 
for the fauna in the canopy and floor. Recent scholarship from Leora S. Ricahr and Sylvia 
L. Halkin, suggests that, contrary to its public image, the strangler figs could actually 
provide an important life-saving role supporting the trees during unexpected and extreme 
weather conditions.427 This new research has created a reinvigorated interest in theorizing 
entities like the Sipo-Matador. What was once considered monstrous is now thought of as 
necessary, friendly, and valuable.428  Mike Shanahan’s opening blog is demonstrative of 
the quick language play that people take up around the new heroic frame of the strangler 
fig: “They are demonized as brutal killers but, as two studies published this month show, 
strangler figs can be lifesavers," due to their anchoring role in times of inclement 
weather.429  In another contemporary blog, In Defense of Plants, the unnamed author 
notes that “by keeping large tree species alive through devastating cyclone events, the 
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figs are essentially keeping legacy trees alive that can then reseed the surrounding forest.” 
430 Perhaps, they speculate, this might be a reason that host trees have not developed any 
evolutionary defenses to impede the vines advances. Eager to demonstrate that the plant 
is actually a part of a harmonious Eden, the villainous frame of the Sipo-Matador and it’s 
close neighbor the strangler fig, is experiencing a heroic Renaissance.  
Banyan figs in India seem to have escaped this negatively-charged rhetorical 
scene, recognized as the national tree and as a central symbol in Hindu texts.431 As a 
helpful rhetorical analogy, following Julius L. Lipner, the banyan fig describes a key 
complexity of Hindu practice. “As an interconnected collection of trees and branches, 
without an obvious center,” Lipner writes, “it is a network of variety, one complex 
shading into another and so forming a multi-faceted unity.”432 As such, the fig, far from a 
strangler, provides powerful resources for mediation, instruction, and communication of 
one of the world’s oldest and most important religious and philosophic practices.  
But, the Sipo-Matador has not always received the affirmative framing attention 
of contemporary biology and Hindu thought. Rather, when sifting through the historical 
texts of Europeans, the hemiepiphyte receives a much less charitable, anastomotic 
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treatment. In the travel annals of nineteenth century botanists, we find a being submitted 
to a far more aggressive and exotic antagonist frame.    
IV. Colonial Figurations 
Karl von Scherzer, an Austrian printer-cum-ethnologist and historian was tapped 
by Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian in the mid nineteenth century to document the 
Novara expedition as it followed the winds around the Earth globe. 433  His travel text, 
Narrative of the Circumnavigation of the Globe by the Austrian Frigate Novara is an 
impressive tome, an almost 500 page personal account documenting his scientific voyage 
between 1857-1859.434  Upon arriving in the third port call, Rio de Janeiro, von Scherzer 
noted his initial impressions:  
The contempt affected for everything foreign, the fretful impatience to become 
emancipated from the smallest resemblance to European customs, is exceedingly 
childish and even ludicrous in a country which can hardly yet be said to stand 
alone, since the pressure of circumstance is daily making them more and more 
dependent on other countries, and where it is necessary to import abroad not 
merely the evidence of high culture, but the very first necessaries of life, even to 
obtaining supplies of foreign labour… Rio used to be, without exception, the 
dirtiest city in the world. As there were neither gutters nor sewers, all impurities 
accumulated during the twenty-four hours used, towards evening, to be carried by 
negroes on their heads, in pails and casks, to the bay and, singularly enough, 
emptied in the immediate vicinity of the Imperial palace, whereby several quarters 
of the city, particularly the hot season, were rendered entirely uninhabitable435  
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His text is littered with these colonial concerns: the need for stronger transportation 
systems; chagrin at exorbitant price of moving coffee from the growing region to Rio;  
a detailed account of local judicial prosecuting of corruption.436 In one passage, he 
describes a day-trip on an English streamer fueled by Norwegian and American 
lumber.437  On this short day excursion to Petrópolois, he introduces readers to the “idea 
of what constitutes a primeval Brazilian forest.”438 Descriptively, he notes, “The wonders 
of tropical vegetation, as manifested not only by vastness of form but also by gorgeous 
and rank luxuriance, strike the eye at first-sight almost the same way an overpowering 
chorus affects the ear.”439 
In this midst of all the verdant wonders, von Scherzer hones in on one plant of 
chief interest: the Sipo-Matador. “It twines round the stem of lofty trees,” writes von 
Scherzer, “which its flattened coils gradually constrict with almost life-like cruelty! Its 
aerial roots run out from all parts and embrace the tree like artificial clamps, forming in 
some places complete rings, and in others growing into the very bark.”440 Von Scherzer 
notes the consequence for the host. “The tree, in consequence of this parasitic embrace, 
dies away by degrees, whilst its destroy continues to grow gaily on the corpse of its 
victim, and spreads its leafy crown until it falls and perishes simultaneously with the 
support that had hitherto upheld it.” 441  
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Von Scherzer does not stay at this descriptive moment. Instead, he uses the Sipo-
Matador as an opportunity to reflect on what opportunity the plant might offer for 
understanding the political organization in Europe:  
To what profound reflections does the contemplation of this spectacle give rise! 
Involuntarily our thoughts fly from the wild Brazilian forest to the plains of 
civilization—to the modern society where, likewise, many a noble human nature 
is slowly undermined by a treacherous cipo matador of flesh and blood, till too 
surely he falls prone on the ground!442 
 
It is not clear the origin of the parasite in his passage; perhaps his contemporary readers 
would make the connection. But, what is clear is that, posited against the backdrop of his 
reception (including the unreflexive accounts of slavery in its connections to excrement 
removal), the Sipo-Matador offers the perfect exotic foil marking a deep divide between 
the “wild Brazilians” and a more “civilized” and “modern society” on the European 
continent. His nature identification amplifies a colonial heartbeat .  
In this way, von Scherzer’s “reflections” of adventure, travel, and enterprise are a 
hallmark of a form of travel writing made popular in the nineteenth century. Barbara 
Krote notes that travel writing as a genre or form, is one of the key feature of nineteenth 
century European empire building. Tales of heroism and expedition activated an appetite 
in the audience on the European continent and thereby played a crucial role in  
colonization.443 As such, it is important to remember, following Tim Youngs that, 
contemporary readers should not take these accounts simply at face value, but reflect and 
analyze them from a critical standpoint. He writes:  
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Travel writing is not a literal and objective record of journeys undertaken. It 
carries preconceptions that, even if challenged, provide a reference point. It is 
influenced, if not determined, by its authors’ gender, class, age, nationality, 
cultural background and education. It is ideological. And it is a literary form that 
draws on the convention of other literary genres. Narrators, character, plots and 
dialogue are all shaped accordingly.444  
 
The accounts are not just historical diaries providing documentation of travel. Instead, as 
noted by Kate Hill, they are written for a European audience with a specific ideological 
purpose. As such, the “became sources of knowledge and of new ways of knowing, sites 
for thrilling adventures…places where Europeans could encounter, virtually or in 
person,” the experience of colonization.445 To read nineteenth century travel documents is 
to understand the concerns as thematic encounters between self and other; perhaps more 
importantly as expressions of immense colonial power against those they sought to 
exploit.446  As Neil Safier reminds us, part of the practice of going back to these texts is 
to “understand the broad contours and unintended consequences of science and its 
representations during this period.”447 As such, “we recognize Enlightenment science in 
an age of imperial expansion for what is was: not omniscient universal knowledge of the 
natural world but rather a partial and contingent knowledge, one that silences and 
suppressed its sources just as often as it acknowledge and represented them.”448 In this 
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way, Safier also asks us to consider “transatlantic scientific commemoration,” as a key 
component of colonization. By that he means, “the broad set of activities through which 
empirical observations were transformed into tangible, memorable products in the 
emerging space of a broad transatlantic public sphere, whether through printing, 
monumental architecture, collected specimens, or manuscript narratives,” Safier notes, 
the rhetorical work is understood by what is presented to the “European reading public” 
and thus also creates a understanding of the contours of the desire for colonization.  
Roy Bridges centers the travel logs of explorers as a constitutive genre. 449 
Written for audiences in colonial headquarters, scientific travel logs of the nineteenth 
century created audiences who would then identify with the colonial enterprise. 
Rhetorically, the tales wetted the appetite for further expansion and provided scientific 
justifications for the immense resource expenditure each voyage required, and often 
encouraged others to take up those journeys. Mary Louise Pratt understands natural 
history writing as a subtle “a way of taking possession without subjugation and 
violence.”450 David Seed writes, “to see, in this collective view, involves incorporating a 
dialogical consciousness of how others have seen and also implicates the travelers gaze in 
the appropriations of imperialism.”451 Thus, understanding small details and rhetorical 
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images used in these texts assist scholars in understanding the operations of imperialism 
and the mechanisms that contributed to it.   
 While the genre of nineteenth century travel writing follows a similar form, 
conventions differ across geographic terrains. Voyages to tropical areas were often 
dialectically situated as heaven and hell, caught between being  “perceived as paradise 
and as sites of corruption in need of cleaning.”452 Beth Fowkes Tobin has an impressive 
study situating tropical accounts of European colonization of the time. 453 Tobin offers a 
special reminder for the need to examine the role plant life played in these endeavors:  
A combination of knowledge and ignorance about plants enabled the British to 
colonize huge parts of the globe, harnessing nature to serve imperial interests. The 
role of agriculture is undertheorized in the study of colonial expansion. The 
economics of imperialism is usually discussed in terms of forging trade routes, the 
rise of mercantile capitalism, and the concomitant military conquest of territory. 
This book insists that agriculture is crucial to understanding the British Empire.454  
 
While much scholarly work exists to understand the colonial attitude toward the people 
of tropical locations, focusing on botanical life shifts the conversation away from 
“colonial and postcolonial subjectivity” deepening our textured understanding of the 
process of colonization and the representations that vitalize it. 455 As a genre, these travel 
writings represented “ways of seeing, describing, and portraying tropical nature 
determined, to a large degree, by preexisting notions of what constituted the pastoral and 
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the picturesque.”456 They also began to shape the reception and anticipation of space 
itself.  Participating in “genres of botanical writing,” they often “sever plants from the 
ecological economies and cultural contexts,” and instead are repositioned in ways that 
support the colonizers and expected fantasies of the audience.457 In this way, Tobin 
confirms what Adorno argued, that the knowledge revealed by the discursive and rhetoric 
practices of botanical representation is the more violent side of Enlightenment.458 
Most critical work on nineteenth century texts demonstrates keen focus on India 
and the South Pacific.  Recent scholarship by Lorealai Kury notes that similar procedures 
are in operation in the development of Brazil. 459 Caught between the imperial interests of 
Britain, France and Portugal, Brazil presented a wealth of new and exotic plant life 
different than other colonies in Africa and India. As such, Brazil was a crucial hub in the 
global exchange of exotic plant life and other luxury staples like coffee. “Plants were 
therefore a key concern of governments and in the individual survival strategies and 
social status of military men, skilled workers, wayfarers, and men of science and 
letters.”460 Beyond commodity, examining plant varieties occupying colonial attention in 
Brazil, I argue, is a significant rhetorical contribution to understanding the practice of 
domination.  
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When examining the travel logs of nineteenth century science expedition, the 
Sipo-Matador comes up again and again as one of these plants of concern. Like Bates and 
von Scherzer, Scottish botanist George Gardner offered one of the first brief descriptions 
of the plant in his late 1830’s documents.  “It runs up the tree to which it has attached 
itself, and at the distance of about every ten feet throws out from each side a thick 
clasper, which has curves round, and closely entwines the other stem. As both increase in 
size, the pressure ultimately becomes so great, that the supporting one dies from the 
embrace of the parasite.”461 French chemist and writer Louis Figuier offers a similar 
detailed description: 
One of those climbing parasites will encircle the trunk of the largest trees to a 
prodigious height; the marks left by the old leaves seeming in their lozenge-
shaped design resemble the skin of a serpent. From this parasitic stem spring large 
leaves of a glossy green, while its lower parts give birth to slender roots, which 
descend again to the earth straight as a plum line. The tree which bears the 
Spanish name of cipo-matador, the Murderous Liana, has a trunk as straight as 
our poplar, but so slight that it cannot support itself alone, but must find support 
on a neighboring tree more robust than itself. It presses against its stem, aided by 
its aerial roots, which embrace it at intervals like so many flexible osiers, by 
which it secures itself and defies the most terrible hurricanes. Some Lianas 
resemble waving ribbons, others are twisted in large spirals, or having in festoons, 
spreading between the trees and darting from one to another, twining round them 
and forming into mass of stem, leaves, and flowers, where the observe often finds 
it difficult to render to each vegetable what belongs to it.462  
 
Richard Francis Burton also adds some colonial flair, noting,  “the cipo-matador, or 
murder liana, is our old friend the ‘Scotchman strangling the Creole’ on the Isthmus of 
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Panama and the “Parricide tree’ of Cuba. Often thick as its victim, this vegetable vampire 
sometimes rises from the neck-compressing coil and stands up like a lighting 
conductor.”463 From these accounts, the Sipo-Matador is a recurring fixture in nineteenth 
century travel logs, occupying significant descriptive attention and exotic wonder. It most 
likely was used to hook readers into a narrative, providing more evidence of that danger 
that heroic travelers overcame in the name of science and country.  
The obsession with the “murderous liana” also mediates the encounter between 
colonizers and the encounter with local indigenous people. Captain Maye Reed has a 
brief description about is sustainable use in construction and travel. 464 But it is in Alfred 
Russel Wallace’s account that the Sipo-Matador is also presented as a keen object in 
gendering rituals. Wallace writes:  
On the first signs of puberty in the girls, they have to undergo an ordeal. For a 
month previously, they are kept secluded in the house, and allowed only a small 
quantity of bread and water. All relatives and friends of the parents are then 
assembled, bring, each of them, pieces of ‘sipo’ (an elastic climber); the girl is 
then brought out, perfectly naked, into the midst of them, when each person 
present gives her five or six serve blows with the sipo across the back and breast, 
till she falls senseless, and it something happens, dead. If she recovers, it is 
repeated four times, at intervals of six hours, and it is considered an offence to the 
parents not to strike hard. During this time, numerous pots of all kinds of meat 
and fish have been prepared, when the sipos are dipped tin them and given to her 
to lick, and she is then considered a women, and allowed to eat anything and is 
marriageable.465 
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One can only speculate on the accuracy of Wallace’s accounts and it is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to explore the nuances that may have been lost in his rendition. However, 
for a European community with vastly different structures of gender, one wonders if the 
previous renditions of the plant also supported colonial ideas of indigenous people as 
primitive and in need of European assistance to bring them more fully into the moral 
community of the colonizer.  
 But, despite the numerous travel logs that mention the Sipo-Matador, it is Bates’ 
description—whose account I used to begin this chapter—that was the most influential, at 
least by judging the reviews and subsequent readings it received. J.E. Taylor’s The 
Sagacity and Morality of Plants replicates his passage word for word.466 Mary Swell, a 
nineteenth century religious scholar, used the Sipo-matador as a synecdoche for 
addiction.467  She writes (with perhaps the most generosity of the time), “under the power 
of strong temptation, they are helpless; and at last, beginning to despair, they cease to 
struggle. If they are not plucked out of the fire by another hand, they must sink into the 
fire that is everlasting” Quoting the same passage of Bates at length she asks, “Is it not 
worth our while to take some pains to prevent this stealthy murder from laying hold of 
the tree?”468 But it is in William Lonsdale Watkinson and William Theophilus Davidson 
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that a more grotesque slippage between the Sipo-Matador and European colonization is 
made abundantly clear:   
The principle of selection is strikingly illustrated in a Brazilian forest: everything 
strives to get upward, and with such reckless indifference to others, that a German 
traveller, Burmeister, has said that the sight made him quite sad, the vegetation 
displayed such a restless selfishness, eager emulation, and craft. The softness, 
earnestness and repose of European woodlands scenery and more pleasing, and 
form, he thinks, one of the causes of the superior moral character of Europeans. 
There is a parasitic tree called the Sipo Matador (‘murderer’): it clings to its 
victim, gradually clasping the decaying body in its arms, until the dead trunk 
molders away, and (its support being gone) the murder also falls. Tis ‘struggle for 
existence; foes on too in temperate counties, but there it is more concealed under 
the external appearance of repose which nature wears.469 
 
It is clear that the accounts of the Sipo-Matador soak up and distribute colonial 
imaginaries. The ease with which its operations are anthropomorphized and then applied 
to cultural conditions of which there is no connection is stunning. That they provide 
support for scientific theories of variation and eugenics is terrifying. The landscape itself, 
scientifically divorced from any true connection to the horrifying purification efforts, 
none the less is the center point for both the colonial project and in the minds of 
nineteenth century readers reveals a fantastic and equally exotic explanation for the 
natural origin of European empire and the need to colonize and suppress the dangerous 
space of the tropics, including the indigenous people living amongst the vines.  
Travel accounts figuring the Sipo-Matador provide a key element of the colonial 
encounter. Just as critical scholars have argued, nineteenth century travel guides used 
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these tantalizing botanical tidbits to entice and entertain readers; they also began to 
represent and organize the audience’s desires.  As a form of nature identification, 
descriptions of the Sipo-Matador prepared a reading public to receive and enjoy 
colonization. These accounts reveal the inner-workings of early encounters, including the 
advance of shipping technology and indigenous informant practices. The descriptions 
themselves offered exotic frames that would interest readers at home and as a result shape 
their understandings of Brazil. Thus, they played a small role in cultivating in the minds 
of the audience an interest in exotic gardening, inspiring a new industry to sustain and 
advance future colonial expansion. It confirms what critical scholars suggest: botany and 
plants, whether exotic or cash crop, are a primary and constituent life at the heart of 
colonial encounters.  
For scholars of rhetoric, it may also interest us to understand how the uptake of 
the Sipo-Matador currently, if not subtly, continues to exert its influence over our 
rhetorical frameworks. Mary Sewell, William Lonsdale Watksinson and William 
Theophilus Davidson were not the only writers to take up the fascination with the 
features of the Sipo-Matador. The murderous liana also shows up in one of the West’s 
most acerbic and perhaps important scholars of the nineteenth century still influencing 
the minds of rhetorical scholars today. In fact, it might be argued that the plant is the 
central figure of Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will to power.  
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V. Figuring Nietzsche 
Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the great thinkers of Western thought, the majority 
of his corpus occurring in the late nineteenth century. 470 Best positioned in terms of his 
famous phrase “God is dead,” his polemic approach aimed to irritate what was considered 
essential truth and instead offer a complex set of suggestions based on contingent 
rhetorical suggestion.471 He is understood as the theorist of a will to power, or following 
Robert Pippen, an understanding of the human and non-human world as described by “a 
constant zero-sum game struggle for dominance and mastery.”472 His challenge to “herd 
mentality,” that is subservience to the dominant reading or interests of the time, has given 
charge to contemporary postmodernists in their imaginative and relativist approaches to 
reality.473  While his reception has been tainted by its uptake and misreadings by 
populist-driven thinkers in National Socialism, his deep aversion to Nazism also inspired 
the most important expressions of critical theory in the twentieth century, of both German 
and French varieties.474 His writing, both polemic and provocative, has inspired both 
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criticism and reflection. 475 Reviled by many, his staunchest critics label his philosophy 
“undeniably second rate, and perhaps even downright naïve.”476 Gareth Southwell more 
charitably understands his corpus to be oriented toward a reader who already possesses a 
background knowledge of high theory, as well as intimate knowledge of art, philosophy 
and poetry.477 Nietzsche’s writing itself is caught, then, in its own dialectical struggle 
between, ironically, good and evil, often positioned somewhere between fantasy and 
fiction, inspired observations and systemic theoretical architecture.478 
It is no surprise that he was highly influential on the thinking of Adorno, who is 
often caught in the same dialectic.479 For Ulrich Plass, more than just the writing style, 
the pessimistic and ambiguous orientation of Adorno’s philosophical thought, his 
admission of suffering and domination as the fulcrum and inescapable part of the human 
condition, and an understanding of the liberatory powers of life that exists in the working 
through of that suffering beyond the exercise of rational certainty are all hallmark of the 
Frankfurter’s reading of Nietzsche.480 Both have been given the tile “great thinkers of the 
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critical negative.”481 So central to his thinking, Adorno wrote, “to tell the truth, of all the 
so-called great philosophers I owe [Nietzsche] the greatest debt—more even than 
Hegel.”482 Ripe with provocative persuasive power, The Frankfurt School struggled with 
interpreting Nietzsche, attempting to figure out what to salvage; trying to parcel out what 
could explain the rise of Nazism and what could be used to challenge it.483 
More than Adorno, Nietzsche plays a crucial role in rhetorical studies. First 
popularized by an article by Paul de Mann on rhetoric in 1974, in communication studies, 
Nietzsche was tacitly introduced in Samuel IJsseling’s survey in 1976.484 He became 
fully introduced in the translation work by Carol Blaire in 1983.485 Ron Lee’s application 
of Nietzschean thought to Richard Nixon provided an example of his influence in 
political speech.486 The debates about Nietzsche and its influence in rhetoric though 
started in earnest with Gregory Desilet in 1989.487 They became more sophisticated in the 
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exchanges among Douglas Thomas, Steve Whitson and John Poulakos in 1993.488 
Interest continued into the twenty first century, notably with James W. Hikins, in 
concerns about relativism and the excitement of postmodernism in the field.489 
As with so many other thinkers, Nietzsche also influenced Kenneth Burke. In an 
issue of the field’s flagship Quarterly Journal of Speech, Burke first explained his theory 
of dramatic criticism with an explicit exposition of Nietzsche. Burke draws from 
Nietzsche in understanding of the particular properties of language as negative.490 For 
Burke, Nietzsche’s insight was central in appreciating a unique ability to examine 
material assumed from culture, notice its injunctions, and understand ways in which 
positive demands were actually negations and vice versa.491 As does Carol Blair, Debra 
Hawhee sees Nietzsche as indeed one of the primary foundations for Burke’s thinking, 
often overlooked because it didn’t fit nicely within disciplinary conversations of the late 
1960s.492 Negation, the ability to interpret, and thus to understand encounters beyond 
instinct is the first brick in the house of Burke, forged through the polemic writings of 
Nietzsche. She notes that in Nietzsche, Burke found an inquiry that began with ethics, 
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that is one dependent on variation, creative interpretation, and relationality as opposed to 
a staunch metaphysics or orienting ontology.493 
Following the work of Charles E. Scott, by "ethics" Nietzsche was referring to  
“the body of values by which a culture understands and interprets itself with regard to 
what is good and bad.”494 In this way, ethics were “sharply distinguished from morals, 
since it refers to a group of principles for both conduct and value judgment,” but rather, 
understands how those principles are framed or put into use.495 Nietzsche’s unique 
understanding of ethics (I argued in chapter one) opened up theory and language to an 
interpretive form of critique, not beholden to the dominant Christian writings of the time 
and as such represent one of Nietzsche’s most important accomplishments. Nietzsche’s 
ethical approach, Peter R. Sedwick notes, is best on display in his writings about nature. 
While “often hyperbolic and figural,” Sedwick argues, they invite further insights and 
require more “explicit theorization.”496 My argument, following Paola Cavalieri, 
understands extra-human relations as one way to figure Nietzsche’s thinking and his 
suggestion about ethical arrangements.497  
Considering public reception, his naturalist writings are a popular entrance point 
for Nietzschean thought as well. In consumer culture, his quotations show up on imaging 
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sharing websites like Pintrest: "For a tree to become tall,” Nietzsche wrote in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, “it must grow tough roots against the rocks."498  In contemplative 
writing, Herman Hesse picks this noble quality up in his book on trees.499 In new 
psychological self-help texts, Uri Wernik describes his Nietzschean approach to self 
management as an “advanced…manual for gardeners of the self.”500 As part of the 
practice of his unique therapy, he asks patients (readers?) to embrace their unique 
individual self-drives, to understand that suffering and pain are inevitable in this world. 
His goal: “a mode of a state of existence, in which life is experienced intensively.”501 
Given the popular interest in Nietzsche’s ethical writings, it’s vital to understand his use 
of natural figures. It is beyond the scope or interest of this chapter to stage a full inquiry 
into the tenants of Nietzsche’s thought, about the position of the negative in language, 
about a will (or lack) of power, or about the viability of Nietzsche’s work in ideology 
struggle. Rather, I aim to add some curious texture to the ongoing conversation by 
noticing an often-overlooked figure in his work.  
The Sipo-Matador shows up at the end of Aphorism 258 right in the center of 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil. 502 He writes: 
                                                
498 Unfortunately it’s already an anesthetized version. In most translations, the actual line is: 
“Too tender, too yielding: so is your soil! But for a tree to become great, it seeks to twine hard 
roots around hard rocks!” Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 136.  
499 Herman Hesse, “Trees,” 1918. accessed April 30, 2017, 
http://www.arltfoundation.org/blog/2017/04/trees-by-herman-hess-and-advice-from-a-tree/. 
500 Uri Wernik, Nietzschean Psychology and Psychotherapy: The New Doctors of the Soul 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 204. 
501 Wernik, “New Doctors,” 214.  
502 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, eds. Rolf Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, 
trans, Judith Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 178 
Corruption as the expression of the fact that within the instincts anarchy is 
threatening and that the foundation of the affects, what we call "life," has been 
shaken: according to the living structure in which it appears, corruption is 
something fundamentally different. When, for example, an aristocracy, like 
France's at the start of the Revolution, throws away its privileges with a sublime 
disgust and sacrifices itself to a dissipation of its moral feelings, this is corruption: 
- essentially it was only the final act in that centuries-long corruption, thanks to 
which step-by-step it gave up its ruling authority and reduced itself to 
a function of the monarchy (finally even to the monarch's finery and display 
pieces). The essential thing in a good and healthy aristocracy, however, is that it 
feels itself not as a function (whether of a monarchy or of a community) but as 
its significance and highest justification - that it therefore with good conscience 
accepts the sacrifice of an enormous number of people, who for its sake must be 
oppressed and reduced to incomplete men, slaves, and instruments of work. Its 
fundamental belief must, in fact, be that the society should exist, not for the sake 
of the society, but only as a base and framework on which an exceptional kind of 
nature can raise itself to its higher function and, in general, to a higher form 
of being, comparable to those heliotropic climbing plants on Java - people call 
them Sipo Matador - whose branches clutch an oak tree so much and for so long 
until finally, high over the tree but supported by it, they can unfold their crowns in 
the open light and make a display of their happiness. 
 
Upon first glance, this passage has all the hallmarks of Nietzsche’s style that at once 
confounds, perturbs, and excites scholars. It appears as though Nietzsche claims that we 
ought to understand corruption as that which deviates from the principles derived from 
the nature. When considering an aristocratic claim to rule, it would appear from this 
aphorism, that the utmost corruption is ceding power to those who are not determined to 
wield it. Thus, to give over to the demands of the exploited is, again upon precursory 
read, a fundamental disservice to the natural order of life.  
Certainly this read motivates rhetorician A.C. Pigou in 1908 when he first began 
to draw out an ethics from Nietzsche’s relationship based on the Sipo-Matador.503 Pigou 
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argues that at the core of humanity, in our “second nature” or ontological state, is a 
primary principle: “to promote the greatest possible amount of goodness in itself.” 504 
But, while the consequences cannot possibly be assured in advance, the principle could 
be considered absolute. “The badness of the effects may outweigh the goodness of their 
original cause,” writes Pigou, and, “it is this practical difficulty which Nietzsche 
envisioned in the concrete and from which as a center, a great deal of his teaching 
radiates.”505  Pigou’s consequentialist reading of Nietzsche here is more complex than 
traditional notions of pleasure and pain, but it is the inevitability, the “naturalness” that he 
draws from Nietzsche.  Here he quotes the entire section of Aphorism 258 in order to 
demonstrate an ethics based on the precursory reading outlined above. In a refusal of pity 
for the poor or women, whose role is best to serve, he ends this part of his “practical 
ethics” with a Malthusian cry, reminding the reader that “to work for the preservation of 
all the sick and suffering, (quoting Nietzsche now), ‘means indeed and in truth to work 
for the deterioration of the European race.’”506 As with the colonial naturalists who 
preceded him, it appears as though the Pigous interpretation of the Sipo-Matador once 
again becomes a natural, indeed ethical justification, for structural domination.   
It is perhaps unsurprising to those who are critical of Nietzsche that many readers 
share Pigou’s perspective, although they formulate the question differently.  Nidesh 
Lawloo, for example, says of Nietzsche’s fascination with the Sipo-matador that the “will 
to power is not as human, personal, often exclusively masculinist force. But will to power 
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as a nonhuman, materialist, and impersonal energy illustrates the vitalist, brutal, yet life-
affirmative power of nature itself.”507 Michael Onfray describes this as the very condition 
of life: the substance of battle upon which all of concepts of affirmations grow.508 Haroon 
Sheikh reminds us, Nietzsche is as much a theorist of the Right as he is of the left. His 
vision of the will to power, the plant man struggling above all else, was taken up by 
conservatives like Leo Strauss and Francis Fukuyama, who provided much of the 
architecture for the modern conservative movement.509 Part of their concern was with a 
retelling of the Devil’s advocate in portions of Nietzsche’s writing that promote “pride,” 
and “self-recognition” over equality and collective cooperation. “Morality that seeks 
comfort, evades danger and discipline; in such a world, man’s [sic] inner tyrants are no 
longer developed and capacity for striving diminishes.”510 When one considers both of 
these scholars inspired the current system of International Relations, it’s not difficult to 
examine the contemporary situation and see the failed fruits of their labor.  
This conservative ethics of Nietzsche also shows up in moral psychology, or the 
study of agency as it is executed in everyday choice. Contra Aristotle’s virtue ethics and 
Kant’s moral imperatives, Brian Leiter and Joshua Knobe take up Nietzsche’s concern 
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for a life driven by moral submission to concerns for those intended to serve.511 Instead, 
they suggest, “type-facts’ drive every human decision. Drawing from Nietzsche’s, they 
argue he first and foremost believes that humans are not choice makers, but driven by the 
natural instincts of growth and self determination, and will develop rationales for their 
behavior after the act is performed. They also have a subtle extended analogy about the 
tomato: while environmental conditions may contribute to the intensity of an organism’s 
development, the environment cannot change a tomato seed into an apple seed. 
Inevitably, they conclude, hereditary traits explain psychological behavior far more than 
any developmental philosophy could.  So, even as Vanessa Lemm offers a more 
charitable re-reading, looking toward the more creative side of life affirming will to 
power, the notion of a human driven with unflinching drive toward the fullest expression 
of their own deepest desires provides the rationale for a governing system built on 
principles of domination.512   
  Biologist Jean Gayson acknowledges this concern about the silence around the 
relationship between Nietzsche and Nazism in their discipline. Gayson notes that many 
biologists would prefer to avoid the philosophically charged understandings of Nietzsche, 
looking for a separate and more independent sphere of inquiry precisely because he is too 
easily taken up by unsavory political projects.  Yet even she cannot but help to opine 
about the power of struggle, supplementing power with nutrition and noting a primary 
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principle of “functional assimilation” working from within the core of biological life, 
seeking to incorporate and dominate, as the basis of evolutionary process.513  
In another sense though, there is a different read that could be offered than the 
conservative ethics drawn from his aphorism on the Sipo-matador. Was Nietzsche subtly 
critiquing the aristocracy for “dissipating” or dissolving into consumptive pleasure? 
Similar to Sophia Copalla’s Marie Antoinette, in which the viewer never actually sees 
any poverty, colonial racism, or revolutionary violence, what Nietzsche may be pointing 
to is a sophisticated jab at consumptive consciousness, overflowing in its own gluttony.514 
In Nietzsche’s aphorism, is it possible he is not applauding the elite, but admonishing a 
group of people who “with good conscience accept the sacrifice of an enormous number 
of people, who for its sake, must be oppressed and reduced to incomplete men, slaves, 
and instruments of work?” In this instance, he is not intrigued by the life-affirming power 
of the Sipo-Matador, but rather, the way it stages its own death in its ultimate expression 
of will. To put it bluntly, the aristocrats kill themselves with their own consumption; their 
unending will-to-life a recipe for their own demise.   
In an 1871 naturalist text by Scottish inventor Mungo Ponton, his chapter on 
parasites outline a peculiar property of the Sipo-Matador that I alluded to earlier: 
vampirism, the drawing of life, is a natural quality of all organisms. 515 Ponton terms “the 
parasitic condition,” as the special effect of the union of two opposites, when the output 
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destroys the host.516 There is a curious caveat, Ponton notes, in a specific parasitic 
condition: “that of one organism growing at the expense of another belong to a species 
different from itself,” and from which the common understanding of the term emerges.517 
In fact, Ponton offers three different versions of this more specialized parasitic condition.  
In the first condition, a parasite germinates near a host and attacks the root system, 
extracting enough nutrients to keep both organisms alive. A second condition is noticed 
when the parasite will enter a host through its fruit and germinates from the forced 
conjoinment. But it is the final condition in which additional variation is noticed. In this 
case, the plant will root near a host and attack the root system, but will also attach to the 
rind. In the slight variation noticed almost exclusively in the Sipo-Matador, as the plant 
seeks nourishment from the host’s roots, its enthusiasm causes both host and parasite to 
collapse and ensure both are destroyed. 518 
It is both perverse and acute that this third variety in the parasitic condition is 
what constitutes Nietzsche’s principle of life, particularly that of aristocratic European 
men. Built into Aphorism #258, then, is a smart and subtle dialectic. It is up to the reader 
to decide which version to interpret. In their own naming practices, perhaps their desires 
and identifications are revealed in the interpretation of the interpretation.  
Did Nietzsche know about the slight variation in the parasitic condition or was he 
too romanced by a vampire?  Was he playfully aware that ultimately the gluttony of the 
Sipo Matador, and not its cunning, would cause its like to come crashing to the forest 
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floor? Is the parasitic condition “ontological” that is to say, the principle of human 
experience or is it in fact merely a clever myth organizing a story in a humorous of way?  
Micheal Marder, one of the primary thinkers of contemporary critical plant 
studies, wants to understand Nietzsche’s plant ethics outside the figure of the Sipo-
Matador altogether. “Perhaps, the assumption that roots engage competitive or altruistic 
behaviors, depending on the identity of their neighbors,” Marder writes, “is nothing but a 
projection of human expectations onto non-human nature. Perhaps, Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of the “fight” among trees growing in a jungle is also a theoretical fiction, 
which, in turn, naturalizes the struggle for survival in human societies.” 519 He figures the 
cakile edentual (a species of plants that produce more roots in shared environments with 
different species) to demonstrate an entirely distinct ethic drawn from plant life.520 
Marder’s more communal frame he terms “nutritive desire.”521 Preferring a sense of 
“pure positivity of growth and expansion where nothing is missing,” Marder argues that 
humans have been sublimated by plants not reverse as is commonly understood.522 It is a 
similar move to that of Micheal Pollen, whose important study of plants asks how we, not 
they, have been domesticated. Marder goes a step further to say that Nietzsche’s problem 
is also ethical, that is  “besides projecting anthropomorphic feelings and behaviors onto 
plants, he includes them under the concepts of sameness and identity. “ Instead he faults 
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Nietzsche for not understanding plants in their ability to “preclude the hoarding of power. 
Their unique ensouled existence enjoins plants to the passages, the outlets, or the media 
for the other.”523 While he flips Nietzsche’s conclusion, perhaps, as I have tried to 
demonstrate, there is more to interpret.  
In the epilogue to Plant Thinking- A Philosophy of Vegetal Life, Marder extends 
his thinking to a broad relational ethics, noting “those who are ready to practice plant 
thinking must be patient enough to see through the germination of a new ethics from 
vegetal existence itself, an ethics singularly adapted to each situation, rid of final 
conclusion, and in tune with our ongoing learning from plants.”524  He suggests that an 
appropriate ethical stance is not to relegate plants to the status of objects, but rather, “to 
cultivate a way of thinking with them… a certain intimacy with plants, which does not 
border on empathy or on the attribution of the same fundamental substratum to their life 
and to ours; rather, like all intimacy, it will take place (largely) in the dark, respectful of 
the obscurity of vegetable life.”525 He considers this situational ethics as a kind of 
intimacy, one which offers to engage in (rhetorical) relationships in order to contemplate 
the simple divisions between mind and body, life and death, theory and practice, that is, 
much like dialogue and debate, an on going process that twists and turns, turns back in on 
itself. 
Marder’s is a romantic and enchanting ethics; Nietzsche has a tendency to draw 
that component out in thinkers. I am also not really in a rush to challenge Marder either. 
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Too many people are willing to laud the will-to-power in Nietzsche without recognizing 
the situational context and the deep aversion the writer has to all things human, 
particularly the aristocracy. But, to be fair, Marder also performs a dangerous rhetorical 
move. He too erases the parasitic nature of the Sipo-Matador in his quest to find 
alternative examples of communal living. It’s understandable, but again, he does a 
disservice to the labor and life of the plant lives he wants to venerate. Perhaps a little 
pessimism about the opportunities for human thinking drawn from the plant world is also 
in order.  
Thus, in this short reading at the heart of debates between conservative and 
radical interpretations of the great rhetorician Nietzsche, I hope to have displayed a taste 
of the immense criticism upon criticism, an almost vine like structure, emerging from and 
developing around the thinker. As a great and influential figure, his style and philosophy 
continues to animate rhetorical inquiry throughout the history of the field. But, as an 
acerbic writer, his interpretations are prone to serious misreading which inform various 
attempts to derive an ethics from his work. Was he, like so many other readers of 
naturalist texts of the time, merely enchanted by the colonial writings of botanical life in 
the various colonies around the world? Is he making the case for an ontological spirit of 
domination emerging from the Sipo-Matador’s attempt to lead its own life? Or, was he a 
sophisticated reader of the antagonist struggle, smuggling in a small reminder that 
parasitic social structures inevitably fall because they extract too much from their hosts?   
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VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to present a rhetorical history—a naming 
identification—of the Sipo-Matador using the method of immanent critique. Drawing 
from contemporary readings in biology, I began with the current affirmation of the plant 
as a life-affirming agent. In exploring the annals of scientific excursions of the nineteenth 
century, I demonstrated that the exotic features of the Sipo-Matador play an important 
role in colonizer fantasies, particularly in establishing an appetite for the exotic in the 
structure’s reception in colonial publics. I examined the Sipo-Matador’s relevance to 
debates over ethics ranging from moral philosophy to contemporary situational ethics in 
extra-human relations as offered by critical plant studies. In each instance, I have 
attempted, following Adorno, to both know and unknow the plant – never leaving it 
fixed, but figured in dialectical struggle between subject and object—hero and villain—as 
it crisscrosses various forms of rhetoric.  
Before I leave the Sipo-Matador to its ways, I’d like to offer one final approach, 
this time in a 1917 short story by Italian antifascist writer Luigi Ugolini simply called  
“The Vegetable Man.” 526 Written as an address, readers are called to a conversation with 
a man, so abhorred by the green hue his skin has taken on, that he lives, it appears, in 
complete isolation. When approached by a neighbor who shows not revulsion but 
concern, Dr. Benito Olivares, the vegetable man shares the travel narrative at the heart of 
his condition.   
                                                
526 Luigi Ugolini, “The Vegetable Man,” in The Weird: A Compendium of Strange and Dark 
Stories, eds. Ann VanderMeer and Jeff VanderMeer (New York: Tom Doherty, 2011) 97-100. 
 188 
While working on his doctorate in natural history, the native Brazilian took to the 
Amazon, “with the ardor of a young pioneer and the zeal of a scientist” and “penetrated 
the virgin forests” to extract “countless secrets of the vegetable environment that know 
no bonds.”527 On these travels, he encountered “a silent and insidious weapon that rules 
the mute combat of the vegetable kingdom … the octopus of the forest … the Cipo-
Matador.”528 In the midst of combat, Olivares is caught in its tentacles wherein he finds a 
new species of plant never before discovered. “What delight, what triumph, what 
delirium,” he recalled upon encountering this “living contradiction” which seemed to 
defy all categorization of the natural history community.529 A “shrub as tall as a normal 
man” with “palmate leaves that were thick and fleshy and two oval scuttulem had formed 
what looked like eyes,” the plant transfixed him with all the wonder, riches, and notoriety 
it might offer up to him.530  
Olivares, upon immigrating to Italy, appears to have absconded with a specimen 
and offered the neighbor-narrator a quick peak. Shivering the narrator remarks upon 
examining the plant, caught behind a glass case: “It’s marvelous … those eyes are 
remarkably real.” But, it appears that the curious plant did not give its body to Olivares so 
easily. With “teeth like a viper,” the plant bit the doctor when he approached it years 
earlier in the Brazilian rainforest. After a brief bought of “violent discomfort” Olivares 
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recalled regaining composure, gathering the plant and naming it: the olivaria vigiilans, or 
verdant sentry.  
Life, it seems, did not return to normal for the good doctor. Upon returning to his 
camp, he asked a local indigenous man about the plant; it appears the young man ran 
from him in terror. Cajoling more information from a local elder with promises of 
weaponry and riches, Oliveras was told the plant was Inhuacoltzi, a plant spirit, and 
warned to avoid it at all costs.531 Smirking “at this strange superstition,” summoning up 
the false heroism of the Enlightenment, “for who could believe there was a deity of 
plants?” he gathered a few specimens—donating most to the Museum of Natural History 
in Buenos Aires—keeping a small trophy for himself. 532 
Slowly though, the fevers returned and Olivera’s skin tone began to turn a verdant 
shade of green. In an attempt to ascertain the cause, he took a slight sample of blood and 
placed it under a microscope. It seems, foreign cells had invaded his body and were 
winning the battle over his body; red cells turning to green before his eyes. After 
exhausting local remedies, Oliveras fled to Italy, hopeful the change in climate would 
eliminate the conditions of the plant’s dominant takeover.   
Speechless, the narrator looked upon the doctor. “But, tell me, would you like to 
know everything?” Oliveras asked. Removing his gloves, the story ends with a terrifying 
crescendo of Oliveras’ transformation: “In place of hands, they were leaves, meaty 
leaves, similar to those of a prickly pear-two large green leaves attached to repulsive 
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looking trunks like human arms without skin. And, horrifying vision, on those two short 
formless fleshy masses sat the same sinister and terrible eyes that I had seen on the leaf 
enclosed in the glass case.”533  Ugolini’s identification tale: a terrifying warning for those 
whose desire to name and enclose the true nature of parasitic strangler fig, the Sipo-
Matador.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: FIGURING YEARS, A VINYL ALBUM REVIEW 
 
 
I. The Tree’s Song 
The Tree’s Song  
 
What needs to be said to 
Remember the wind’s inclinations?  
 
The way the mind forgets a word midway 
Between here and there syllables slipping  
 
Gracelessly through fingertips.  
Surely tomorrow the sweet notes 
 
Will sing for the first time, the tree 
Unfurling its leaves lie counterpoint. 
     —C Waite534 
 
II. Introduction 
 
Theodor W. Adorno got his start in the philosophy business (much like 
rhetorician Kenneth Burke) not in writing theoretical treatises of insight and density, but 
instead by penning album reviews—critiques of music.535  Adorno biographer Stefan 
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Müller-Doohm notes that while suffering with the pressure and rejection of academic 
production and a life lived in exile, Adorno turned to sound composition and its review as 
a salve.536  He found in music a multidimensional experience in which the practice of 
composition and the act of listening harmonized a unique dialectic between structural 
compulsion and everyday living.  For Adorno, and those later inspired by his work, music 
requires grappling between expected form and imaginative innovation; an object caught 
between the pressures of industry and the possibilities latent in the act of sonic creation.   
If there is any opening offered by Adorno for a more hopeful reflection on 
freedom and liberation, it is in his texts on aural perception of composer and listener. 
More than any other art, notes David Ingram, music could inspire an orientation that at its 
most thoughtful could craft a practice of living driven not by Enlightenment principles of 
utility and consumption but of community interests, shared material existence, and 
collective consciousness.537 Drawing from Friedrich Nietzsche, Ingram suggests that 
Adorno’s interest in sound-inspired consciousness expresses a “sense of striving…for a 
final destination or goal that is endlessly deferred.” Even with his characteristic 
bleakness, Adorno understood possibility at the beginning of each “album" or piece of 
music. The sound of the first note initiated an interpretive pilgrimage that is never fully 
complete, even as the vibrations from the final note settle in the ear to house themselves 
in memory. Adorno’s mythic scene of music—akin to Homer’s epic figuring Odysseus’s 
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trials and tribulations on his quest homeward—situates the communicative power of 
sound as one that invites a journey in body and mind on a quest homeward.538 Never 
certain of a victorious return, a hero carries on, following the constellations as they 
gesture toward a return. The experience of listening to an album, for Adorno, is similar: 
an Odyssey.  
 This fantastic journey activated by the body’s sensory equipment and its interplay 
with the apparitions in the mind is also a dialectical one, always already mediated. On the 
one hand, the musical composition is a reflection of the composers’ orientation—
including the situation of production—itself a unique map of selection, design, and 
dissemination. But in a more oft omitted moment of analysis, the orientation of the 
listener, the silent object/subject whom plays an essential role in sound’s activation, is 
also an essential participant. Thus, the experience of sound is less about opinion or “what 
one likes,” and instead, reveals more about the mediation between structure and reception 
in an ideological sense. As a form of critique, reviews play a vital role in constellating 
both the affirmation of sound—the fantastic, creative and interpretive experiences it can 
generate—also its negation—the hidden dominance of structural pressures—impeding a 
full embrace of freedom that toward which sound often gestures.  
From this theoretical vantage point, I offer a critique of a specific vinyl album 
inspired by Adorno’s sense of journey through sound. Years is an art-piece composed by 
Austrian theorist Bartholomäus Traubeck in 2012.  The piece performs the sound of tree 
                                                
538 Steven Hemling, “A Martyr to Happiness: Why Adorno Matters,” The Kenyon Review 28.4 
(2006): 156-172.  
 194 
rings taken from cross sectionals of varietals found in European woodlands.539 I’ve 
structured my review in four broad movements, often allowing myself to get carried 
away, only to return to the central argument: the dialectic between subject and object, 
human and plant. In applying immanent criticism in this way, I reflect on what music 
invites us to feel—transported to a new place only to return to ourselves; the method 
playful in the sense one plays a record.  
Let me offer a track list, though, to help guide the experience. First, I situate my 
approach more closely in contemporary writing on sound studies, returning to Adorno to 
more fully unpack his understanding of music. Second, I examine Years for its content, 
taking a closer look at the vibrant life of the forest subjects inspiring the piece. Next I 
examine the composition for some of the interpretive dialectics at play in situating the life 
and death of trees. Finally, I look at this specific object’s relationship to the structure of 
production, understanding various mediums as they effect sound and reception. In some 
ways that is a metonym for three different positions Adorno asks us to assume about 
sound, understanding the album as a commodity, a composition, and a structure. In 
reading and auditing this way, I hope to make the album familiar and unfamiliar, getting 
carried away by some fantastic meditations of my own before resting and returning to 
argument.  
                                                
539 Bartholomäus Traubeck, Years, No Label-ARM001, Austria, 2015, Vinyl LP. If you’d like to 
listen, its also available at Jose Rodrigo, “Year- Bartholomäus Traubeck,” YouTube, February 28, 
2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=12dc4IQGnFc.  
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III. Sound Studies 
Sound studies is one of the new scholarly edges in the field of rhetoric and 
persuasion.540 Joshua Gunn, Greg Goodale, Mirko M. Hall and Rosa A. Eberly argue 
succinctly that the “sonic has wrongly taken an epistemological back seat to the scopic; 
sound studies is the attempt to change the seating order.”541 Taking up a traditional 
understanding of rhetoric as the examination of elements of persuasion in speaking and 
writing, the authors recommend adding an aural element to rhetoric’s objects of inquiry. 
In so doing, the authors draw attention to “an ethics of listening” that might contribute to 
a deeper awareness of and commitment to understanding and strengthening “our shared 
predicament.”542  Understanding the act of listening to sound in as an ethical practice 
draws from the rich history of public address, but deepens an understanding of persuasion 
beyond direct calls to action. Instead, we are invited to reflect on how sound cultivates 
unique publics, affects material and psychic structures, and participates in the 
composition and decomposition of an audiences’ orientation.543  
                                                
540 Joshua Gunn, Greg Goodale, Mirko M. Hall, and Rosa A. Eberly, “Auscultating Again: 
Rhetoric and Sound Studies,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 43.5 (2013): 475-489. See also: 
Koushik Banerjea, “Sounds of Whose Underground?: The Fine Tuning of Diaspora in an Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction,” Theory, Culture & Society 17, no. 3 (June 2000): 64–79.; Joel 
Beckerman, The Sonic Boom: How Sound Transforms the Way We Think, Feel, and Buy (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2014); Christopher Cox, “Beyond Representation and Signification: Toward a 
Sonic Materialism,” Journal of Visual Culture 10, no. 2 (2011): 145-161; Veit Erlmann, Hearing 
Cultures: Essays on Sound, Listening, and Modernity (Oxford: Berg, 2004). 
541 Gunn, Goodale, Hall, and Rosa, “Ausculating Again,” 477.  
542 Gunn, Goodale, Hall, and Rosa, “Ausculating Again,” 477, 487. 
543 The concept of orientation I examined in chapter one is derived from Kenneth Burke. See 
relevant section or, again, Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984). 
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As with most sensory-based interventions, sound studies has been cherished and 
reviled; on the one hand, accused of unnecessary fragmentation of the filed and on the 
other, welcomed for opening up new and curious interdisciplinary connections.544 Trevor 
Pinch and Karin Bijsterveld describe sound studies as “an emerging interdisciplinary 
area,” examining, “the material production and consumption of music, sound, noise, and 
silence, and how they change throughout history, and within different societies, but does 
so from a much broader perspective than standard disciplines such as ethnomusicology, 
history of music, and sociology of music.”545 These scholars of sound studies invite us to 
explore what they term the auditory dimension of investigation. In 2012, in their Oxford 
Handbook of Sound Studies, Pinch and Bijsterveld organize their inquiry around “places 
where sound is experienced.”546 Juxtaposed against a dominant “visual paradigm” that 
includes the social science and humanities, numerous volumes, including Michael Bull 
and Les Back’s edited volume The Auditory Culture Reader and Hearing Cultures: 
Essays on Sound, Listening and Modernity, demonstrate the growing interest in—to 
borrow a phrase from critical French sound theorist and economic advisor Jacques 
Attali—theorizing about and through sound.547 These volumes all describe, as Michele 
                                                
544 Tony Grajeda, “Introduction: The Future of Sound Studies,” Music, Sound, and the Moving 
Image 2, no. 2 (2008): 109–14. 
545 Trevor Pinch and Karin Bijsterveld, “Sound Studies: New Technologies and Music,” Social 
Studies of Science 34, no. 5 (2004): 636. 
546 Trevor Pinch and Karin Bijsterveld, “Introduction,” in The Oxford Handbook of Sound 
Studies, eds. Trevor Pinch and Karin Bijsterveld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6. 
547 Michael Bull and Les Back, The Auditory Culture Reader (Oxford: Berg, 2003); Jacques 
Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985), 5.  
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Hilmes points out, the excitement in the study of sound as it attempts to appreciate 
traditional convergences and divergences in unexplored terrains.548 
In the Sound Studies Reader—one of the most comprehensive collection of essays 
in the area—Jonathan Sterne establishes a vital overview of the growing field of 
academic inquiry in which the phenomena of sound drives inquiry. In his approach, 
“sonic practices and discourses and institutions that describe them,” create the “analytic 
point” for understanding human communication systems and meaning making.549 In more 
eloquent terms, sound studies “redescribes what sound does in the human world, and 
what humans do in the sonic world.550 By redescribes (opposed to mere description), 
Sterne argues sound studies draws on intersections among academic disciplines, publics, 
and standpoints to understand sound in dense creation not a more passive appreciation. 
As such, inquiry must include recognition of position and reflexivity, for how and what is 
heard is mediated by social, cultural, geographic and economic locations in which the ear 
is located on the body.551 Such a posture also articulates a guiding force of wonder, or in 
Sterne’s words, “a broad transdisciplinary curiosity,” in which sound studies and students 
                                                
548 Michele Hilmes, “Foregrounding Sound: New (And Old) Directions in Sound Studies,” 
Cinema Journal 48, no. 1 (2008): 115–17. 
549 Sterne, “Sonic Images,” 2.  Sterne divides the The Sound Studies Reader, into six primary 
areas, which are often taken as platforms for research: hearing, listening, and deafness; space, 
sites, and -scapes; transduce and record; collectives and couplings; aesthetics, experiences, 
interpretation; and voices.  As Stern points out, the turn to sound is also driven by an 
understanding and appreciation of race in an American context. W.E.B. DuBois for example 
argues that sound and song played a key role in building resistance in the plantation system in the 
United States. 
550 Sterne, “Sonic Images,” 2. Of course, sound is not endemic to the human world. But, Sterne 
leaps to anthropocentric justifications for an inquiry into sound. Humans are cordoned off as 
exceptional sound makers, living in exceptional sound fields- acting and acted upon, not in co-
constitution not co-habitation. See Sterne, “Sonic Images,” 8.  
551 Sterne, “Sonic Images,” 4.  
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ought to be situated and whose “sonic imaginations” might be cultivated and 
nourished.552 Finally, Sterne points out that sound studies is ultimately a discussion of 
object and method, an approach to research that tries to think through conditions and 
concepts, not predictions and universals. 553 When juxtaposed against another sense—
vision—Sterne makes a number of key points about what he terms “audiovisual 
litany.”554 While vision is directional, based on assumptions of distance and perspective, 
sound is spherical and immersive, placing one inside an event happening around and 
through a hearing (or nonhearing) subject. In this instance, Sterne is closely related to 
what Rey Chow and James A. Steintrager articulate as the “slide between referential and 
figurative registers” induced by sound.555  Chow and Steintrager remind us that “sound 
does not appear to stand before us, but rather to come to us or at us."556 And in this way, 
sound plays between the notion of the human, as something trying to “capture” or hold 
onto an ephemeral, fleeting phenomena and that which surrounds one, or as a “force of 
capture.”557 But in this interplay, “sound is always capture, and capture is always a 
                                                
552 Sterne, “Sonic Images,” 4-5. Sterne here is also drawing from a number of important cultural 
references including T.S. Elliot’’s “auditory imagination,” C.W. Mills’s “sociological 
imagination,” and Anne Balsamo’s “technological imagination.” See: T. S. Eliot, The Use of 
Poetry and Use of Criticism: Studies in the Relation of Criticism to Poetry in England 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); C. Wright Mills and Todd Gitlin, Sociological 
Imagination, (Cary: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anne Balsamo, Designing Culture: The 
Technological Imagination at Work (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).  
553 Sterne, “Sonic Images,” 5.  
554 Sterne, “Sonic Images,” 9.  
555 Rey Chow and James A Steintrager, “In Pursuit of the Object of Sound: An Introduction,” 
Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 22 (Summer/Fall 2011): 1-11.  
556 Chow and Steintrager, “In Pursuit of the Object,” 2.  
557 Chow and Steintrager, “In Pursuit of the Object,” 4. 
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loss.”558 By this, I interpret them to mean that there is no one static definition, instead, 
part of the method of sound studies itself is to grapple with the impossibility of 
concretizing either object or process. Instead, how one approaches, describes, positions, 
consumes and refines are the critical qualities that make sound a necessary object of 
inquiry but also a continual process of creation and discovery in criticism. 
From a science studies perspective, sound is understood as intimately related to 
technology and the history of innovation. Some sounds, for example, are driven by major 
industrial transformation (a car engine or conveyor belts); others by electronic and digital 
advance (video games, personal computers, and Automatic Teller Machines). Specific 
sounds, as Pinch and Bijsterveld note, can mark major moments of change in the material 
structure. 559  For these authors sound is a conduit for understanding the larger sociology 
of science and technology. 560  
The scientific approach to the study of sound has ancient historical origins. 
Pythagoras, for example, attempted to design an aesthetic taxonomy of pleasurable 
sounds, developing a theory of ratios and a scale of pure fifths to define experiences of 
pure gratification. 561 As such, he is noted as one of the first in Western thought to 
                                                
558 Chow and Steintrager, “In Pursuit of the Object,” 4.  
559 Pinch and Bijsterveld, “Introduction,” 4-5.  
560 Academically, these authors understand their lineage routed through a 1996 conference in 
Bielefeld, Germany named “STS faces the Music,” culminating in a special issue of Social 
Studies of Science entitled “Sound Studies: New Technologies and Music.” See also Karin 
Bijsterveld, Mechanical Sound: Technology, Culture, and Public Problems of Noise in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008). 
561 Imelda S. Caleon and R. Subramaniam, “From Pythagoras to Sauveur: Tracing the History of 
Ideas about the Nature of Sound,” Physics Education 42, no. 2 (2007): 173. According to the 
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approach a schematization of vibration, pitch, and numerical calculation.562 Aristotle 
conceived of sound mechanically like waves or “ripples of water” that fill the space 
around the producer.563 In both cases, the Ancient Greek theorists explored sound as an 
expression of balance, reconciling opposites into harmonious compositions.564 Ancient 
Romans imbedded sound thinking in spatial design, designing sites to maximize the 
powers of human voice. Virtuvius perfected the technical design of the forum, where the 
sounds of theatre and politics could be amplified by the contours of the stage and its 
relation to the audience.565 Indeed, rhetorical interest in Ancient rhetoric benefits by 
further considering the relationship between spatial design and persuasion. 
Moving quickly though time, as sound does in space, Galielo Galilei and Marin 
Mersenne both refined the a scientific approach to sound, arguing that vibrations travel 
like waves from a body to a receiving instrument. The resulting stimulation is a tactile 
experience provoking interpretation and meaning.566 Sound reaches out to touch in 
nonhuman ways. One might imagine the sonic boom—or the noise of waves created by 
an object traveling faster than the speed of sound—as a new innovation in the thinking of 
                                                                                                                                            
authors of this paper, Pythagoras based most of his research on the pleasure (or discord) at 
various durations between moments of hammers striking anvils.  
562 Paolo Gozza, “Introduction,” in Number to Sound: The Musical Way to the Scientific 
Revolution, ed. Paulo Gozza (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 2. 
563 Caleon and Subramaniam, “From Pythagoras to Sauveur,” 174.  
564 Gozza, “Introduction,” 4.  
565 Richard Patterson, “What Vitruvius Said,” The Journal of Architecture 2, no. 4 (January 1, 
1997): 356. 
566 For a more complete history, see, for example: H. F. Cohen, Quantifying Music: The Science 
of Music at the First Stage of Scientific Revolution 1580–1650 (Boston: Kluwer, 1984). 
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new objects of sound and technological impact.567 (Those of us who lived through the 
1990’s might appreciate the sound of AOL dialup similarly; the anticipation of receiving 
digital access characterized in sonic terms). Understanding scientific shifts through the 
sound they create presents a new and profound way of considering rhetorical experience. 
In more traditional rhetorical inquiry, specific sounds are considered crucial to the 
cultivation publics—groups of people brought together in shared identification in the 
experience of hearing sound. Alain Corbain historically describes the use of church 
bells—in the marking of time and role—as an early example of publics established in this 
way.568   Phonographs and nickelodeons at the turn of the 20th century in the US also 
played a similar role, as described in Eric W. Rothenbuhler and John Durham Peter’s 
study Defining Phonography and the collection by Timothy Taylor, Mark Katz and Tony 
Grajeda, in Music, Sound, and Technology in America: A Documentary History of Early 
phonograph, Cinema, and Radio.569 John Mowitt’s Radio: Essays in Bad Reception 
speculates on the apparatus of the radio as a specific mechanism of production that also 
consecrates both a new public or audience built around and through this consumption of 
                                                
567  See Jack D. Leatherwood et al., “Summary of Recent NASA Studies of Human Response to 
Sonic Booms,” The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 111, no. 1 (January 2002): 586–
98; M. Berci and L. Vigevano, “Sonic Boom Propagation Revisited: A Nonlinear Geometrical 
Acoustic Model,” Aerospace Science and Technology, 35th ERF: Progress in Rotorcraft 
Research, 23, no. 1 (December 2012): 280–95. For a popular press approach to the term, see, for 
example: Joel Beckerman, The Sonic Boom: How Sound Transforms the Way We Think, Feel, 
and Buy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014).  
568 Alain Corbin, Village Bells: Sound and Meaning in the 19th-Century French Countryside 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
569 Eric W. Rothenbuhler and John Durham Peters, “Defining Phonography: An Experiment in 
Theory,” The Musical Quarterly 81, no. 2 (1997): 242–64; Timothy Dean Taylor, Mark Katz, and 
Tony Grajeda, eds., Music, Sound, and Technology in America: A Documentary History of Early 
Phonograph, Cinema, and Radio (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012). 
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sonic material mediated by the form of transmission.570 This is confirmed in a number of 
important articles, including Susan Douglas’s text Listening In, Hilm’s Radio Voices, and 
Simon Elmes’ Hello Again.571  Public creation is not limited to radio. Other examples 
include Michéle Martin’s understanding of worker organization caused by the telephone, 
in which specific gendered assumptions distribute labor around newly emergent sound 
devices.572 For these scholars, the apparatus is a key entry into the rhetorical power of 
sound and new way of considering publics consolidated around its address. 
Sound studies in rhetorical theory, however, need not be device-driven, as the 
previous scholarship seems to foreground. Thomas Rickert’s beautiful offering Ambient 
Rhetoric situates sound in relation to rhetorical understandings attentive not just to the 
accepted categories of speaker, situation, and direct persuasion, but to a more immersive 
and enveloping condition better suited to approach human-plant relations.573 In 
understanding rhetoric situated in an immediate surrounding, his study takes up different 
dimensional registers of attunement, amplification, and arrangement. From this vantage, 
persuasion assumes a sense of invitational adjustment.  “Understanding rhetoric as 
ambient,” following Rickert, “must diffuse outward to include the material environment, 
                                                
570 John Mowitt, Radio: Essays in Bad Reception (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2011). 
571 Susan J. Douglas, Listening In: Radio And The American Imagination, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Michele Hilmes, Radio Voices: American Broadcasting, 
1922-1952 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Simon Elmes, Hello Again: Nine 
Decades of Radio Voices (London: Random House, 2012). 
572 Michèle Martin, “Hello Central?”: Gender, Technology, and Culture in the Formation of 
Telephone Systems (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1991). 
573 Thomas Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being  (Pittsburgh: The 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013).  
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things (including technology), our own embodiment, and a complex understanding of 
ecological relationality as participating in rhetorical practices and their theorization.”574 
Asking after questions of perception, openness, and availability, rhetoric can take on 
more subtle shades and nuances which can inform and inspire different orientations, 
criticisms, and connections based on textural sensations of permeation and porousness. It 
is also helpful to situate dialectic understandings of rhetoric in this relief, for ambient 
attunement is not, for Rikert, a “subjective achievement,” but a “fundamental 
entanglement, with the individuation of particular facets being an achieved disclosure.”575 
Characterizing a genre of music, ambient rhetoric also gestures toward “fresh ways of 
listening” and “can transform how music can be disclosed to us.”576 In situating the 
practice in this way, “rhetoric is an emergent result of environmentally situated and 
interactive engagements, redolent of a world that affects us and persuades us prior to 
symbolicity.”577 Rickert’s gesture allows us to understand the practice and study of 
rhetoric and sound in “its fullest flowering.”578 
One obvious and direct connection drawn from Rickert is to notice the place 
where nature and sound seem to directly meet: in albums archiving nature sounds. Berne 
Kraus’s 1968 The Great Animal Orchestra was an early “biophony” that attempted to 
                                                
574 Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric, 3. 
575 Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric, 8.  
576 Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric, 28. 
577 Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric, 34.  
578 Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric, 36.  
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create a catalogue of sounds from the natural world.579 In 1977, R. Murray Schafer’s The 
Soundscape Our Sonic Environment and the Turning of the World began the use of the 
term “soundscapes” or what became known as acoustic ecology. For Schafer, sound 
becomes the mechanism of communication between the human and the environment.580 
That is, people surround themselves with the sounds of nature so that they can understand 
its language more fully. Stefan Helmreich’s “An Anthropologist Underwater,” figures 
himself a submarine, understanding a process of research and life as a form of immersion 
in life and sound underwater.581 In another example, Ericka Pilcher and other researchers 
asked participants to rate sounds in national parks on a scale of annoying to pleasing. 582 
More recently, David George Haskell’s In the Song of Trees attempts to reveal a network 
connection in forests, one that embodies an “ecological aesthetics,” where the study of 
sound might reveal the overall complex structure of the forest.583 
But David Michael’s “Toward a Dark Nature Recording,” offers a cautionary note 
in his overview of traditional soundscapes.  Traveling in various fields from ecocriticism 
through environmental aesthetics, he asks us to be cautious of approaches that claim to 
                                                
579 Bernie Krause, The Great Animal Orchestra: Finding the Origins of Music in the World’s 
Wild Places, (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2013). 
580  Raymond Murray Schafer, The Soundscape. Our Sonic Environment and the Turning of the 
World (Rochester, VA: Destiny Books, 1993).  
581 Stefan Helmreich, “An Anthropologist Underwater: Immersive Soundscapes, Submarine 
Cyborgs, and Transductive Ethnography,” American Ethnologist 34, no. 4 (November 2007): 
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582 Ericka J. Pilcher, Peter Newman, and Robert E. Manning, “Understanding and Managing 
Experiential Aspects of Soundscapes at Muir Woods National Monument,” Environmental 
Management 43, no. 3 (November 20, 2008): 425–35. 
583 Ed Yong, “Trees Have Their Own Songs,” The Atlantic April 4, 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/04/trees-have-their-own-songs/521742/. See 
also, David George Haskell, Song of Trees (New York: Viking, 2017).  
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bring the natural world directly to human ears.584 He writes, “nature sound recording has 
been panned as kitschy New Age, accused of pandering fantasy as ‘reality’ to a naïve 
public, and worse, maintaining and perpetuating a picturesque, Romantic view of nature 
as something over there, separate from us, to be quasi-religiously revered.”585 Micheal’s 
caution is not one of rejection, but reminder: to listen to soundscapes is not to get closer 
to real nature but instead to understand how humans mediate a natural relation through 
technical devices of reproduction. That is to say, we are already one step removed, 
listening to ourselves interpret nature more than hearing the raw sound itself.  
To loop fully back to the beginning then, as Hilmes notes, no matter how much 
proponents try to articulate the specific contours of a unique field of sound studies, it may 
remain, “always emerging, never emerged…doomed to the position of the margins of 
various fields of scholarship.”586 Too often, Hilmes argues, sound studies are relegated 
solely to the realm of cultural studies, most often evoking—however misguided—a  
sense of music appreciation. Instead, she gestures toward the need to strengthen a critical 
sense, one that might involve a more careful attention to the dialectic process and drives 
that initiate examination of sound. She suggests that we might draw from philosophical 
methods, in particular Adorno, as a possible way of placing sound in its historical and 
mediated process and not in a world “seemingly transhistorical,” defined by an 
                                                
584 David Michael, “Toward a Dark Nature Recording,” Organized Sound 16, no. 3 (2011): 206-
10. 
585 Michael, “Toward a Dark Nature Recording,” 206. 
586 Michele Hilmes, “Is There a Field Called Sound Culture Studies? And Does it Matter?” 
American Quarterly 57, no. 1 (2005): 249. 
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unreflected upon sense of taste.587 Thus sounds of nature do not escape the pressures of 
design and production anymore than any other genre nor do our listening habits. The 
compulsion and desire to hear nature is as deeply indebted to structure as the studies of 
Pythagoras, radio, sonic booms, and the latest pop jingle. Just because it is the sound of 
trees does not make it any less mediated—in fact, perhaps the easy slippage makes it 
more ideologically primed than any other genre.  
The inquiry into sound studies, as this short review attempts to demonstrate, 
offers a new and exciting way of thinking about rhetoric. It opens up strong 
interdisciplinary connections and brings into the field objects and phenomenological 
experiences that require interpretation and critique. Nature sounds in particular are an 
important object of examination. Rickert offers an opening to understand rhetoric in 
attunement with the natural world. Harmonizing with his call, I would like to invite 
Adorno’s voice into the live set. His work on sound is impressive and has much to offer 
in complimenting and contesting the discussion by stressing the rhythm of dialectical 
process. As such, Adorno can provide more instructive caution to avoid the pitfalls of 
unreflexive listening and help adjust our ears with ethical philosophical architecture, so 
that we hear the structural and ideological elements coming at us as well as the songs of 
trees. Connecting Adorno and the sound of nature, I argue, is a vital album in this 
collection.  
                                                
587 Hilems, “Is there a Field?” 258.  
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IV. Adorno and Sound 
Ludwig von Beethoven occupied Theodore W. Adorno’s mind throughout the 
corpus of his philosophical writings. Adorno left a trove of texts—a “diary of 
experiences”—small scatterings of thoughts, throughout his journey in homage to the 
composer.588 In one ensemble, Quasi una Fantasia, Adorno draws on Beethoven to 
present a composite of his theory of music.589 Adorno’s title prefers the formal name of 
Beethoven’s Piano Sonata No. 14 in C♯ minor, rather than the figuring offered by 
Ludwig Rellstab; “the Moonlight Sonata” conjured for the poet an experience of floating 
at night in refracted effulgence among a lit up woodland on the waters of Switzerland’s 
Lake Lucerne.590  The formal frame—translated as “Sonata in the Manner of a 
Fantasy”—was more in line with Adorno’s understanding of the dialectic qualities of 
music, one that operated more closely to music’s experience of fantasy seeped in 
structure. Adorno theorized the dialectic encounters present in music in the creation of the 
object—in its composition and production—but also in the minds of those who listen, 
who bring their own images of theme and expectations of sound movement that could be 
fulfilled or challenged by the arrangement of notes, tempo, and range across the work. 
To continue one of the themes I have been tracking, Adorno was concerned with a 
similarity and difference in the interpretive process between language and music. When 
                                                
588 Theodor W. Adorno, Rolf Tiedemann, and Edmund Jephcott, Beethoven: The Philosophy of 
Music (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
589 Theodor W. Adorno, Quasi Una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone (London: Verso, 1998). 
590 James Attlee, Nocture: A Journey in Search of Moonlight (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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sound studies is device-driven, it can minimize an account of Adorno’s dialectic 
orientation, often positioning the listener as receiver and not active participant in creation. 
In its most generous interpretations, sound can also be given too much freedom, deterred 
from the hidden ideological commitments its production entails. Instead, refocusing on 
the dialectic relation attunes us to the structural and fantastic dimension comprising our 
experience. That is, “music has a resemblance to language in the sense that it is a 
temporal sequence of articulated sounds which are more than just sounds. They say 
something, often something human.” But, he leveled the difference at interpretation. 
“Interpretation is essential to both music and language, but different in ways. To interpret 
language means: to understand language. To interpret music means: to make music.”591 
For Adorno, the production of music, its unique quality, happens at a number of 
moments: in the composer’s rendering and in the mind of the listener as they hear the 
notes. The meaning communicated does not need to be directly transmitted; music allows 
for a host of reflections to constellate around an object. While Beethoven never intended 
the Piano Sonata No. 14 in C♯ minor to conjure a sense of floating in moonlight, 
something about the sound created such a strong association that this misreading lives on 
in the popular name. The fantasy of an European woodland seemed much stronger than 
any funeral march for those listeners intimately involved in the making of its music.  
Fantasy, in this sense, is closer to the psychoanalytic concept of "phantasy" as a 
reality structure than it is the more commonplace understanding of the anxiety that 
plagues a sleepless night or the pleasant feeling of finding oneself caught daydreaming. 
                                                
591 Adorno, Quasi Una Fantasia, 1. 
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For Adorno, a fantasy names a site where the subject and object mix. For historian and 
scholar Peter Gay, Sigmund Freud’s greatest contribution was the recognition of ongoing 
psychic process that escaped reason but nonetheless still operated reasonably: “a fantasy 
or delusion,” Gay wrote, “is a reality to those who experience them.”592  In the 
therapeutic context, generally speaking, the subject is asked to put into words—render in 
the symbols of language—the ineffable operations of the unconscious. These reflections 
are taken as an opportunity to reflect upon the subject as an object. In attempting to 
describe a daydream or a night tremor, fantasy (again, more often phantasy in 
psychoanalytic registers), directs us to those ephemeral symbols. 593  But, more than read 
the symbols themselves for content, it is the organization itself that matters to analysts in 
trying to discern the psychic life of the subject. In hearing how the subject describes what 
is indescribable –most often memories of fear, love, anger, denial—the more one could 
be attuned to the pressures organizing a persons’ experience. For Freud, a fantasy, that is, 
the image of a dream or the memory of a childhood experience for examples, had less to 
do with the real rendition of facts and instead gave insight into how the subject organized 
and communicated those ongoing influences.594  In general, fantasy operates on the level 
of symbolic organization, functioning as method of transposing sensory or 
phenomenological experience into communicative terms for the purpose of an audience. 
                                                
592 Peter Gay, Freud for Historians (New York: Oxford Paperbacks, 1986), 119. 
593  On the difference between the two terms, see for example Susan Isaacs, “The Nature and 
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Gay wrote “it was on the ground of fantasy that the house of psychoanalysis was 
built.”595 Fantasy gestures toward the concept of mediation, where the contours or 
structure of reality meet the wishes, desires, or interpretations of the inner workings of 
the mind.  
The work of fantasy is not typically included in music theory, a rectification 
Adorno hoped to perform. Broadly, music theory follows a few distinct approaches. First, 
in  “eclectic analytic writing,” endemic in Charles Rosen’s Sonata Forms, where the 
theorist looks at each piece individually, noticing how small tonal shifts might create 
ripping effects through the anticipation of musical forms. The second category, more 
characteristic of the work of Leonard G. Ratner’s Classic Music is  “strictly historical-
evidentiary empirical” in which a piece of music is placed in its historical context and 
understand it from the period’s perspective.596 Music theory has its own approach, 
endemic of Heinrich Shenker’s Free Composition, in which the design of sound is 
understood to give the piece a new and unique dimensional texture.597 And finally, in a 
fourth approach, music is assumed to take on features of a grammar, the sounds placed 
                                                
595 Gay, Freud for Historians, 117. 
596 James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and 
Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth Century Sonata (Oxford: Oxford English Dictionary, 2006), 
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597 Hepokoski and Darcy, Elements of Sonata Theory, 5. See also, Heinrick Schenker, Free 
Composition, trans. Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, 1979).  
 211 
into theme types allowing the theorist to arrive at a taxonomy of juxtaposition within the 
piece of music.598 
From these more traditional approaches to music, Adorno applied his own 
constellating method of immanent criticism. Following primary Adorno Scholar Max 
Paddison, music is itself caught in an interpretive dialectic—while one might try to come 
at the formal components that make a piece meaningful, something about the experience 
of listening also creates a meaningful experience that always escapes formal grasp.599 
Much like the difference between internal and external criticism of speech, Paddison 
suggests Adorno draws attention to the relationship between the components of a piece 
and its place in a larger cultural milieu. Such criticism requires not just formal training in 
musicology but also a deep understanding of culture reception, and, if I might add a 
bridge term, rhetoric, to fully understand its interpretative elements.600 To understand 
music with Adorno is to understand its mediated quality: music internally communicates 
the structural relations of a given society and externally—as a commodity—
communicates a structure of production, distribution and consumption regardless of an 
artistic claim to autonomy.601 Again, drawing on the constellation or figuration theme I 
have presented, rhetorical understandings of music stress together social structures in 
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construction, dissemination, and consumption much more than a singular meaning 
contained within the work, as traditional musicological theories might stress. 
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully appreciate Adorno’s storehouse of 
theories about musical constitution, composition, and industry. For example, I am not 
reviewing any material on his writings about jazz, perhaps the most fraught.602 Instead, I 
am following Tia DeNora, in appreciating the notion that, for Adorno, sound is “at the 
centre of his critique…and through the manner of its consumption, affected 
consciousness and was a means of social management and control.”603 Indeed for 
Adorno, “music is not about, or caused by the social; it is part of whatever we take to be 
the social writ large. Music is a constructive ingredient of social life.”604 It is both 
discourse and action.605 Caught between labor and leisure, music sutures and conditions 
life lived in everyday late-capitalism.606 Thus to understand the central role of sound, 
following Adorno, is to understand a form of criticism, attentive to the contours of the 
object, including its place in processes of production, and the role it plays in either 
anesthetizing or moving an audience to reflect on their role in ideological activation.607 
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Like the psychoanalytic register of fantasy, the criticism of a particular album should 
draw attention to all these elements of this experience.  
 Adorno’s work is at its best when, or according to Adorno scholar Robert 
Miklitsch, it is used to “historicize aesthetic judgment.”608 Following Miklitsch that 
means to place the art-object and the criticism in its material context: to examine the 
layers one by one in order to arrive at a sense of the whole. In order to demonstrate this 
principle, I now offer my own Adorno-inspired review: a close read of a vinyl album 
Years, to understand how his analysis could be applied to a very specific expression of 
natural sound: the life of trees in a digital relief.  
V. Years, Up Close 
Years does not present itself as a mimetic—a direct rendition—of the sound of 
trees; it is a fantastic rendering of their experience, more akin to an art-album than 
soundscape. In 2012, Bartholomäus Traubeck, a trained multimedia artists and visual 
communication academic, took cross sectional slices from eight different Austrian trees 
and constructed a piece of equipment that would read the tree as a musical 
composition.609 His contraption essentially mimicked the operation of a vinyl record 
player; a digital needle translated groove depth, color, and texture of each tree into a 
mathematical sign-system of pre-coded piano chords.  
                                                
608 Robert Miklitsch, Roll Over Adorno: Critical Theory, Popular Culture, Audiovisual Media, 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 46. 
609 Benjamin van Loon, “Where Art & Technology Meet: An Interview with Bartholomäus 
Traubeck, Multimedia Artist,” Anobium (blog) February 8, 2012, accessed March 1, 2015, 
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The album cover is a marbled abstraction of grey scales, a small box cut out in the 
center reads in small capitalized letters the title YEARS, a contrast in design and 
experience with its surrounding frame, enveloping the eye as if looking up at the top of a 
pyramid from inside. It reminds me of an experience looking toward the sky from within 
a Redwood grove in a Northern California forest. Redwood trees sprout from the base of 
their fallen ancestors, forming perfect circles in what will become empty core (known as 
a fairy ring).610 When a viewer stands in the direct center and looks up, a small opening 
reveals itself at the top of the ring.  Posed in the radius in this way—with eyes directed by 
the encircling trunks toward the sky—at the right time of day a true clearing is revealed: 
the small aperture allows a radiant light to cascade around the viewer as it travels from 
star to floor. It’s a gesture of ambient perception—beautiful in experience—warming in 
energetic embrace. 
Years offers a different way of understanding the enveloping sound of European 
woodlands. The contents include simply the vinyl record, shrouded in a non-descript 
black sleeve. As on the back cover, each song is named for its tree of origin: 
A Side:  
Picea (Spruce) 
Fraxinus (Ash)  
Quercus (Oak)  
Acer (Maple)  
B Side:  
Alnus (Alder) 
Juglans (Walnut) 
Fagus (Beech) 
Fagus II (Another Beech) 
                                                
610 “About Costal Redwoods,” California Department of Parks and Recreation, accessed 
January 3, 2018, https://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=22257.  
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The back of the package acknowledges its production, reminding us that: “This record 
features eight compositions made from Austrian trees. They were generated and recorded 
on the artpiece ‘Years. Vienna January – August 2010.’ Music, Art, and Production is 
credited to Traubeck; Mixing and mastering with Ivo Fancz. At first glance, the object is 
an opportunity to meditate on the contours of European forests. 
THE RETURN OF TREES: OR THE PERSISTENCE OF NATURAL HISTORY 
Peter Thomas, perhaps one of the most well known translators of comprehensive 
knowledge of tree life to everyday audiences, notes that in our minds, trees are easily the 
most identifiable creatures, but often are much more varied than we give them credit 
for.611 It certainly explains why they continually show up in my journey through human 
and plant relations. Their life span exists in a scale far beyond human perception. Some 
current living trees, especially in California’s Redwood and Sequoia grooves, are some of 
the oldest on the planet; one organism outliving every member of the human race with a 
lifespan beyond embodied comprehension.612 Trees themselves claim a lineage almost 
400 million years old, casting shadows on the planet as the first expressions of life.613 
According to tree geneticists Timothy L. White, W. Thomas Adams and David B. Neale, 
trees cover 3.4 billion hectares of the Earth (30 percent of the surface).614 Humans have 
                                                
611 Peter Thomas, Trees: Their Natural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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integrated their lives fully with sylvan beings, using their bodies for fuel, food, and 
building materials. More broadly, forests are scenes for play and conflict—indeed all 
elements—of human civilization.615 Essential to all life on Earth, trees tower over 
consciousness, stretching our senses of time, community, and imaginations.  
In Europe, according to Thomas and John R. Packham, over 44 percent of the 
landmass is covered by various densities of trees known as woodlands and forests.616 
While often used interchangeably, the difference between woodlands and forest have to 
do with light penetration; in the former, a substantial amount of sunlight hits the floor due 
to open canopy and loose arrangement of trees while in the later the dense canopy 
impedes light access to less than 20 percent.617 European forests are distinct from their 
tropical counterparts due to seasonal differences resulting from latitudinal changes. 
Known as temperate broadleaf forests or mixed deciduous forests, one continuous forest 
belt across the Earth’s surface develops where similar varietals of spruce, pine, beech, 
and oak can be seen across continents.618   
The body of the tree, so characteristic in our imagination, can be read as a part of 
its equipment-for-living, to borrow a phrase from Kenneth Burke.619 “As a strategy which 
outgrows other plants in competition for light,” Thomas and Packham note trees 
developed, “a large perennial woody skeleton,” which aids in height and also seed 
                                                
615 Thomas, Trees, 6.  
616 Peter Thomas and John R. Packham, Ecology of Woodlands and Forests: Description, 
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dispersal.620 Trees are distinctive in both outer and inner bark; the former creating 
insulation from water damage and predator attack, the latter functioning as the cellular 
transportation system moving the life material from soil to leaf.621 With each year that 
passes, a new layer of wood is added underneath the bark to maintain respiratory 
maintenance, expanding the skeleton and pushing the tree upward to new heights. 
Because of their stature and influencing effect, woodland trees create smaller ecological 
communities—microclimates of unique temperature and humidity—around them, hosting 
fungi, bacteria, flora, and fauna. 622 As a tree dies, it also provides fodder for new life, 
known as the detritus subsystem, where decomposition organisms breakdown the 
structure of the tree and in so doing, gain a life of their own.623 
When and how leaves present themselves is also an integral aspect of a tree’s life 
and death. “Leaves are the main powerhouse of the tree,” notes Thomas, as they use the 
energy intake from the sun to transform carbon dioxide received from the air and water 
and other nutrients from the soil in a process called photosynthesis; they output oxygen 
and sugar in the process.624  The more leaves a tree produces, (and how often they fall) is 
determined by access to sunlight and carbon dioxide level. Evolutionary processes reflect 
this in the body and make up of individual species. An evergreen tree may keep its short 
needles for 12 years while a beech may have a higher annual rate of leaf production; both 
                                                
620 Thomas and Packham, Ecology of Woodlands, 8.  
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a result of access to the raw materials.625 Pines, beech, and oak represent the “most 
economically and silviculturally [a branch of forestry aimed at understanding and 
maintaining the health of forest ecologies] important species’ in seasonal forests; while 
there are 800 species of oak there are less than 20 beech, both part of the fagaceae 
family.626  In particular, beech tree base and stem provide strong habit environments for 
lichen diversity.627  European forests are critical ecosystems, all trees essential keystone 
species for the countless flora and fauna that also grow through and around them.628 
Given the fragile networked relationship among the woodland ecosystem, a 
number of threats are currently putting pressure on the lifecycle of European forests. 
According to current research, old-growth forests are experiencing sever strain as a result 
of increased human development in Europe, particularly over the last hundred years, even 
as a paralleled increase in new types of woodlands growth is noticed as industrial 
practices and former agricultural land have been abandoned since World War II.629 
Commonly populated by beech and oak varietals, mixed with woodlands pastures, 
grazing land for livestock and the need for energy puts pressure on European forest 
growth. Massive deforestation took place both as a result of and in the years following 
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the war. Wars, then, following contemporary interpretation of satellite aerial mapping 
data across decades, demonstrate a continued and ongoing detrimental effect on forest 
density and ecosystem health overall.630  
Perhaps the most significant variable in the contemporary life (and death) of trees 
is the undisputable effect of human fossil fuel use and its alteration of the Earth. Peter H. 
Freer, Mark S.J. Broadmeadow and Jim M. Lynch, in their assemblage of contemporary 
research, put it bluntly:  
There is no bigger challenge in the world today than how we respond to the 
scientific evidence that our climate is warming—for which the human race is 
responsible, climate change is not just an environmental issue, it is an economic 
issue a social issue, a security issue and above all, a moral issue…We will not 
meet this challenge without reducing emissions from deforestation. The future of 
the world’s forests is central to the well being of the human race and to the well 
being of the planet.  As we all appreciate forests as the worlds’ ‘lungs’ and one of 
our best hopes for heading off dangerous climate change631  
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to review all of the data contributing to the 
consensus—and the material incentives for some to disregard—on human induced 
climate change. Since the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1995, a 
global scientific call exists that confirms human carbon emissions are creating planetary 
effects that will irreversibly alter the environment.632 European wood varieties are under 
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particular assault from the affects of climate change.633 Given the intimate relationship 
between forests and season, climate change’s effect on temperatures and growth seasons, 
precipitation and humidity levels, and various changes to migration patterns each pose a 
direct threat to the forests.634 These patterns will also begin to integrate and create 
cascading effects, especially in spruce and beech trees where increases of nitrogen, ozone 
flux, and enhanced drought will continue to magnify the initial ecological effects of 
seasonal transformation.635 
Years is a kind of specimen container—a sonic natural history—one that might be 
more akin to a glass case in a museum, rendering in sound a vanishing that can not be 
depicted visually. It is a deep mediation on time provoked by the trees themselves. Julia 
Norblad summates this as a problem with trying to understand the grammar of forests and 
how to interpret our place within it.636 “Since trees grow slowly, when dealing with 
forests, politicians and administrators are faced with a particular set of problems. The 
forest has its own unrushed temporality and politicians have grappled with the challenge 
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of turning the organism and material long termism into political time.”637 In Germany, 
explains Norblad, eighteenth century management politics centered around the number 
84. Trees were assumed best to be harvested 84 years; grids of forests were divided into 
84 squares and managed accordingly.638 As such, Norblad argues, the forest and the way 
it is conceptualized relates centrally to Enlightenment values about time, precision and 
management. To speak of the forest, then, is to place short term immediate needs, within 
a sense of the fragile nature of the ecosystem, but also with a knowledge that forests 
vastly surpass human life span and thus, cannot be comprehended as such.  While, 
“sylvan time has always been imagined as fragile and always on the brink of scarcity, a 
calculable and discrete realization of improvement and value growth, or as describing a 
decline from paradise lost caused by the unenlightened. These histories can serve the 
purpose of extending our political imagination in the continual deliberation and 
legitimation of the political long term”639 
At first glance, Years (with its rendering of Spruce, Ash, Oak, Maple, Alder, 
Walnut, and Beech) offers an opportunity to encounter in sound what is difficult to render 
in words: that the life of a tree, “sylvan time,” and the deep ecological networks it 
connects, cannot withstand the massive industrialization caused by late-capitalism, 
exceeding any of the Enlightenment promise of management. Human’s perceptual 
impoverishment of time, and a deep desire to consume, will have long-term consequences 
that are indeed unimaginable.  
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But, it is important to not let our reflection on Years rest on the auscillating strain 
of the world’s lungs as it attempts to breath through the smoke of human consumption. 
To return to the track list, I’d like to offer a reflection on other kinds of rhythms.  
ETERNAL RETURN OF THE OBJECT 
I’d like to draw attention to three different kinds of rhythms on Years.  
 
Picea (Spruce) 
Fraxinus (Ash)  
Quercus (Oak)  
Acer (Maple)  
B Side:  
Alnus (Alder) 
Juglans (Walnut) 
Fagus (Beech) 
Fagus II (Another Beech) 
 
The first is the obvious repletion of the Beech tree. In this sense, no two trees, even of the 
same genius are exactly alike. So while the criticism of natural history I offered in 
chapter three approaches the unique life of the subject ‘tree,’ the object Years reminds us 
that each tree also has its own, singular, subjective life span. This is what Adorno 
referenced by A is not A: even in the same field of identification no two individual 
utterances or compositions are ever exactly alike. Individual knots for example sound like 
“hitting a fist on the piano,” and will produce an entirely distinct sound.640 Thus, to listen 
to Years is also to bring us closer in intimacy to the unique particularity that one tree 
presents. The sound of one tree will be unlike any other.  To listen to Years is to see both 
forest and tree.  
                                                
640 Bruce Gellerman, “Interview with Bartholomous Traubeck,” Living Earth (blog), February 3, 
2012, http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=12-P13-00005&segmentID=7. 
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The second rhythm though is subtler, and exists in the activation of each journey 
of play. Even though it is the same recording, it is never possible to listen to the same 
sound recording twice. Even when played over and over, the sound itself will emerge 
differently, notes resonating with different memories and experiences. That is what 
Traubeck considered one of his innovative contributions: the newness of repetition. He 
commented in an interview with Bruce Gellerman, “It’s sort of a poetic translation into 
music. Every time you put the record on, even though it’s the same slab of tree, it will be 
slightly different, because I would have to start at the exact millimeter point of the record 
every time, which I can’t. If I would have to say what part of the music is coming from 
me and my decisions and what part is coming from the tree, then I would have to say, I 
guess 50/50.”641 For Traubeck, his work creates a harmonized relationship between the 
voice of the tree and the ear of the human, triangulated by the judgment of the machine. It 
draws attention to the practice of listening, where every subtle detail of the sonic 
experience is, like the life of a tree, unique.  
Given that, it is important to place my listening experience in its unique context, 
there is a third rhythm I’d like to call into being. I experience listening, perhaps, more 
acutely than those who witnessed the art-piece exhibited on display at the Louisiana Art 
and Science exhibit “Lovely as a Tree,” or on the popular user-driven website 
Soundcloud.642 My object mimics the design more closely than Traubeck may have 
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intended: I own the commodity on vinyl, one of 500 copies produced. Vinyl produces its 
own unique sound, less clear than digital, structured by its own unique grooves. It 
references a personal history of listening, where a scratch marks a specific moment in 
time. Just as the life of the tree will display variations in the environment, so too the life 
of an individual record will mark personal interaction much more than the infinite mass-
production of sound in the digital environment. The scratch—like a drought in the life of 
a tree—is a unique mark in the life of an album. It gives life to the object itself. 
There are obscure sets of enjoyment practices revealed in the object that is my 
copy of Years. A young millennial friend of mine stopped by my apartment and I was 
proud to show him my record collection, especially Years. As with most album 
collections, most are also geared toward the appreciation of others. He looked 
unimpressed noting that vinyl looked “bulky” and felt “old.” I’ll leave the psychoanalysis 
open here, but his insight is instructive in a way he had not intended. Let me 
disambiguate.  
First, there is a moment in which I want to champion the object of the record in a 
way that Adorno typically would not. Unlike a performance from a symphony, Adorno’s 
major concern with the phonograph (and by extension the album) is that it reflects a 
nostalgia that collapses the live-ness of the performance into a composed and easily 
repeated sound format.643 It steals its essence and represents it. In other words, it is 
already an abstraction—an alienation—consolidating experience in commodity form 
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trafficked thought market forces that render it in structural terms. Surely my experience 
supports his position in total.  
There is a small slippage in Adorno’s thought, however, that I’d like to point out 
and ruminate on. This record, like all records, actually provides a small moment of bodily 
resistance that is evaporating in the digital takeover of the lifeworld: you have to get up 
and flip it over. In this short moment a listener is reminded that they do not in fact get 
what they want endlessly; the scene of pleasure they have concocted with abstract sound 
is in fact not ubiquitous but limited. The revelation is instructive of all forms of desire in 
the smallness of scale but grandeur of explanation. Soundscapes are limited, made by 
subjects/objects in the world, and when they end, will demand to be played again. But the 
slight pause, the moment of silence in which the sound of the composition is replaced by 
the mechanical movement of needle to rest, offers a moment of serene tragic shock: the 
end of listening pleasure and the return of the pain of silence.  
Finally, there is something specific about this vinyl: it looks uncannily like the 
object it purports to represent: a sliced tree. Of course, this substance is really an oil-
based plastic (with all of the accompanying history laden into the material itself). Split 
into two sides, my slick vinyl is much closer to that of Traubeck’s plane of the trees than 
any other performance. It exists for me—cut and sliced open—ready to be played. In this 
way, there is a sadistic tonality to the whole enterprise, one that pries open the world and 
makes the enjoyment available for private consumption in the form of listening.  
Perversely in tune with Adorno, my specific copy of Years is a commodity in the 
truest sense and reflects the problems that currently threatening European woodlands. In 
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owning this bulky copy, I too have made a small contribution to the gasses suffocating 
the thing I am witnessing. And yet, dialectically, it also brings me closer to that 
suffocation than any repetition could. Rather than the endless display of commodity-
fetishism that the digital music environment structurally creates, this vinyl copy of Years 
just like the specific beech is not like any other: it holds in itself the very song of life. I 
cannot keep either dimension at bay, but am called—indeed required—to reflect upon the 
condition as I get up to flip the record. The journey from couch to player can sometimes 
be its own Odyssey.  
VI. Grammar 
I began this case study with a figuration of a journey Adorno invites us to 
consider when appreciating sound.  Rachel Ahern Knudsen notes the Odyssey is different 
from other ancient texts because the exchanges are interpersonal: the context is not 
occasional speeches that follow a traditional path. Instead, they are poetic utterances of 
casual exchange told in an atmosphere of intimacy by a third, unseen narrator.644 For 
classics scholar Deborah Beck, this type of song is what makes Homer unique in the 
rhetorical tradition.645 What Beck calls “free indirect speech,” is a specific structure in 
Homer representing a blended quality, where two different voices–two different formal 
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representations of agency—harmonize together to disseminate a curated meaning.646  
Why do either of these two matter? These old canonic systems of representing rhetorical 
persuasion and compositional agency demonstrates two curious principles in an 
archetypal journey: first, that the speech of song intentionally reflects a different 
grammatical structure with blended rules and uncomfortable narrative positioning and it 
requires a judgmental stress on a specific type of playful consciousness. Often, this can 
make it difficult for contemporary rhetoricians, ensconced in a categorical mode of 
assessment, to pin it down and thus debate meaning. Stuart Hall argued that 
understanding song in this formal or grammatical way approached music “a ‘language’ 
with complex relations between different sounds and chords.”647 But like the songs of 
Homer, it became difficult to pin down the exact, precise, universal meaning beyond its 
form, because its was in a sense referencing a host of individual choices unknown to the 
observable world.  For Adorno, the whole essence of a piece of music could be boiled 
down to the first note.648  
Like Traubeck’s influences, Céleste Boursier-Mougenot and John Cage, whose 
designs reflect an interest in compositions created by the rule-structures unknown to a 
casual listener, Years is an intervention at the level of rendered livable grammar. What 
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this really means remains to be said. But decisively what Traubeck did not intend, is for it 
to be an actual replica of tree communication.  To Traubeck’s credit he is constantly 
insistent in most interviews that his project is not an ecological capture. He reminds 
interviewers again and again not to conflate his sound machine with true mimetic 
reproductive capacity. Instead, he told the Huffington Post, that he created “an input that 
sends a soundwave directly to a cutting machine which is using the sound as instruction 
for movement… My machine is rather a contraption for generatively producing music 
that is interpreted by the data in the year rings than an actual sonic representation of the 
data.”649 In another, he uses the frame of coder:  “I set a rule set for the compositions by 
programming and building this machine which has some kind of internal rules of how it 
works so it can’t just produce any sound but then again the composition is actually then 
being made by the tree’s data, which is not really random."650 In an interview with 
Benjamin van Loon, he is explicit about his intentions:  
Finding an aesthetic form (visually and aurally) for it was rather hard because I 
wanted to avoid any implications supporting tendencies like emotional kitsch or 
esotericism, which wood is prone to do when presented in a certain way – 
especially when the combination of wood and music (which is emotional) already 
supported this notion. So I tried to build something very reduced and formalistic 
around it. I painted it completely in black to draw the focus to the matter itself: 
the wood and its structure.651  
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Truabeck settles with a precise grammatical answer in an interview with Stewart Russel, 
“Years lets us hear music based on patterns that form through an ageing process in 
different environments.652 
Three important revelations emerge for me from these interviews.  First, why do 
all interviewers ask the same question?  Many are questions that are too often asked not 
only of artistic process, but especially when they interact with plant material. Are they 
really speaking? How do we know? How can you prove it? Easily lends way to: why do 
we care? What did you do? What am I supposed to learn?   In this instance, the constant 
asking after the mimetic correspondence, the one-to-one exact, direct, authoritative stake 
is an awful way of exerting a specific form of dominating rhetorical address. This call of 
the Enlightenment—an Althusserian hail—is contained in the utmost important question 
for some analysts is his compositional role as the auteur. That is to say, so many 
interviewers yearn to know if Traubeck thinks he invented sylvan voice, as if to confirm a 
human role in all of this. Despite his protests, it speaks to deep human fantasy resonating: 
that we are fully in control.  
 Second, it’s interesting to hear Traubeck’s grammatical agency slip in and out of a 
recognition of a more passive residence in his mimetic reality: his machine lets us hear.  
I say slippage, because it is true that the machine is the amplifying mechanism for a 
relationship with natural sound, just as Traubeck intended. However, in his positioning of 
the apparatus as a neutral bridge, he refuses it the object status it actually deserves and 
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also slightly conceals his subjective control. He is, after all, the primary programmer, 
inventor of a grammar of exchange between the world of artificial and natural. It is the 
ultimate Enlightenment trick: to mask the human programming in the passivity of the 
machine as it captures vibrant life for pleasurable consumption. 
 But there is a final grammatical trick in Traubeck’s reflection on composition. In 
his continued insistence on understanding the growth rates of trees, he neglects often to 
comment on the actual reality that is presented in Years: it is like a great Homerian epic 
song, the tale of life in assumed death. We are not listening to climate change, as science 
is want (and right!) to do with tree ring archival study. This is much more personal, a 
song sung of battles fought when we already know the tragic end. In this sense, the actual 
sound is decidedly not to growth rates, as Traubeck would have us believe. We are 
listening, grammatically, to a life in reverse, a diary of lived experience of one single 
vibrant being in a forest of other vibrant beings in a world of breathing death. That we 
cannot decipher the particular struggles is irrelevant and best left for the audience to 
impose and ponder, muse, and fantasize about.  
Yet, it is death, I offer to Adorno, that is the first note initiated in the album Years. 
We begin not in medias res, as with the Odyssey, or with birth, as traditional biographies 
are want to do. Rather, in Years, because of the specific nature of tree design, we hear 
their last breath, first. In this case, we are confronted with the death of a certain subject, 
this tree, and follow its life in reverse. Unlocking this fantasy is to also remind ourselves 
of our own impending demise (philosophical and personal): death is the great natural 
equalizer; no matter how much luxury we choose to surround ourselves with. Its ghost 
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casting a shadow on our life lived in the present. Unfortunately, the story of the present is 
one that is not so poetic. In the next section, I examine the operating structure, the 
medium, influencing Year’s design and my reception of it.  
VII. Structure 
After returning to Los Angeles after a stint in San Francisco, I felt isolated and 
alone. Living in a street level studio apartment with no furniture and no air conditioning 
during the hottest weekend on record, I had only one outlet: a small radio which would 
blast KCRW, NPR programming, and selected sounds from notable jockeys with 
impeccable taste operating out of a radio station in Santa Monica. At the risk of over 
sharing, I recall the exact moment when I resurrected myself from death in a depressed 
blanket of heat overwhelming Los Angeles. I heard a new song on the radio, turned it up, 
and began to dance totally naked in my living room. I was able to reimagine myself in 
that space at that time, sharing sweat, tears, longing, and laughter–the human condition– 
with other imagined audiences tuning in at that exact moment. I felt like I belonged to a 
place and time.  
Adorno biographer David Jenneman points to a concern entertained by Adorno 
regarding the dissemination of sound over mass channels, in particular radio, and this 
sense of “freedom” –or whatever it might be called—that overcame me and stuck with 
me at just the time. Jenneman notes that Adorno cautioned against the acceptance of 
radio’s ability to transform the perceptual experience of our world. Radio, not just each 
song, but the medium (and thereby the structure it represents) preys on these moments of 
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rhythmic enjoyment to create communities of connection through standardization. It is 
with the interests of the structure (that is purchase and profit) that radio is designed: the 
constant contact, perpetual time use, and sound manipulation cultivates in the mind of the 
listener an orientation toward submissive consumption.653 The freedom of the radio is 
false, for each note is not an invitation to liberate but concocts a compulsion toward 
repetition, toward easy sound for easy listening.  In mere appreciation, morning 
programing, work sounds, and leisure beats structure the world for us. And yet, all the 
while, the structure of profit marches on.654 
 Scholar Keith Chapin reminds us though, that in order to understand the 
dimensions of the structure we find ourselves in, “a critic needs to read the aesthetic and 
technical components of a piece in conjunction, for…the artistic idea …is constituted in 
the life of its components, in the way they form new constellations.”655 That is, we must 
be attentive to the medium of production to understand how it participates in this social 
experience. In Years, Traubeck combines aesthetic and technical components of 
dendromusicology with new digitalizing instruments of visuality.656 To read Years in this 
fashion is to understand each tree captured and integrated not by radio, but by newly 
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emergent audio-visual apparati.657 Central to his design is a video game camera. 
According to Jennifer Sodin’s review (which is the only one I found who mentioned it), 
“the custom record player takes-in data using a PlayStation Eye Camera and a stepper 
motor attached to its control arm, and relays the data to a computer. A program called 
Ableton Live then uses it to generate an eerie piano track.”658 “The difference,” Traubeck 
notes, “is that basically it’s just a camera and this camera is a modified camera, a very 
fast one, and the camera has just moved in and it waits until there is a tree ring passing 
the camera's field of view and then it is translated into a sound.”659 It is impossible to 
appreciate Years without spending some time discussing this apparatus.  
I want to read this dialectically. In one sense like Donna Haraway suggests about 
National Geographic’s “critter cam” there is nothing intrinsically suspect about the 
yearning for this form of interspecies connection through new technology.660 In fact 
visualizing equipment encourages us to receive a relationship with plant life we had not 
been able to understand without it. Most documentaries from BBC’s Planet Earth to the 
Wild Kingdom require this kind of technology. Perfected first in the Secret Life of Plants, 
the visualization is without a doubt stunning. Its clarity captures scenes human presence 
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would forbid. And in the rendition, it allows us to understand something essential about 
plants: we see them move. It’s a witnessing that can establish a certain recognition: in 
noticing their growth, we understand them as life. This process would not be possible 
without the opportunity to visualize them. What Traubeck has done, is transform the 
visualization process into an auditory experience. As sound studies gestures toward, we 
can, in fact, begin to establish an entirely new experience based on the sense of speech 
and not the sense of sight. Fully integrated into the community, trees can take up a place 
at the table with their human counterparts, speaking to us as we might each other. 
But, there is also a hidden cost associated with the digitalization of tree song in 
Years.  Plant figures have always struggled with the human demand to move, as I 
mentioned in chapter one. In that the more they move, the more they germinate, the more 
they produce, and the closer they come to the commodity form of agricultural. That is, 
the more we see their utility, the more we will cultivate and manage their existence. So, 
even as the possibility exists to sit in community with plants, more often, the apparatus 
brings them more fully under human domination. In this way, Traubeck’s digitization has 
not changed expectations or wants, internal conflicts and antagonist realties: it has simply 
accelerated them. It should come as no surprise that the same technology capturing forest 
sounds in Years, is also explicitly used in drones, euphemized as Unmanned Ariel 
Vehicles, in a new type of accelerated warfare.661 Thus, the medium is the message: a 
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heightened sense of close connection is part and parcel with a digital experience of war, 
finalizing and perfecting an expression of formal Enlightenment control and domination 
over bodily senses, as well as natural and human world.  
Traubeck, of course, does not make this explicit. He does suggest he chose the 
piano to render tree songs given its sense of “familiarity,” but neglected to make the same 
association with the technological equipment he used.662 He chose the PlayStation, as did 
the military (and as we do popular songs flipping through the radio), because of a sense 
of familiarity and because that level of visual perception makes the world uncannily real 
and similar for us, in our grasp and under our control. We should be extremely skeptical 
of this particular human compulsion–the need to make the world exceedingly familiar, 
rational and predictable. Digitalization preys upon this well curated trained incapacity: 
one in which the world is completely, always, and permanently available to us, yet 
constantly fleeting, chaotic, and out of grasp, threatening us with force or withdrawal. 
Not unlike the experience of social media, in which the sense of being watched is 
constant and the motor of the industry itself, so too the demand for immediate digital 
availability enhances an ongoing sense of alienation in the world. Accompanied by a total 
smoothening of surfaces, digital life may make experiences easier to share and archive, 
but with less nuance and fewer errors, the effect is one of a more permanent erasure of 
the tones of relationality that make life livable.  
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Since there are no scratches in digitalization, I am troubled by Traubeck’s 
ominous recalcitrance to digital takeover in an offhanded utterance to an interviewer, “I  
guess nowadays, everything can be data or can be an archive or a database.”663 It reminds 
me of the intrusion of television everywhere, as if it has a natural right to be in the center 
of it all.  
THE PAINS OF DIGITAL HEARTHS 
 I got rid of television in my house when I left home. I felt satisfied that sound 
could satisfy my consumptive media habit. But, if as scholars in the edited collection by 
Kathleen M. Ryan and Debora A. Macey are correct, for most of the people in the 
American public, “television has replaced the hearth of old as the center of home life.”664 
In my home, as with many other (particularly) queer white affluent male Gen X–
millennial, the television is increasingly replaced by these sound machines. I say this 
because a classic record player, bequeathed as a gag gift by my Uncle Cliff over a 
holiday years ago, represents my most prized object, and sits in the traditional special 
spot a hearth might have occupied in different rhetorical times. A tan Grosley belt-driven 
stand alone model that I was shocked worked and even more surprised continues through 
the writing of this very sentence. It outputs its own unique sound—“noise” in classic 
communication models—over every record it interprets. It’s unique impressions ungulate 
outward like the crackling of a fire or the glow of a screen.  
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I’d always looked upon its hearth status as a small little moment of resistance to 
the colonization of television. Adorno understood the need to examine this sense of 
resistance though as a reaction to a “mutli-layered structure” of propaganda that is mass 
media, and in particular, revealed by television. Driven by constant spectacular 
“enthrallment,” coded messages of consumption “escape the controls of consciousness” 
and become even more prone to fruition as they are planted and grow conceptually inside 
the viewer’s mind.665 The experience of the media itself–a fusion of “surface content’ 
(programming) and “hidden meaning” (narrative structure, symbolic association, network 
formats and so on)–which in their complex interplay nevertheless create a certain 
condition in the state of the watcher.666 “Repressed gratifications,” expressed in “jests, 
off-color remarks, suggestive devices,” Adorno notes, “channelize audience reaction,” 
and “reproducing the very smugness, intellectual passivity, and gullibility that seem to fit 
in with totalitarian creeds even if the explicit surface message of the shows may be anti-
totalitarian.”667 The audience, for Adorno, is thus “handled” and “is used in order to 
frame” and thus ensnare the people in a consumptive orientation, attempting to naturalize 
this feat “as completely as possible and in order to engage [them] psychodynamically in 
the service of premeditated effects.”668 For Adorno, the structure is more than a single 
object or program (or album) but the “presuppositions [of the medium] within which the 
implications function before a single word is spoken.” Like a stylistic “halo effect” that 
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encourages the viewer to identify the story by its genre (or be pleasantly delighted by the 
slightest alteration or hybridization with the genre), television, Adorno argues, 
encourages us to map the scenes and situations in this heightened anticipated awareness 
onto similar situations in our everyday lives. In some cases (especially with those whom 
have fully substituted the screen in their day-to-day lives) all everyday experience 
becomes over determined, charactering, and colonizing “direct sense perception.”669 If 
taken to its absurd extreme (which we may have already arrived at, surpassed, and come 
to enjoy) Adorno notes, “people may not only lose true insight into reality, but ultimately 
their very captivity for life experiences may be dulled by the constant wearing of blue 
and pink spectacles.”670 
But, his final call at the end of this article is uncharacteristically simple and clear. 
“The effort” of resistance here, writes Adorno, “is of a moral nature itself: knowingly to 
face psychological mechanisms operating on various levels not to become blind and 
passive victims. We can change this medium of far-reaching potentialities only if we look 
at it in the same spirit which we hope will one day be expressed by its imaginary.”671 In 
this way, challenging what I have been calling orientations, but which Adorno simply 
means here a fantasy, a certain set of psychological devices instituted, manipulated, and 
reproducing in the form of the television and its viewer, requires a perceptual 
comportment to transformation.  
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It doesn’t always work of course. In my haste to throw out my television and 
“rely” on the easy aesthetic categorization of Netflix and the smooth and instant 
gratification of Spotify premium, I maintained the same orientation toward cultural 
consumption I had hoped to resist. Yet I stand, naked and caught, listening to this album 
Years, still blazing a noisy fire from the hearth in my living room. Ra Hu noted in their 
review of Years a similar curiosity. “Years,” Hu says, “plays with the relationship 
between the fossil, a now inanimate representation of a vibrant being into a newly living 
form–sound. Thus the record player spans the natural, pre-analog world of time 
immemorial and the digital alchemy of transcribing visual data into sound.”672 In this 
way, Years is a bridge, harmonizing the world of nature with that of human, retroactively 
rendering the digital world into analog at the same time.  
I am left, following Adorno, with a deep sense of dialectical ambivalence. 
Digitalization, reflected in the all seeing PlayStation eye camera, is as likely to present an 
opportunity for new community development as it does, like television, reinforce 
authoritarian control and accelerated warfare. It retains the position of Enlightenment 
consumer as much as it opens up the play of resistive naturalist. At his most negative, 
Adorno might dispel all attempts at considering Years to be anything beyond its 
attachment to structure. But, Adorno’s call is one of complex meditation—of continual 
dialectic struggle through this structure. Music, especially in Years, makes and breaks 
rules, of form and content, to reveal and install the spell of the commodity form as it 
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props up the structure at the same time. But, it also leaves open the possibility of deep 
reflection, in which one is transformed from passive consumer into critical thinker. As 
this album review demonstrates, coming to terms with the failures of our fantasies places 
us in a more fully aware position, one attuned to the material structure and our place 
floating inside its emptiness.  
VIII. Floating 
Like the context of fantasy, arranged by this album review of European trees in 
the art-album Years, Adorno described the process of music (and its critique) as 
constantly caught in dialectic struggle reflected in its status as commodity, composition, 
and medium. Listening to music in this way is a different mode of figuration. It is also a 
way of reading, with Daniel Chua, Adorno’s contribution to the understanding of sound.  
Chua considers it like floating with a message in a bottle, or what I might prefer, atop 
apiece of driftwood floating down the streets of Austin after a flood.673 “Drifting,” writes 
Chua, “is the moral attitude required of new music, involving a kind of material 
agnosticism where the composing subject cedes to the tendency of the musical material. 
The only compass available is an internal dialectic within the historical material of new 
music that points to possibilities and tendencies—but there are no fixed points”674 He 
makes a delightfully obvious leap here: 
Darkness also shrouds Adorno’s text. Its obscure dialectical maneuvers do not 
yield the kind of clarity demanded by modern reason. There are no immediate 
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results. Rather it drifts, forcing a myopic tracking of its movements. Adorno’s 
dialectical struggle is a way of conscripting the reader on an odyssey of disaster in 
which our survival is not guaranteed – only hoped for.675  
 
I encourage everyone to read his beautiful reading of the Enlightenment hero and its 
demise and reclaimed hope for survival. It’s revelatory in its understanding of the journey 
of the human in relation to the natural world, left to its mythic understanding, caught as 
we are in a perpetual journey through time and space.676  
But I want to get back to the trees in Years, the driftwood that I have been floating with.  
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After a class conversation on the album, in his blog Jim Cotter notes, “The 
discussion in the Composition Seminar whirled around how much control is exerted by 
the creator of a piece when mapping data to the musical parameters via software and 
hardware, with opinions covering all parts of the spectrum. The final agreement was that 
ultimately the ear must be the final arbiter for the music, and the eye for the visual, and 
that it was entirely subjective as to how one rated the piece artistically.”677 I have to 
respectfully disagree with this consensus of this class regarding this read. How one comes 
to know the album reflects a series of productive choices that far exceed Cotter’s review. 
Even concretizing the piece in domains of eye and ear misses the technical construction. 
Finally, to render the final assessment to mere consumptive opinion, (“I like what I 
like,”) is the emergence of the false, fabricated, fantastic formal orientation of 
consumptive desire looking not for experiments in sound by the familiarity of the next 
dominant fix.  
Judith A. Peraino reminds us, “Adorno famously championed high modernist 
music and eschewed popular music, arguing that difficult music requires intellectual 
work by the listener, and that the effort of the work brings the estrangement between 
music and its auditor that is needed to counter complacency and alienation from 
ideological superstructures.”678 Peraino offers a common misreading in suggesting that 
Adorno did not enjoy popular music; one must have a deep appreciation in order to offer 
                                                
677 Jim Cotter, “Forest Sonata: Listening to the Music of the Trees” The Conversation (blog), 
April 12, 2012 (4:22 p.m.), accessed February 8, 2017, https://theconversation.com/forest-sonata-
listening-to-the-music-of-the-trees-6096.  
678 Judith Peraino, Listening to the Sirens: Musical Technologies of Queer Identity from Homer 
to Hedwig (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 2. 
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a critique.679 As Miklitsch notes, “one recurring, enduring motif of [Adorno’s] theory is 
the need to historicize aesthetic judgments,” including Adorno’s.680 To do so is to bring 
immanent criticism into full ambient amplification: Adorno’s dialectical thought 
demands we return again and again to his text as well. It’s a practice he performed 
himself. Adorno’s confrontations with popular music and jazz, Eric Oberle notes, 
provided an opportunity for him to reflect and present a different and transformed 
thought in his later work.681 Peraino’s major critique—that Adorno is too high brow, too 
theoretical, not everyday enough—is overly rehearsed and as such no longer allows the 
audience to struggle with what presents itself to them.  
I have tried to demonstrate what an opportunity presents itself in reading the 
sound of trees with Adorno; one that brings him intimately into my own life and listening 
experience. I hope he helped understand an elegant everyday relationship—fraught as it 
is fruitful—between humans and plants. Acting as guide, I argued that Adorno helped 
establish an ethical orientation toward listening to the journey of a needle rehearsing the 
fantastic sound of trees knots as it circumnavigates a spinning piece of plastic.  
  
                                                
679 See Richard Leppert, “Introduction,” Essays on Music: Theodor W. Adorno (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002), 1-84.  
680 Miklitsch, Roll Over Adorno, 45. 
681 Eric Oberle, “Jazz, the Wound: Negative Identity, Culture, and the Problem of Weak 
Subjectivity in Theodor Adorno’s Twentieth Century,” Modern Intellectual History, 13, no. 2 
(2016): 357–386.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
Well, wait: plants are not one thing, because— 
-Avital Ronell682 
 
I’d like to imagine this conclusion is but one possible way of filling in an ending 
to Avital Ronell’s exchange with Diane Davis in their conversation in Philosophy and 
Rhetoric. They are discussing the place of the extrahuman in contemporary rhetorical 
studies. By returning to the question that motivates this study—how the plant is and is not 
both subject and object of human rhetoric—I hope to demonstrate an orientation that 
holds the question open at its limit, by approaching various iterations of “the plant” 
caught in dialectic motion. Returning to the central thesis-as-question guiding this 
dissertation—how can we understand the plant (and the human) as both object and 
subject and what are the interpretations and critiques that mediate an encounter with the 
human?—I have followed Theodore W. Adorno’s invitation to apply negative 
dialectics—or immanent criticism—to everyday sites of personal encounter and 
interdisciplinary texts from a range of discourses—in which this meaning making or 
rhetorical exchange has been figured. That is, I sought to understand the dialectic features 
of human-plant relations as they present themselves in the concepts of natural history 
revealed in an experience at Red Rock State Park, the naming identification of the Sipo-
Matador, and the sounds of trees in the art-piece Years. Approaching these figures in both 
                                                
682 Diane Davis, “Breaking Down ‘Man’: A Conversation with Avital Ronell,” Philosophy & 
Rhetoric 47, no. 4 (2014): 372. 
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affirmative and negative modes, I argued that keeping the dialectic in motion instantiates 
a critical process—a reflection on reflective capacity—across multiple renderings of 
representation and structure. I argued the writing and reading is an essential part of this 
process, understanding thinking as a movement of mediation—a dramatic journey or 
symphony—through theoretical abstraction and material reality to reveal a 
multidimensional orientation to rhetorical criticism. More simply I hope my approach to 
immanent critique kept Adorno and the plant, both subjects and objects of this 
dissertation, close enough to touch while at bay enough to remain mysterious. I hope it 
placed the Western structure that surrounds my encounter between the human and the 
plant—the Enlightenment and all of its iterations—in relief as much as it leaves open 
opportunities for creative reflection and critique.  
 I’d now like to place its significance in motion one last time, in three iterations. I 
explore one way of thinking about the consequences for rhetoric by examining a 
synthesis of human and plant symbolic exchange in contemporary scientific studies of 
“plant communication.” Second, I explore the opportunities for including immanent 
critique as a rhetorical orientation for approaching plant life by situating the practice in 
conversation with a key Quarterly Journal of Speech article by Lawrence Grossberg. 
Finally, I’d like to conclude by offering an application of the criticism to one final 
figuration a short reflection on the prime mover of this dissertation: Stevie Wonder’s 
album Journey through the Secret Life of Plants.  
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I. Plant Communication Models 
One variation of plant studies explores the conjunction—a cultural interface of 
two meaning systems—between traditional communication theory and botany, in which 
the relationship between predator and prey is theorized as a form of value.683 Best 
exemplified by the work of California botanist Richard Karban, generally, this approach 
represents an attempt to understand plant behavior in a communicative sense; he asks 
how plants sustain value—vitality—through symbolic exchange. 684 Karban’s work is 
extensive, often focusing on the behavior among plant communities in ways that 
highlight the benefits that emerge from the exchange of toxins, rapid movement, and 
other chemical responses.685  Karban understands this as an expression of basic 
                                                
683 For a detailed discussion of conjunction, see for example: Lawrence Grossberg, Carolyn 
Hardin, and Micheal Palm, “Contributions to a Conjunctural Theory of Valuation,” Rethinking 
Marxism 26, no. 3 (2014): 306-355. I’m using this this term here as a shadow to the second 
section. I’d like the reader to understand this combination between biology and communication 
theory in this iteration of plant studies to be a type of conjunction that Grossberg and others 
invite. Drawn from a reading of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, conjunction is a cultural 
studies approach to ideological criticism that attempts to understand capitalism beyond a 
traditional labor theory of value. Instead, these authors propose cultural understanding of 
economic structures to theorize the expression of capitalism from a platform (a line of flight) of 
complex power relations originating from ontological obligation into social identity.  Attentive to 
various theories of value originating from debt, these scholars argue that capitalism works by 
enumerating obligation into value and then captures this affect into various social formations. 
Decoding these receptions offers a historically contingent method for understanding economic 
exchange beyond a structural analysis offered by traditional Marxist interpretation. While not 
essential for this section, it is a playful reminder of the limits of conjunctural analysis, initiated 
itself by Grossberg’s understanding of rhetorical inquiry.  
684 Richard Karban, Plant Sensing and Communication (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2015).  
685 See, for example: Richard Karban, “Plant Behavior and Communication, Ecology Letters, 
11.7 (2008): 727-739.  “Plants anticipate future conditions by accurately perceiving and 
responding to reliable environmental cues. Plants exhibit memory, altering their behaviours 
depending upon their previous experiences or the experiences of their parents. Plants 
communicate with other plants, herbivores and mutualists. They emit cues that cause predictable 
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communication theory: “Plants emit cues that cause other organisms to respond.”686 In 
the exchange of symbols--visual (flowering, light manipulation, growth patterns and so 
on) and volatile (chemical releases)—entire communities are constructed and built 
around the linguistic act.687  In so arguing, Karban draws inspiration from a sender-
receiver model of communication (itself a technologically mediated invention), and also 
one that tacitly draws from an Aristotelian approach to the rhetorical situation, in which 
we understand persuasion as a speaker recognizing all the abilities they have at their 
disposal in order to move an audience to act or respond.688 While Karban is a vocal figure 
in this expression of critical plant studies, historically the scientific approach could be 
said to begin in the early 1980’s especially with David F. Rhoades’ study of willow, 
poplar, and sugar maple trees. 689  Rhoades understood plant communication as a type of 
early warning system; plants defended against attack by sending communicative counter 
measures—alleochemicals—to avoid detection or to deter access to predators. Edward F. 
Farmer and Clarence A. Ryan extended the theory to “eavesdroppers,” noticing that 
plants could effect or induce behavioral changes not just in plants of the same species, but 
                                                                                                                                            
reactions in other organisms and respond to such cues themselves.” Karban, “Plant Behavior and 
Communication,” 727.  
686 Karban, “Plant Behavior,” 734.  
687 Karban, “Plant Behavior,” 734-5.  
688 Karban, Plant Sensing and Communication, 4-7. Also see Alan G. Gross, “What Aristotle 
Meant by Rhetoric,” Rereading Aristotle’s Rhetoric, eds. Alan G. Gross and Arthur E Walzer, 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 2000), 32.  
689 David F. Rhoades, "Responses of Alder and Willow to Attack by Tent Caterpillars and 
Webworms: Evidence for Pheromonal Sensitivity of Willows," Plant Resistance to Insects, ed. 
Paul A. Hedin (Washington DC: American Chemical Society, 1983), pp. 55–68. See also: I.T. 
Baldwin and  J.C. Schultz, “Rapid Changes in Tree Leaf Chemistry Induced by Damage: 
Evidence for Communication between Plants,” Science 221 (1983): 277–279.  
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across varietals.690 Later studies have continued to confirm this phenomenon, and 
extended it into an ecological understanding of plant community development.691 The 
importance of this analysis—in understanding the flows of communicative value between 
and among plants—is two fold according to Karban. First, his theory offers arguments to 
limit human pollutants (ozone and carbon dioxide saturation for examples) that, like 
noise, might negligently impede plant life by interrupting their communicative 
mechanisms. Second, Karban argues that it might help humans continue to “mimic” plant 
behavior by learning to interpret and absorb their tactics.692 Velcro and solar power, he 
notes, are two kinds of technologies that emerged from plant communication analysis and 
could gesture toward other secrets yet to be deciphered.  
 There is a latent poetry in Karban’s work. For example, his study of the artemisia 
tridentate, more commonly known as the sagebrush, is a beautiful description of living 
and sacrifice.693 Sagebrush plants thrive in close proximity—communal settings—and 
benefit from this joint living situation. When a predator begins an assault, the injured 
plant will release volatile cues of methyl jasmonate, to warn other branches on its own 
body, but also to members of its community, of the impending attack. Sensing this, the 
other plants will “play dead,” encouraging the predator to pass to another grouping, 
                                                
690 J. V. Lovett, M. Y. Ryuntyu, and D. L. Liu, “Allelopathy, Chemical Communication, and 
Plant Defense,” Journal of Chemical Ecology 15, no. 4 (1989): 1193–1202. 
691 Anurag A. Agrawal, “Communication between Plants: This Time It’s Real,” Trends in 
Ecology & Evolution 15, no. 11 (2000): 446; Ronald Pierik, Carlos L. Ballaré, and Marcel Dicke, 
“Ecology of Plant Volatiles: Taking a Plant Community Perspective,” Plant, Cell & Environment 
37, no. 8 (2014): 1845–53. 
692 Karban, Plant Sensing, 177-9.  
693 Anna Lena Phillips, “Savory Individuals: A Field Study Reveals New Evidence for Airborne 
Communication in Sagebrush Plants,” American Scientist 97, no. 5 (2009): 380–81. 
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which allows the colony to thrive at the expense of one of its members.694 This 
communicative defense is potentially not limited to those within the similar species 
grouping; Karban’s research suggests the sagebrush will issue the same communicative 
warning to nearby tomato and tobacco plants, perhaps representing a form of structural 
meaning-making systems in vibrant beings thought to have lacked the capacity.695 
Poetically, this is a beautiful rendition of ecological conjunction, challenging many 
assumptions about the singularity of plants and a common trope of “survival of the 
fittest” archetype that has come to dominate human understanding of the natural world 
(including our own nature).  Karban’s research agenda could encourage reflection on the 
static notion of plant beings, ones that may have more in common with the sophisticated 
complexity of human meaning systems with equally important ramifications for 
assumptions about possible human organizations as well.  
But there is also danger to reflect upon in Karban’s study, beyond what many 
considered to be significant statistical flaws in research methodology.696 When taken to 
its extreme, Karban’s model has been used to establish a scientific research program to 
initiate theories of plant neurobiology—the suggestion that plants have complex 
                                                
694 See, for example: Richard Karban, Kaori Shiojiri, Satomi Ishizaki, William C. Wetzel and 
Richard Y. Evans, “Kin Recognition Affects Plant Communication and Defense,” Proceedings: 
Biological Sciences 280, no. 1756 (2013): 1-5. 
695 Vladimir Shulaev, Paul Silverman, and Ilya Raskin, “Airborne Signalling by Methyl 
Salicylate in Plant Pathogen Resistance,” Nature 385, no. 6618 (1997): 718–21. 
696 Simon V. Fowler and John H. Lawton, “Rapidly Induced Defenses and Talking Trees: The 
Devil’s Advocate Position,” The American Naturalist 126, no. 2 (1985): 181–95; For more recent 
criticisms, see for example: Nancy Stamp, “Out of the Quagmire of Plant Defense Hypotheses,” 
The Quarterly Review of Biology 78, no. 1 (2003): 23–55. 
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structures equivalent to brain function.697 It has been summarily rejected by over 30 
scientists in an unequivocal article in Plant Science arguing, “simply there is no evidence 
for structures such as neurons, synapses, or brains in plants…We now urge the 
proponents of plant neurobiology to reevaluate critically the concept and to develop an 
intellectually rigorous foundation for it.”698 Stefan Rieger argues that it is Karban’s 
strategic communication model that has been the foundation for the failure of its 
reception; too easily the sender-receiver model transforms plants into media objects, 
relying on an assumption of antiquated and nostalgic technology that obscures the very 
vibrancy it attempts to reveal.699 “Manifest here,” he writes, “the inflexibility of a 
communicative paradigm so accustomed to making human beings its measure that any 
form of alternative understanding becomes ridiculous and esoteric.”700 Thus, it is both the 
lack of rhetorical sophistication in his communication models and its absorption of plant 
life into human terms that prevents a persuasive case to be made for considering what 
appears to be a network of communicative symbolic exchange beyond the human.  
But, does that mean there is nothing of value in reflecting on the conjunction of 
plants and communication? Precisely because rhetoric offers the possibility of critical 
reflection, in this study I have argued that the journey is worth taking: not for what it 
                                                
697 Paco Calvo, "The Philosophy of Plant Neurobiology: A Manifesto." Synthese 193, no. 5 
(2016): 1323-1343. 
698 Amedeo Alpi et al., “Plant Neurobiology: No Brain, No Gain?” Trends in Plant Science 12, 
no. 4 (2007): 135-136. 
699 Stefan Rieger, “What’s Talking: On the Nostalgic Epistemology of Plant Communication,” 
in The Green Thread: Dialogues with the Vegetal World, eds. Patricia Viera, Monical Gagliano, 
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reveals about plants, but what it allows us to understand about the dialectic relationship 
between subject and object in relation to the way we interpret plant life. Following my 
extended reading of Kenneth Burke and Theodor W. Adorno, approaching plants with a 
sense of immanent critique could be a more appropriate and indeed important orientation 
for considering and contesting critical plant studies. The approach requires a text that 
communicates ecologically as well, referencing and returning to figures (like the tree, for 
example) to tease out a being in multidimensional relief. Immanent critique does not 
easily lend itself to one short essay, but a durational practice of the length I offered in the 
preceding pages. A rhetorical relationship more complex, textual, and relational than 
Karban’s strategic communication model reveals the plant in figural not in mimetic relief. 
It is supple enough to understand a vital poetry that defines an intimate historic 
relationship between humans and plants while structurally and critically oriented to avoid 
turning the plant into a parascience more appropriate for the New Age.  
But, the imperative for critical plant studies is also, as I have demonstrated, not a 
relationship that should remain unattended. This relationship is already in operation: in 
state parks and their museums; in natural history texts and television documentaries; in 
poetry and science fiction; in the cannons of religious texts and philosophy of all cultures; 
in soundscapes and dreams. Instead, I argue, we should consistently maintain a 
connected-separation, for only in the reflection upon our rhetorical structures that 
Western human meaning making systems, including a historical drive to domination, can 
be revealed and criticized. This is not to suggest that plants do not effect changes in each 
other but rather to understand that collapsing subject and object, as Karban does, is not 
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the route to a political and ethical account capable of reflecting on both similarity and 
difference, on poetry and science, and on intra species relationality.  Collapsing the 
subject of human communication into plants too easily renders these vibrant beings 
legible, metabolizing their systems into ours. Instead, we ought to let their systems, 
perhaps, remain illegible; to refuse to understand their systems as our own.  
I have also argued that there are additional reasons to be cautious of Karban’s 
version of critical plant studies: the hidden orientation of the researcher. Standing inside 
Karban’s interpretation is also a secret interpreter—the scientist-critic—whose laboratory 
methods structures the observation of message transference and whose desire charts the 
change in action.  Devoid of historical context, a strong understanding of structures of 
domination, Karban renders the plants available for use.  When you consider Karban’s 
research is being picked up in efforts to maximize pest control for ultimate agricultural 
perfection it’s hard not to see the connection.701 Karban’s approach, especially in his 
value of mimicry (of our own discernment between self and other) is one that reveals 
itself as intimately attuned to Enlightenment assumptions of management, growth 
observation, and ultimately human supremacy that reduces the plants to a specific type of 
rhetorical object: the plant is acted upon, its secrets primed for human use especially in 
technological transformation, its body rendered totally available for us. In this 
conjunction where humans attempt to become more like plants, what is revealed is not 
just a complex network of "actants" (a phrase borrowed from "new materialists" Jane 
                                                
701 Marcel Dicke, Maurice W Sabelis, Junji Takabashi, Jan Bruin, and Maarten A. Posthumus, 
“Plant Strategies of Manipulating Predatorprey Interactions through Allelochemicals: Prospects 
for Application in Pest Control,” Journal of Chemical Ecology 16, no. 11 (1990): 3091–3118. 
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Bennett and Bruno Latour) that humans can sit in community with.702 The truth of the 
plants secrets is reduced to use-value: a desire for humans to transform that knowledge 
into utility, to mimic behavior to make our lives more primed to consume and maintain 
technological advancement. Caught in the never ending drive to understand the difference 
of meaning making systems is an old desire to make their secrets our own.  
“On the surface, critical plant studies,” argues emergent scholar Greta Gaard, 
“may share a commitment to plant well being.”703 But Gaard shares my skepticism about 
Karban’s approach, which too easily slips into questions about moral consumption—“if 
they communicate, can we eat them?”—instead of reflections about the dialectic 
structuring of human consumption and contemporary industrial life. Instead, in reference 
to a much broader rhetorical orientation, Gaard argues that, “ethical practice depends not 
on the quality or attitude of the other, but rather on the quality of relationship and 
attention humans bring to the other.”704 I have argued that Adorno’s immanent criticism 
is a more effective way of assessing historical practices of domination in relation to plant 
life and returns us to an ethical place of considering our relation to plants and not an 
overemphasis on their use value or their mystique.  
I have been arguing that we should be as poetically excited as we are 
pessimistically cautious about Karban’s conjunctive synthesis that attempts to understand 
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and read the cultural codes of a silenced subject. In the attempt to gain an understanding 
of a plant’s different social and communication systems, we have deposited a great 
human capacity to be non-reflexive: to make their systems our own, in model or in use. 
Even worse, we have no idea to what ends this knowledge presents if captured by 
corporations whose interest it is to develop pathogens that cause various reactions in 
species for the purpose of unending growth. Thus it is at once a poetic metaphor and a 
cautionary tale, a dialectic struggle between subject and object at the core of 
contemporary research on plant and communication. 
I find a similar struggle in a scholar of the curious concept of the "conjunction," 
and in its repudiation of a dialectic sense of rhetoric, Lawrence Grossberg.    
II. Reconsidering Grossberg 
At the end of his introduction of Adorno and dialectic thinking into the field of 
rhetoric, scholar Lawrence Grossberg, in his only submission to the Quarterly Journal of 
Speech in 1979, argues against what I have attempted in this dissertation as impossible.705 
He writes:  
Consequently (and in conclusion), it seems mistaken to identify rhetoric and 
rhetorical criticism with critique (in the sense of a Marxian or dialectical critical 
reading). Because rhetorical discourse constitutes and projects a transcendental 
subject onto the world and into language (including its own discourse in the form 
of a critic who remains undetermined by a personal involvement with the 
discourse being read) it is unable reflexively to acknowledge its own 
determination. It is unable, without giving up its own concern, to question the 
nature and role of the subject within a particular social formation. Nor is rhetoric 
a general theory of the social construction of a particular social reality. Both these 
understandings of rhetoric are grounded in a metaphorical theory of discourse, 
                                                
705 Lawrence Grossberg, “Marxist Dialectics and Rhetorical Criticism,” The Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 65, no. 3 (1979): 235-49.  
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which fails to acknowledge is own determination. This is not a criticism of 
rhetoric, however; it is only to accept that rhetoric exits only in its contradictions, 
i.e. only in its relations to that which it is not.706  
 
This article is less a description and more a challenge to figure rhetoric differently, and as 
such, is one that is historically situated and available for reinterpretation. Grossberg, then, 
already demonstrates a role for rhetorical criticism as I have situated it in the terms 
offered by Adorno and Kenneth Burke: a practice in reflecting on reflections, or on 
criticizing our criticism: a dimensional mode of thought.  It is true that the dialectic, as I 
argued in the method section, is not often considered in these terms. Relegated to the 
domain of analytic philosophy, it is also often positioned as too technically determined, 
too pessimistic, too high theory, too dismissive, too structural, as to leave little space for 
more artful or poetic situations. But, as I have argued by example, those traditions of 
dialectic thought are not an essential constitution—a natural element—of the practice. 
Negative dialectics in particular offers an opportunity to think through its abstraction by 
placing it in relation to what are considered objects—plants, in this case—and outside the 
spheres of traditional speech making—in sites of everyday encounter.  I have argued that 
if the goal of rhetoric is limited to the effort to compel human action, then of course, my 
approach might not make a lot of sense. But we do not need to begin from this model of 
strategic communication. Rather than see rhetoric as a “functional discourse built upon 
persuasion and manipulation,” as Grossberg does by providing “a discursive defense of 
the possibility of creating a shared reality among free and independent human subjects,” I 
have attempted to understand rhetoric as a challenge and invitation to think through the 
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terms themselves, asking tacitly about the contours of a shared reality of subjects and 
whether it could ever be considered free. If the human is as conditioned by the plant as 
the plant is the human, then I argue, perhaps the freedom is more one of responsibility, 
not revealed in the “articulation” and the “cultural reading of codes,” but by tracing a 
dialectical address between the subject and object. The misstep, if I might call it, is 
Grossberg’s assumption of an exceptional or privileged figure of the human subject for 
rhetoric: one in which the turn to the extrahuman clearly does not advance. Allow me the 
opportunity to explain and summarize accordingly.   
“In considering three basic interpretations of the dialectic,” what Grossberg terms 
mode of thought, description, and discourse, he argues  “each of these moments will be 
used to shed light on the task of rhetorical criticism: on the way in which the critic relates 
to the language of the text, on the nature of language which makes such a relationship 
possible, and on the nature of the discourses of rhetorical criticism.” To this I have 
focused on the term nature that is left unattended to in Grossberg’s article. What 
Grossberg believes is a function of the rhetoric (an installation of a hidden transcendental 
subject where one does not exist), I have argued is more an expression enacted by certain 
rhetoricians who feel addressed by Enlightenment understanding of the human, a subject 
unencumbered by natural roots making claims on the world autonomously and 
independently. But, to understand a relation between the human and the plant is one that 
asks about a different embrace: the human object enveloped by the plant subject. In other 
words, I have reordered the terms of Grossberg’s inquiry: I have sought to understand the 
language of (our) nature in various texts; a natural relationship that makes language 
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possible; and a criticism of the discourses of and about nature that also operates as a limit 
in our interpretative capacities even as it motivates it. In other words, I argued in this 
dissertation that immanent critique, the specific approach Grossberg argues exists at the 
limit of rhetoric, indeed is an opening for reconsidering the term critique itself. In so 
doing, I have considered a dimension that Grossberg leaves unattended in his well 
thought out essay: the way dialectics allows us to consider the role of rhetoric in nature 
and the nature of rhetoric; placing the critic inside rhetoric at the same time we recognize 
a limit to our interpretative potential. 
Constituted by the primary relationship between subject and object, the 
contradiction experienced by humans is the “inescapable relation (opposition) between 
human life and the world which cannot be reduced or broken.”707 Such mode of thinking 
establishes itself as grounding in two ways: first, humans approach the natural world as 
an object of use, a scene of struggle, and as raw material for advancement. But second, an 
opposition between living things whose very terms of life are in relation, but remain 
illegible and undecipherable. That is, no matter how much mastery we display, we are 
forever tied to a world some wish to escape. Both this assumption reveals a contradiction 
in subjective experience: what is dominated is also free, what is considered free is in a 
relationship of domination. In order to demonstrate that principle, following Adorno, I 
designed each chapter as a journey through this contradiction. To that, I would like to 
review the contours of each adventure. 
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The first case study examined a structural dialectic revealed in the everyday 
encounters with the concept of natural history in California’s Red Rock State Park 
located in the heart of the Mojave Desert. Situated among the Joshua trees and red rock 
pillars, I attempted to reveal this contradiction by reading two displays in the small 
museum: a diorama of a tool-wielding human subject and a display of 
dendrochronological tree-rings. I understood these as two different ways of hearing 
human-plant relations: one as an archetype of domination and the other as an expression 
of freedom. But, the conversation between the two also exists in relation to the world 
around it, both rhetorical features grasping at the ineffable life in a terrain that seems to 
defy it and a compulsion to travel to witness it. Inspired by life in one of the driest parts 
of the world, I examined how the plant terrain gets worked up in a variety of ways to 
support a static notion of natural history, one examined through Adorno’s lecture on 
dialectics.  
 In the second case study I took up a different posture: examining contemporary 
biology, natural history texts, and philosophical writing surrounding one plant the Sipo-
Matador. Understanding these discourses as forms of nature identification, I traced the 
dialectic struggle between affirmation and negation that it seems to induce at each stage 
of its figurations. As a parasite, it appeals to the figure of monstrosity identified by 
Adorno, one that prepares us for uncontrollable accounts with (our) nature as it cautions 
us against the gluttony of human desire for consumption and domination. As a member of 
an ecological whole, it acts as an essential member of its community, inspiring creativity 
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and connection across cultural divides. At the same time, it is a frightening figure that 
asks us to pause at the delight of our revelation.  
In the final case study, I took up Adorno’s dialectic understanding of music to 
explore Austrian trees fantasized through the art-album Years by Bartholomäus 
Traubeck. I summoned reflections on the life and death of trees, the material artifact of 
the vinyl album, its production processes, and its participation in various forms of media 
to meditate on the structural possibilities and limitation present in the album. In so doing, 
I also contributed to a dialectical understanding of sound studies, one that can inform 
how to write reviews in as much as it asks us to reflect on soundscapes beyond mimetic 
representation. The album review itself is a practiced situation of an ethical orientation of 
listening, an ambient form of persuasion attentive and attending to the dialectic between 
subject and object in all its expressions.  
All three of these cases studies respond to Grossberg’s primary call: to understand 
how a dialectically informed rhetorical practice forecloses understanding of human social 
formation. He writes, “dialectics is thinking precisely about the way in which opposition 
or difference produces identity. That is dialectics is a reflection on the way in which 
something is constituted by the set of contradictions in which it exists, by which it is 
not.”708 As I have argued in this dissertation, this is a common, but not exclusive reading. 
Dialectic inquiry is not a focus on binary opposition (“I understand myself because I am 
not a plant”) but in harmony: how are both the plant and human subjects and objects of 
rhetoric, together. The moments of similar constitution may not be legible, but it is not 
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the job of rhetoric to bring the conjunction into clear relief; I have understood the practice 
differently. How a tree, for example lives the arch of its life from birth to death is done so 
on entirely different terms than a human, and yet, the totality of vitality is a dimensional 
experience that is deeply shared. In order to appreciate this shared distance, we must take 
up and hold the human as both exceptional in their capacity to reflect upon the edifices of 
language but also in the ability to get confused, get it wrong, and perhaps misrecognize 
those codes. In this way dialectics is as much about the dissolution of identity—denying 
the strong sense of self—and its claim to clarity. This contradiction is one that may 
complicate Grossberg’s hope for a critique that forges a free and creative human 
community, in that it may be Grossberg (and not rhetoricians) who is smuggling in a 
hidden transcendental subject. That does not suggest its goal of freedom is not shared, but 
has a much more complicated sense of expression. 
 In this regard, Grossberg argues that, “dialectical thought always relates to human 
reality (his emphasis)… More simply this can be understood as the subject-object 
relationship…Each is embedded within the other as that which gives it identity.  This 
situatedness, the interaction of the subjectivity of human consciousness and the 
objectivity of existence, defines praxis as an essentially dialectical mode of life.”709 To 
stand in agreement with Grossberg is also to acknowledge the opposite of these 
statements as well, the negation called forth by his assertions.  Human reality is 
constituted by a praxis: a dimension of abstract thinking that brings together a specific 
mode of history within a specific term of description of language. It is also to suggest that 
                                                
709 Grossberg, “Marxist Dialectics,” 237. 
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the subject of consciousness is also an object that exists outside of itself—in its status as 
that which is reflected upon.  But, I argue here, the call to identify as human is not as 
appropriate a form of praxis as the negation of an exclusive claim of human to the 
concept of the subject. The danger of Grossberg’s identity-focus here is that it smuggles 
in a uniquely human understanding without reflecting on its opposite: a life lived in non-
identity (which may also apply to some human identity formations). I have argued the 
plant is one such being. We use the plant to situate our understanding of consciousness, 
precisely because we think it exists outside ourselves, as in a nature park. And yet, we 
also integrate the plant, as in the Sipo-Matador in renditions of Nietzsche’s theory of the 
will, to use it as an explanatory feature for our consciousness, drives, and desires. In both 
instances it is not the claim to subjectivization, to a human identity, that I wanted to 
outline, but a claim to what Adorno refers to as “non-identity” in operation; a constant 
process of affirmation and negation that makes and unmakes human and plant worlds in 
motion.710   
My suspicion—which I will leave for another scholar to examine—is that 
Grossberg’s concern has more to do with a difference in appreciating various European 
traditions of cultural critique.711 The iteration informing Grossberg is one that emerges 
                                                
710 José Esteban Muñoz understands this process as disidentifications. It is not appropriate for 
me to claim this as my own, but I encourage others to read his important work. See: José Esteban 
Muñoz, Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics (Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999).   
711 See: Bruce Mccomlskey, Dialectical Rhetoric (Bolder: University Press of Colorado, 2015), 
iii. Mccomlskey writes, “Rhetoric thinks dialectic will determine set procedures for their 
discussion, and dialectic thinks rhetoric will do all the talking. Eventually, they will realize these 
presumptions are unfounded, acquired from their long-associations with other disciplines and arts 
that do not have their best interests at heart.  Wounds quickly heal, hurt feelings subside, and 
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from the French tradition, from Louis Althusser and his school, through Michel Foucault 
and Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari; the other he postulates against, the German 
tradition and one defined by a tradition from Georg Hegel to Adorno and more recently 
Jürgen Habermas.712  Instead of identifying, as I have, a primary object/subject dialectic 
in operation between the human and the plant, he wants to take up dimensions of human 
cultural experience as the primary mediating principle, ignoring a structural limit in favor 
of a representational phenomena that he terms, “the dialectic of immanence and 
transcendence.”713 He centers human agency in the factory of language, arguing that “as a 
social code or system,” language allows humans, “to construct a world which is not of the 
shared symbolic reality in which they live.”714 This to me, given the vantage point of 
history, is a dangerous concept of freedom of code reading, embodied in the false 
liberation of digital life; the Internet is not free anymore than the factory is.715 As such, 
                                                                                                                                            
dialectic and rhetoric agree to explore what might result from a renewed interaction, not only as 
counterparts (though they both have fond memories of Aristotle), but as collaborators, as 
partners…” 
712 See Grossberg’s choice to reference Joseph Stalin continuously throughout the essay which is 
a hidden code that is both unfair and unnecessary. It’s also insightful that he chooses later to 
reference Althusser as one who “has offered one of the core cogent and suggestive readings of the 
dialectic. Grossberg, “Marxist Dialectics,” 241.  
713 Grossberg, “Marxist Dialectics,” 238.  
714 Grossberg, “Marxist Dialectics,” 238.  
715 See, for example: Christian Fuchs, "Information and Communication Technologies and 
Society: A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy of the Internet." European 
Journal of Communication 24, no. 1 (2009): 69-87; Christian Fuchs and Vincent Mosco, Marx in 
the Age of Digital Capitalism (Boston: Brill, 2016); Trebor Scholz, Digital Labor: The Internet 
as Playground and Factory (New York: Routledge, 2013); Nick Dyer-Witheford, “Digital labour, 
Species-Becoming, and the Global Worker,” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization 10, 
no. 3 (2010): 484-503. Refusing the ruse of digital freedom is extremely important given the rise 
of white nationalism and its relationship to digital organizing. See, for example: Jamie Bartlett, 
“From Hope to Hate: How the Early Internet Fed the Far Right,” The Guardian, August 31, 2017, 
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we should also understand that natural world as a different grounding for offering 
resources to rhetoric for understanding forms of domination in both social formation and 
structural control.  This is not to disagree with Grossberg’s understanding of the freedom 
and creativity involved in the poetics of language, but it is not to rush to believe that 
freedom will come from understanding cultural codes as the only form of domination. 
Domination is as structural as it is representational, and it is not the grounding of rhetoric 
that imagines that structure: it exists.  “Immanence-transcendence” as Grossberg argues, 
“points to the contradiction within language between tradition (as constraint) and 
creativity (as freedom).”716  In one sense, for Grossberg, language escapes the limits of 
contemporary structural conditions. In its creative and poetic expressions, it can create 
new kinds of worlds of relating and perceiving. At the same time, the resources and codes 
of creative expression are also structural (both in design and in context); the tools are 
received and are limited because of the social context. What is possible to transcend is 
already limited, in other words, by the needs that transcendence conveys. We cannot 
imagine what is not possible to conceive, we cannot conceive outside the structure that 
makes creativity possible.  
Grossberg asks that if language is both creative and constrained, involving as 
much in the critic as it is in the social world that surrounds us, then “how does one begin 
to reflect?”717  He offers the motif of wager here to explain how one might enter into one 
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online. 
716 Grossberg, “Marxist Dialectics,” 238.  
717 Grossberg, “Marxist Dialectics,” 239.  
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side of the dialectic as an invitation to consider the other. He writes, “the weighted 
dialectic allows the use of contradiction as the door through which understanding must 
pass; it is only by wagering effort, by seeking to discover and assert some truth, that the 
critic can successfully create an understanding of criticism which is vital—both necessary 
and alive.”718 But, while Grossberg interprets language to be the primary entrance point 
for dialectics, the object through which it struggles, I have posited structural vitality and 
its illegibility as the contradiction at the origin of human consciousness: who am I with 
and not who am I. In this instance, it is both constrained by the structural features of 
existence, the compulsion to live toward death, but also the poetic constraints, the 
fantasies, dreams, and exchanges that make that life livable. The wager in my reading is 
the way one embodies the contours of life and death, the dialectic, and the traditional 
constraints (domination) and creative expressions (freedom) that emerge from that 
reflection.  
Each chapter attempted to demonstrate this point actively, inviting the reader into 
different ways of writing in order to understand the body of plants in structural relief.  I 
used the term figure to demonstrate this point, as does Grossberg.  “It is only through the 
use of figurative language,” writes Grossberg, “that the contradictions found in the world 
of humanity’s own creation can be constituted, expressed, and potentially overcome.”719 
This is true of both of the primary mechanisms, metaphor and metonymy, rhetoric offers 
for Grossberg. Metaphoric figuration is “one can appreciate the explosion of meaning 
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that occurs when the two discordant universes of meaning are brought together.”720 Out 
of that collision new forces are brought together. For Grossberg, this is a kind of escape, 
an out or exit, where “a form of creative fabrication, using language metaphorically to 
transcend immersion within the world of everyday life.”721 It presents a real possibility of 
living differently.  “Dialectical discourse is an attempt to incarnate self-consciousness, to 
think simultaneously about some event while thinking about it and the role one had in 
creating it. It is an expression in language of the situatedness of all thought.”722 But 
Grossberg is rightfully cautious here to understand the negation in this equation—the 
rhetorical form of metonymy, or the “contextualization and the assertion of 
connection.”723 It acts as a limit, one which demands the terms do not collapse on 
themselves, but remain different.  I made a similar claim about Karban, when we 
consider that making plant meaning systems look and act like ours does a disservice to 
their uniqueness. Thus, as much as we want to perhaps believe that singing to our plants 
makes them grow because they feel happy and loved, reminiscent of Peter Coffin’s work 
which began this piece, we must appreciate that a very real gap in the interpretative 
dimensions of language and meaning make that prospect both unlikely and dangerously 
reductive.  
But, I suspect that Grossberg is up to something else here. His view of the 
dialectic is one that wants to take up the creative possibilities and absolute difference as 
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722 Grossberg, “Marxist Dialectics,” 245.  
723 Grossberg, “Marxist Dialectics,” 246.  
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one that would sever the possibility that a structural unity exists at all. He too begins with 
the same assumption about communicative mechanistic understanding similar to Karban. 
“Rhetoric is immanence because its primary concern is how the relationship of a speaker 
and audience is fashioned through the resources of language.”724  That is, he is concerned 
with fixing rhetorical effect, again, at a specific mode of human existence: the differing 
social formations and situations set up between speaker and audience.  My suspicion is 
that his criticism is itself historical, existing at a time when speech making was the crown 
jewel of rhetorical theory. But, his desire, if I could claim to hear it, is one that becomes 
too open to the freedom of nonrhetoric, that is in the readings of cultural studies. It is one 
bound, like Karban’s, in a true belief that if we just heard difference enough, the 
conjunctions would be sufficient to perform out of the contemporary structure. It’s an 
ethic of an impossible escape, one cruelly hopeful.  
 Perhaps this is not the case. Grossberg argues that dialectics can be understood as 
a mode of description.  Reality is structural, often hidden, but nonetheless in operation.725 
Thus in terms of the structure of production, social relations are made up of individuals 
whose exchange exceeds themselves and whose value is caught in either the labor they 
are required to give or the labor they demand.726 As I have argued, this is also the 
condition of structural domination reflected in our relation to plant life. This is not to 
challenge the Marxist version nor is it to suggest that there is a more fundamental, non-
economic formation at work here. What I have attempted to demonstrate is the operation 
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of this structure, revealed in the scenes at natural parks, in travel logs, philosophy texts, 
and in the medium music production. I hope it reveals a deeper sense of the intensity of 
domination and its long historic origins.  
To successfully alter these conditions, for Grossberg, begins with a push away 
from the mechanistic frames of transformation. “Rhetoric,” he writes, “as a field of 
inquiry cannot be conceived of as explicating some particular form of influence, function, 
or causal relation.”727 Thus, it is both as a style of discourse and a theory of discourse, a 
way of writing and a writing about ways. I interpret him to mean that it cannot guarantee 
a blueprint for transformation. In this way the difficulty for rhetoric is not one of 
revelation, where what is made clear is some secret. “Because dialectics is reflexive,” 
writes Grossberg, “one is already involved in the contradiction one is confronting.”728 
Thus acts of criticism may invite the critic to step outside of themselves, only to rush 
right back. Unlike the approach to plant studies introduced by Karban, I have actively 
avoided the temptation to read the thinker inside the laboratory and instead outside as one 
who encounters; I have actively tried to place myself in the encounters with plants, 
getting carried away only to return again to the central contradiction between subject and 
object of knowledge at the center of investigation. In this, way, I am not seeking out what 
the plant says any more than I am trying to cull their resources for my own creative 
musings.  Instead, like Kenneth Burke and Adorno, to think dialectically is to reflect on 
the contradictions as they present themselves to us about us, and one cannot begin any 
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more closely than the everyday encounters with plant life, either historical or 
contemporary. As such I sought out the contractions of human life revealed by how we 
bring the resources of human language to a fundamental nonhuman communicative 
phenomena and grapple with the moments of similarity and difference.  
Grossberg does not see this potential, rather he posits a fundamental difference 
between the “rhetorical critic” as one obsessed with speaker and audience and a “literary 
critic” as one approaching a work on the intrinsic value of the work itself.729 I have 
argued for a dual reversal: to open up literary criticism to its form as address and for 
rhetoric to consider not just the causal effects, but also its intrinsic assumptions about the 
very ground itself. In other words, I have opened up the term speaker and audience 
(which Grossberg thinks is rhetoric’s limit) to the extrahuman, to explore ways in which 
human interpretation is at once limited or constrained by our interpretative capacity as it 
is opened up by the creative capacity to hold the plant in both those terms: it speaks to 
humans and as a result we are addressed by it in as much as we speak to it. The primary 
contradiction is one that works through the hidden structuring limitations of the 
Enlightenment in as much as it recognizes its ongoing influence. Thus I have hoped to 
offer the two correctives Grossberg sought: to reveal the hidden transcendental subject 
and to make the critic as implicated by the concept as it purports to escape.  
Let me conclude by summarizing six principles emerging from my conversation 
with Grossberg’s article: 
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1. DIALECTIC MOTION 
Human reality is constituted by a principle of dialectical motion, a constant struggle 
between subject and object. On the one hand, we seek to experience ourselves as subjects 
of freedom, in part because we experience ourselves as objects of domination. That 
could, in some instances, be described as a freedom from the domination of nature: the 
conditions that make humans feel exposed to threatening conditions of the elements of 
the world around us. It could also be a yearning for a freedom from the domination of 
those tools and economies designed to alleviate those risks, reflected in a contemporary 
antagonism between those who labor and those who exploit. In a third sense, it is also a 
dangerous quest to free ourselves from our own nature, to walk autonomously and 
independently. At the same time, it is also a freedom to embody our nature, our life, in a 
quest to seek the difficult truths of ourselves, to express a creativity experience, and to sit 
in community with all the beings in which we find ourselves in contact, and not just 
humans.  
2. LANGUAGE AS MECHANISM 
Language is often the mechanism we use to navigate this experience. It is one that allows 
us to address our fears and yearnings and to explain and mediate the experience we have 
within ourselves and the world around us. It is a desire to identify ourselves as much as it 
is a desire to eliminate our identifications: to be heard and to hear. It is revealed in 
moments of constellation or figuration, where we bring those phenomena together, as in 
metaphor, or break it apart as in metonymy. As particular features of language, they 
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reference a quality that appears uniquely human, an opportunity to reflect on these motifs 
and to undo them.  
3. RHETORIC AS ADDRESS 
Rhetoric then, as a form of address, is one committed to understanding the relationships 
between speaker and audience. Historically, that has been defined in one direction, as a 
subject-speaker enacting tools on an object-audience to compel movement to act. This 
history already addresses us. But, it is not determined in that it needs to be accepted as 
such. The speaking subject is also addressed by a preceding object: the audience. To take 
up the question of the extrahuman is to open up those categories to understand human 
experience implicated already by an address that emerges before it and to hear something 
as new as it is old.  
4. RHETORICAL CRITICISM AS ORIENTATION  
Rhetorical criticism, as an orientation, situates us at this limit: one who is responsible to 
speak as one who is addressed. We are addressed by the ongoing structures of violence in 
our world—capitalism, slavery, and colonization—and the telos of vitality—of life and 
death—and in our incapacity to fully grasp their gravity and yet motivated by a quest to 
destroy the former and fully embody the latter. The arch will not be characterized by a 
perfect march but better expressed by lessons from our plant companions: cycles of 
seasonal growth, of registers of composition and decomposition, of connection and 
independence.  
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5. AN ETHICS OF LIVING AND DYING 
To situate rhetorical criticism as an ethical orientation is as much an invitation to death as 
an opportunity to live. That is, it asks to let the subject of Enlightenment die in order to 
invite a process of living differently. What that life might look like is already 
immediately apparent and remains to be seen: It is as individual as it is structural; as 
representational as it is phenomenological; as ontological as it is contingent; as real as it 
is fantasy. It appeals to a sense of composition and decomposition, of arrangement and 
entanglement, of complex scales of perception.  
6. MULTIDIMENSIONAL WEATHERING 
 
There is no exit or escape from this multidimensional experience as much as there are 
infinite possibilities for its expression. We ought to hear less from those who have made 
their experiences known and be addressed more by those who have not. We may find 
ourselves transformed in the process, even without knowing it. Even when we fail, the 
call to continue to weather the storm is perhaps the most important address to hear.  
Thus, I have argued we need not be afraid of this dialectic journey any more than we 
should be lax or overwhelmed by its daunting and unending process in rhetorical 
criticism. To demonstrate, let me apply these principles to one last figuration of address: 
Stevie Wonder’s soundtrack to the film Journey Through the Secret Lives of Plants.  
III. Journey through the Secret Life of Plants, an Album Review 
Stevie Wonder’s Journey Through the Secret Lives of Plants, which was recorded 
the same year of Grossberg’s essay, has been the hidden siren guiding this dissertation 
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from the first note.730 The double-sided album composed, performed, produced and 
arranged all by Wonder is a break with the majority of his corpus. As one of Motown’s 
(indeed the 20th century’s) greatest musical thinkers, Wonder was a prolific genius, able 
to play all musical instruments with ease and creative panache.731 Picked up by Berry 
Gordy in 1961, at age 11, Stevie Wonder’s musical career also reads like a biography of 
Motown, Detroit, and by extension, US culture from the 1960’s to contemporary period. 
Because of his ability, he was one of the few Motown artists to break out of its star-
making industry to gain complete creative control over his work. Journey through the 
Secret Life of Plants is the first album he wrote after getting the freedom over his creative 
process.732  
I struggle with this album, even still. Wonder put to sound what Peter Tompkins 
and Christopher Bird’s 1973 book compiled (in what they considered empirical 
evidence), of plant sentience and emotional-cognitive response.733  In 1978, film director 
Walon Green, in collaboration with Wonder, supplemented the popular book with a 97-
                                                
730 Stevie Wonder, Journey Through The Secret Life Of Plants - Vol. 1 & 2. Recorded May 11, 
1992. Motown, 1992, Streaming Audio. Accessed February 2, 2016. 
731 James E. Perone, The Sound of Stevie Wonder: His Words and Music, (Westport, CT: 
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minute documentary and art film.734  They hoped the aesthetic experience might also 
contribute evidence to support a theory of vegetal consciousness and ecological 
interconnection. 
At first, I considered the album, along with many critics, an unenjoyable 
experience in its failure to meet my assumed expectations. According to the short 
encryption in the Encyclopedia of Popular Music:  
Released in 1979, this unusual album failed to connect with Wonder’s sizable 
following. ... Although bizarre lyrics and sound effects occasionally dilute the 
impact of many of the performances, several long instrumentals like the ambient 
soundscape ‘Earth’s Creation’ and the African-flavoured ‘Kesse Ye Lolo De Ye’ 
are some of Wonder’s most adventurous and rewarding compositions. Presumably 
humbled by the poor response to this album, Wonder never again tried to make as 
bold an artistic statement as Journey Through The Secret Life Of Plants.735 
 
Ahmir Thompson, joint-frontrunner of The Roots also shared a poignant story that 
captures much of the audience’s response:  
Like every other Stevie Wonder fan who purchased Songs in the Key of Life, my 
father got Journey Through the Secret Life of Plants the first day it came out. He 
played it at night and I was in bed, so I could hear every song. And the first thing 
he said to me after he listened was, "He blew it."736 
 
Ken Tucker, in his 1980 review for Rolling Stone wrote: 
 
Plucking the exhilarating moments from Journey through the Secret Life of 
Plants is a harrowing, highly subjective task. One person's nectar is another's 
                                                
734 The Secret Life of Plants, directed by Walon Green (1978; Hollywood, Paramount), Amazon 
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736  Ryan Dombal, “Interviews: ?uestlove,” Pitchfork (blog), December 16, 2011, 
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Karo syrup, and the stamens of Wonder's Plants are bursting with both…. we're 
left with a few lovely but overwrought pop melodies, a renewed respect for 
Wonder's technical prowess and an even fiercer desire to hear what he'll create 
when he's unfettered by the banal restrictions of a movie-soundtrack 
assignment.737  
 
The overwhelming sense of failure is one of the first approaches to view this album: his 
freedom is a failure for the audience. Left without the need to produce hits, no one quite 
knew how to listen to what he created.  
But in a second reading, I wanted to recuperate, as others do, Wonder’s technical 
prowess. “For an album whose lyrics explore the organic imagery of plants and flowers,” 
writes David Ingram, “Journey Through The Secret Life of Plants marked the first use of 
a digital sampling synthesizer, the Computer Music Melodian, and was one of the first 
digital recordings.”738 Stephen Holden makes a similar argument:  
A blind man obsessed with "seeing" through music, Wonder used synthesizers to 
imagine the colors of the sun. Synthetic instrumentation became an integral 
textural ingredient of works structured like sweeping murals which bore a 
humanitarian message. Wonder's most spectacular impressionistic work, his 
flawed but interesting "Journey Through the Secret Life of Plants" soundtrack, 
conjures up a magic garden, in which the notes unfurl like tendrils.739 
 
But there is a danger in collapsing the plant into a technical apparatus. In making the 
message human, what is lost is the unique address the plant posed to Wonder. The 
creative meaning of Wonder’s exploration of plants in technical sound is reduced by the 
reverie the audience holds for the technology at the same time they are left befuddled by 
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the composition that challenged their ear. The technical mediation is the magic, for these 
listeners, more than the relations it sets up to confound and transform. All the while, the 
mediation is one that has nothing to do with the botanical world and everything to do 
with the technical components that do the rhetorical work. In other words, audience 
members are enraptured with the digital world and the power it displays over the plant 
bodies.  
There is also a third sense in which I hold Journey through the Secret Life of 
Plants: as vehicle for the expression of and reflection upon difference. Francesca 
Royste’s beautifully written and insightful chapter in her book on queer black sounds 
explores the cultural politics of the performer and his body and voice caught and 
compelled by structures of domination; it’s one I pause my own thinking at.740 She points 
out that Wonder himself provides a different kind of blackness, one situated beyond the 
hypermasculine assumptions of black performers, even as it is constrained by the ears of 
white audiences, like myself. As Royster puts it, Wonder displays, “the sonic and bodily 
performances as opening up the spectrum of black sexuality.”741 As a certain kind of 
queer body—one existing in the conjunction among discourses of race, ability, sexuality, 
and class—Royste argues that Wonder’s album made it okay to “take up the pleasures of 
listening to black music in public space,” of the pleasures of feeling strange, “paying 
                                                
740 Francesca T. Royste, “Stevie Wonder’s ‘Quare’ Teachings and Cross-Species Collaboration 
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close attention and getting lost in music.”742 In this uniquely queer way of listening, the 
album’s failures are exactly its experiment with freedom: the freedom to be ajar from the 
anticipated mold of production and with slight challenges to the ear that could make 
listening, based on the interpretation, enjoyable for its difference. “Wonder’s willingness 
to reimagine that living as a sensual/erotic connection beyond species,” she writes, “is 
one of the ways that he expands the notion of the black genius, releasing him from the 
constraints of black genius and black masculinity as tragedy, as well as from the idea of 
blind sexuality as invisible.”743 In these ways, the album is a triumph in its failure, a 
captured sound freeing in as much as it is contained by the structures of production and 
listening. But, I have to ask, what disservice I might perform for hearing in this way, or 
ask, if really I could ever hear or be truly attuned to the message his work conveys.  
In a fourth way, then, I’m arguing to view Journey Through the Secret Life of 
Plants in relief of each of the previous three iterations—as reception, constitution, and 
cultural practice—with a return to immanent criticism and rhetorical dialectics. As an 
address, Wonder’s reveals a capacity to reflect on human-plant connections, only to have 
those limited. The deeply technical form that mediates all levels of creative enterprises, 
acts as a constraint of freedom in as much as freedom’s expression. But, as an invitation 
to meditate on mediation, it opened up, for me, this dissertation project itself, a practice 
of rendering a multidimensional experience in contradiction.   
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This orientation, I hope, encourages us to ask more long-term questions about the 
structure, compulsion to consume, and the limits of the enjoyment of the promise of 
rhetoric: I am, after all, a white queer listening to Stevie Wonder, caught somewhere 
between subject and object myself. We ought to apply a place of deep skepticism to my 
hearing, which is why I reveal this inspiration only at the end of this journey as a 
reminder that so much more is in play. It is the real constellation guiding the practice. I 
offer this dissertation then as my album review of the Journey through the Secret Life of 
Plants, as an answer to the address to reflect on an overlooked part of Wonder’s cannon 
and my implication in all of its productive elements.  
Criticism informed by the dialectic is ultimately a dimension of balanced 
movement; one that continually cautions not to take too much. In one sense it imagines us 
grounded in a fairy grove, surrounded by the warmth of the sun’s apex peaking through 
the arms of beings we can never understand, whose life exceeds far beyond our capacity 
to know.  In another, it imagines us floating, on a small piece of driftwood on the sea, 
caught up and surrounded by a storm, at risk of drowning but clutching to stay afloat. In 
both, with no guide but the stars, we hold on: caught in an insurmountable current, 
pushing us forward and back, assured of our failure yet hopeful our embrace will be 
balanced enough to weather this wind and rain, grounded enough to know that the sea is 
moving all around us.   
Our goal should be to mobilize a change to orientations of domination that 
brought us here. What I have tried to demonstrate is that a rhetorical orientation that 
acknowledges the ongoing structural elements of domination that comprise the life world, 
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coupled with a deep ethical devotion, might open up that possibility only to remind us not 
to get carried away with our own failed heroics. It attunes us to dialectical dimensions 
and a willingness to travel that journey nonetheless—avoiding the promises of reward 
and return—even if its goal or destination does not exist beyond the recognition of its 
failure.  
 Therefore, I argue, the stress of rhetoric should not be on revealing the truth of the 
terms secret, life, or plant. Instead, rhetoric is the name for the figural journey we take 
with each of those concepts connected to their composite opposites: discernment, death, 
and human. This journey is revealed in the pages of this dissertation figured tenderly as a 
shared breath with the creosote atop a red butte the moment before the cascading rain of 
desert storm hits our bodies, the clutching embrace of the Sipo-Matador, and the 
movement from death to life initiated by the sounds of an Austrian beech played on a 
vinyl record. Their dialectic reverberations, I have offered, is a vibrant rhetorical journey 
though conceptual address.  
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